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ARAB LEAGUE BACKS PRINCE FAHD

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 18-19 Aug 80 p 1

[Text] Mr Chedli Klibi, secretary general of the League of Arab States, made the following declaration public:

"We have respectfully received the appeal of His Highness Prince Fahd supporting holy war to deliver Jerusalem from Israeli occupation.

It is clear that the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia has expressed the deep desire of the Arab nation and its unanimous determination to fight to the bitter end to recover the occupied territories, liberate Jerusalem, and put the Palestinian people in a position to exercise their legitimate national rights, particularly that of building an independent state.

It is also clear that the Israeli challenges to this Arab will are of the kind which will provoke the League states into changing their plans of action and elaborating a strategy which will allow them to face in better circumstances the situation created by the Israeli decision to annex Jerusalem and make it the capital of Israel.

The meetings organized by the League in coming months will be called upon to react to this decision, the first one being the meeting of the ministerial committee set for the end of this month and meant to bring together seven foreign affairs ministers in addition to the League secretary general."

9631
CSO: 4400

KLIBI'S DENUNCIATION OF ISRAELI AGGRESSION AGAINST LEBANON REPORTED

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 18 Sep 80 p 5

[Text] Chedli Klibi, secretary general of the League of Arab States, left Tunis yesterday morning for Beirut, where he and Lebanese leaders, headed by President Elias Sarkis, will study the situation in Lebanon, especially the latest Israeli aggressions perpetrated against Lebanese territory.

Afterwards Mr Klibi will go to Baghdad to attend the first meeting of the Board of Directors of the Arab Industrial Development Organization.

On his departure the secretary general of the Arab League was saluted by Hussein Al Abdallah and Abdelmalek Al Yassine, the permanent delegates from Lebanon and Iraq, respectively, to the Arab League, as well as by the deputy secretaries general and several highly-placed officials of the pan-Arab organization.

During a press conference on Wednesday, at the end of the work of the 74th session of the Council of the League of Arab States, Chedli Klibi announced that "This visit was planned well before the Council was held and was postponed until this week by common agreement with the Lebanese government, because of a heavy schedule."

Chedli Klibi also indicated that he will study with the Lebanese leaders, especially with President Elias Sarkis, the situation prevailing in Lebanon, especially the Zionist aggressions perpetrated in recent weeks against his territory and those being suffered by the Lebanese and their Palestinian guests.

"These talks," he said, "will clarify for the League the path to be followed in order to help Lebanon surmount its difficulties and strengthen its authority over all of its own territory."

On the other hand, Chedli Klibi announced that he was going to Baghdad after his trip to Beirut, to attend the first meeting of the Board of Directors of the Arab Industrial Development Organization, which will establish its headquarters in the Iraqi capital.

The secretary general of the League expressed the hope that he could meet with President Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi foreign affairs minister, Dr Saadoun Hamadi.

To a question about the content of the conversations he had recently in Damascus, Mr Klibi replied that urgent questions required that he make contact with the Syrian government, in particular assertions by Israeli officials, according to whom Syria was preparing an offensive against the Zionist state.

He said he believed that the real meaning of these assertions was that Israel is preparing the ground for a premeditated aggression it is getting ready to launch against Syria on the pretext of preventing an attack by the Syrians.

Chedli Klibi stated that he had also taken advantage of the occasion to talk with President Al Assad and Syrian Foreign Affairs Minister Abdelhalim Khaddam about the plan for union between Syria and Libya, as well as a number of subjects concerning joint Arab action.

Mr Klibi indicated further that in Damascus he had had a talk with Yassar Arafat, the president of the Executive Committee of the PLO, on the subject of the dangers that are threatening the Palestinian resistance, and the modalities of an immediate Arab counter-offensive in case of an Israeli aggression against the Palestinians.

The secretary general of the League on the other hand denied that some participating delegations are opposed to furnishing any aid at all to the Eritrean people, adding that the Council believed only that those organizations are adopting a common position so that the League of Arab States can have only one interlocutor to face.

Mr Klibi also said he was concerned about the events taking place on the Iran-Iraq borders, and that he hoped the difference between the two countries would not degenerate into an armed conflict.

On the subject of the possibility of establishing coordination between the League of Arab States and the Islamic Conference Organization for the purpose of finding a settlement to the Iran-Iraq difference, Mr Klibi revealed that he had agreed with Habib Chatty, the secretary general of that organization, on the need to establish such coordination in all areas of common interest.

To a question about the position of the Council of the League concerning the existence of foreign bases in some Arab countries, the secretary general indicated that the Council had charged him with making the necessary contacts and studying the record in the interest of preserving the Arab national interests and respecting the charter of the League of Arab States.

Chedli Klibi in conclusion made it known that several heads of delegations on many occasions exalted the efforts deployed by the secretary general since the League headquarters were transferred to Tunis, just as they were pleased with the work accomplished by the secretary general personally toward bringing about the growth of the structures related to the general secretariat and the League of Arab States.

KLIBI APPEALS TO WORLD COMMUNITY TO PRESERVE PEACE IN MID-EAST

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 15-16 Sep 80 p 3

[Text] Chedli Klibi, secretary general of the League of Arab States, has issued an urgent warning of Israeli preparations for an attack on Lebanon.

In a speech pronounced before the 74th regular session of the Council of the League of Arab States, which began Saturday evening in Tunis, Chedli Klibi stated that he had disturbing information telling of Israel's preparations for an attack on Lebanon.

Klibi, who met with Syrian President Hafiz al-Assad and Yasser Arafat, president of the PLO, in Damascus on Friday, made an appeal to the great powers, urging them to use all "means of dissuasion to prevent these events" and to "face their responsibilities so that the situation in the Middle East is not further complicated."

Klibi stated that "the information in our possession is disturbing. It tells of Israeli preparations for once again presenting the international community with a *fait accompli*, whether it be achieved directly or through local agents acting in its behalf. We cannot remain silent, waiting for the irreparable to occur at the expense of Lebanon's sovereignty, the forces of the revolution or any other Arab territory.

"We must appeal to nations to assume their responsibilities for maintaining the peace, to use suitable means of dissuasion to prevent these events before it is too late. We ask that they meet their responsibilities so that the situation in the Middle East is not complicated further, making it even more difficult to settle the problem."

The secretary general of the Pan-Arab organization also emphasized the Arab nations' need to act so that Israel will be certain that if it undertakes a new act of aggression, it will find itself facing the entire solidary and united Arab nation."

Klibi also expressed satisfaction with the new union of Syria and Libya.

After hailing "efforts undertaken by these two brother countries to combine their means and build solidarity," Klibi expressed the hope that "this new experiment will be undertaken judiciously so that it will be assured of success."

For his part, Farouk Kaddoumi, head of the Political Department of the Palestine Liberation Organization, emphasized the "deterioration of the situation in the Middle East due to Israel's terrorist practices of penetrating occupied Arab territories and the annexation of the Holy City."

Kaddoumi, who is presiding over this session of the Council of the Arab League, condemned the Camp David accords, which have had "very harmful effects on the Arab world, entirely cutting Egypt off from the Arab world of which it was the main force."

11,464

CSO: 4400

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

KOOLI'S STATEMENT OF SUPPORT FOR PLO REPORTED

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 18 Sep 80 p 4

[Text] Mongi Kooli, director of the PSD [Destourian Socialist Party] and ministerial delegate to the prime minister, talked yesterday morning at the Party House in the Kasbah with Farouk Kaddoumi, head of the political department of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

In a statement the Palestinian leader indicated that he had discussed with Mr Kooli "the Middle East crisis and the tension that prevails in the region because of the negative repercussions the Camp David accords have had on the Arab world and because of the terrorist practices of the Zionist enemy in the occupied territories.

"The interview also dealt with the necessity of strengthening solidarity and joint Arab action, to win more support from friendly countries and peoples, and so that the Palestinian cause will remain at the center of the concerns of the international community," Mr Kaddoumi added, and he noted in conclusion that Mongi Kooli had reaffirmed Tunisia's support for the just struggle the Palestinian people are waging for realization of their national objectives and the establishment of an independent state.

Attending the talk were Hakam Balaoui, representing the PLO in Tunis, and Sadok Fayala, in charge of foreign relations for the PSD Board.

8946

CSO: 4400

HAWATIMAH STRESSES NEED TO OPPOSE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENTS

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 27 Aug 80 p 17

[Report on interview with Nayif Hawatimah, Secretary General of Democratic Front for Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), by Khalil al-Taqi, in Damascus; date not given]

[Text] DFLP Secretary General Nayif Hawatimah told AL-QABAS that in cooperation with some Arab regimes, Europe is trying to promote a Western European initiative which would be tantamount to a Trojan horse to rescue the Camp David parties from their deadly dilemma.

He stressed the need to convene the Palestine National Council as quickly as possible, today and not tomorrow, in order to adopt a resolute, clear Palestinian position towards the plots and conspiracies aimed at extricating the Camp David agreements from the dead end they have gotten into by virtue of our people's struggle within the occupied homeland and outside it and the struggles of all Arab steadfastness forces. The council would issue its verdict on all the dubious schemes which are pouring out of the Camp David mill.

It is known that the Palestine National Council will hold its fifteenth session on 4 September, and that the Palestinian leaders have begun holding intensified meetings to prepare for this session.

At the beginning of his talk with AL-QABAS, Mr Hawatimah said, "Our region is experiencing some very complicated circumstances. After the parties to the Camp David conspiracy failed to carry out the program for their agreements throughout 1979 and during the first half of 1980, by virtue of the struggle and steadfastness of our people in the occupied areas and the struggle and perseverance of the national Lebanese-Palestinian front, and by virtue of the unanimous national Palestinian rejection of the agreements and the autonomy plan and insistence on our people's right to return, determine their own destiny and establish an independent state, side by side with the struggle of the Arab steadfastness forces-- after all of this, American imperialism, the Zionist enemy and al-Sadat

are continuing their offensive against the Palestinian revolution and the Arab liberation movement, to rescue the Camp David agreements from the failure they have met with.

"Here Western Europe and some of the Arabs are trying to promote a Western European initiative, and are preparing themselves to be a Trojan horse for the Camp David parties.

"In order to further their goals, they are trying to transform Lebanon into a heated arena in the face of the Palestinian revolution and its allies from the Lebanese patriotic, nationalist and progressive movement and Syria. On the other hand, they are trying to concentrate their efforts to push western regimes into taking other steps for the benefit of extricating Camp David from its mortal predicament."

The DFLP's secretary general added, "We can say that under the present circumstances we are struggling on a number of fronts. The first is consolidating the phased patriotic, national program, rallying all revolutionary groups and the entire Arab national movement around it, insisting that the central point of this program be return, self-determination and an independent state, and thwarting all attempts to prevent this.

"Therefore, the untiring struggle to consolidate the phased program, protect and anchor national unity within the context of the PLO, and promote a unity which includes the revolution in the occupied lands within the context of the Palestinian National Front, is the most effective weapon in our people's struggle."

"Our immediate struggle is concentrating on achieving a union of revolutionary forces in the occupied areas within the context of the Palestinian National Front, inasmuch as this front is a tool for the principal struggle of the PLO within Israel, as stipulated in the resolutions of the fourteenth session of the Palestine National Council."

"The second front in this stage of our struggle is reacting to attempts to entangle our people's rights, and their sole representation by the PLO, in dubious projects, the most recent of which is the European initiative, supplementary to the Camp David plot, whereby the Western European states, after the failure of the so-called autonomy talks, are trying to extricate the Camp David agreements from their dead end by means of an initiative based on a new resolution issued by the Security Council recalling the clauses of Resolution 242 and adding a clause about the Palestinian people's rights couched in obscure, easily stretched phrases so as to evade the effective, tangible standards which deal with recognizing the national rights of the Palestinian people, the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of our people, and the Palestinian people's right to return to their country and determine their destiny within the context of an independent state.

"In its initiative, Western Europe stopped at a very limited understanding of the Palestinian rights, inasmuch as it was responding to the concepts of the Camp David framework and was paving the way for shattering the isolation of the al-Sadat regime, all the while constituting an attractive factor for some Arabs."

Mr Hawatimah told AL-QABAS, "In Lebanon, where we are anticipating the escalation of Israeli and American political and military operations and pressure, we are confronting these hostile tendencies with a greater alliance with the Lebanese patriotic, nationalist and progressive movement and Syria."

"Our Palestinian revolution also requires vigilance for the implementation of the Tripoli Steadfastness Summit resolutions, so that the Arab steadfastness movement can shift over from the defensive to the offensive against the Camp David agreements."

"In confronting all of this, we are continuing our efforts to escalate and expand our struggle in all its various forms--in the military sense, by escalating our armed struggle quantitatively and qualitatively within the occupied territory against the enemy's organizations and its vital economic installations and its military presence and its settlements, along with increased mass uprisings and other forms of struggle."

"This also requires spurring our military struggle on all the Arab fronts according to the Rabat and Baghdad resolutions, as well as defending our revolution's presence on the Lebanese scene and reacting to Israeli aggression, which has become increasingly ferocious during the last few months, by raising our vigilance and readiness, reacting to aggression, developing means of response, and ensuring all forms of protection for the battlefields of the revolution and for the masses of our people in the tent camps."

"On the political level, we must expose all solutions which encroach on our people's rights--solutions which have all ended in failure. Without the recognition of the proven national rights of our Palestinian people to return, determine their own destiny, and build an independent state with the leadership of the PLO, peace and stability will never be established in the region. At this stage we have to struggle to transform the sweeping failure with which the autonomy talks ended into permanent failure."

Relations With Syria

Speaking of Palestinian-Syrian relations, Mr Hawatimah said, "Relations are good between the various Palestinian resistance groups and Syria. We are two parties in the national perseverance front, and our relations are built on the common national struggle against the racist, imperialist, Zionist enemy and the Camp David plots. Relations with Syria are based on frankness and clearness through dialog and continual meetings."

"Also, we and Syria stand together in the hot front line with the enemy, and in the struggle against the Egyptian regime and the capitulatory, compromising Camp David agreements directed at the entire Arab nation in general and against Syria and our Palestinian people in particular."

"The Syrian and Palestinian fronts are the cornerstone of Arab steadfastness, without which there is no steadfastness or reaction. Perseverance will be determined by shoulder-to-shoulder struggle with the Syrian and Palestinian front, and strategic, political, military and economic integration among them."

"In this particular stage, when the efforts by American imperialism and its allies to beautify the Camp David agreements, extricate them from their impasse, and extend them to other nearby fronts are intensifying, especially through Western European attempts to consummate the agreements, we need to consolidate the alliance, straighten up the ranks, and continue the dialog and the meetings between Syria and the Palestine revolution, in order to expedite the application of the fourth steadfastness front summit's resolutions and promote the various ways of confronting the Camp David agreements in order to defeat and topple them."

"Furthermore, continued consolidation of the joint struggling alliance between Syria and the Lebanese patriotic, national and progressive movement and the Palestinian resistance groups is the real entrypoint to reacting to the Camp David parties' plots against Lebanon."

In his talk with AL-QABAS, Mr Hawatimah stressed that "an important part of the joint concern on the part of Syria and the Palestinian revolution must be concentrated on achieving higher degrees of coordination between them and the national movement and the Lebanese patriotic, progressive and national forces, in order to ensure joint security for Syria, the Palestinian revolution and Lebanon, especially since our collective experience affirms that the Camp David parties have plotted, and are still plotting, to transform Lebanon into an arena which would exhaust Syria, the Palestinian revolution and the Lebanese national progressive forces, preparatory to weakening these combined forces, imposing a plot to Zionize Lebanon, and subsequently dragging it, as a second circle, into the framework of the capitulatory Camp David solution."

Mr Hawatimah spoke of the plot to which Syria is exposed, saying, "Syria's steadfastness in the face of the Camp David agreements, and its insistence on overthrowing these agreements, explains the American-Zionist-reactionary offensive against Syria, whereby the Camp David parties are working to arrange and embrace all acts of mass or individual sabotage, murder and assassination in Syria. All of this is clearly shown in the timing of this plot, which followed Syria's rejection of the capitulatory, low, shameful agreements."

"In the face of this offensive, the Arab steadfastness forces must support the battlegrounds on the front lines against the Zionist-imperialist enemy, especially the Syrian and Palestinian fronts."

"The stiffening of circumstances on the steadfastness front necessitates the stiffening of the Syrian front and its political, military and economic reinforcement in the face of the attack by the imperialists and reactionaries, who intend to direct a strong blow to the struggle of all the Arab steadfastness forces by striking at Syria, in view of the important role which Syria plays in reacting to the big plot."

The Soviet Stand

Mr Hawatimah ended his talk with AL-QABAS by evaluating the stands of the Soviet Union vis-a-vis fateful Arab causes, especially the Palestinian cause. "Principally, the Soviet Union is the major supporter of the struggle of our Palestinian people and the Arab nation to liberate the occupied Arab territories and ensure the rights of the Palestinian Arab people to return to their homeland and determine their own destiny in the context of an independent Palestinian state."

"The Soviet Union is also the major supporter of the Arab nation's struggle for liberation, full independence, and social progress."

"This is what the fourth Arab steadfastness front summit clearly defined and specified when it took stock of the friendly front and the hostile front."

"All the time the Soviet Union was standing at the head of the friendly front, on the side of all the peoples' just patriotic and national issues, America was standing at the head of the hostile front, on the side of imposing surrender on the Arab nation."

"Over the last 30 years our Arab nation has learned through experience who is its friend and who is its enemy. Therefore, the steadfastness front has stressed that there is no neutral ground between friends and enemies."

"The steadfastness front's decision to promote relations with the Soviet Union, so as to strengthen our nation's ability to overthrow Camp David and ensure Arab rights, was an expression of just how necessary it is to develop relations with our nation's strategic allies in its struggle for liberation, progress and unity, and to expose propaganda aimed at damaging Arab-Soviet relations and equating friends with enemies under the false cover of neutrality."

8559

CSO: 4802

ISLAMIC CONFERENCE APPEALS TO CHRISTIAN WORLD

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 21 Aug 80 p 5

[Text] On the occasion of the Day of Islamic Solidarity with the Palestinian people, Mr Habib Chatty, secretary general of the Islamic Conference, made the following statement:

"On this same day during the year 1389 of the Hegira, the criminal hands of Zionism reached out to defile one of the most exalted places of Islam by setting fire to the El Aqsa mosque in defiance of the nation of Islam. Today, what's more, and 12 years after that hateful sacrilege, Israel is annexing the Arab part of Jerusalem and making that city its capital, thereby succeeding in showing the highest disregard for the feelings of two billion Moslems and Christians throughout the world.

The nation of Islam, which considers Jerusalem an integral part of the Islamic homeland, is determined to face up to the religious and racial war Zionism is declaring against it. It reaffirms its determination to carry on the struggle to deliver Jerusalem from Zionist occupation.

The Jerusalem Committee, which recently met in Casablanca, has given voice to the determination of Islamic countries to work by any and all means in an effort to make sure the heroic struggle of the Palestinian people goes on and to give total and unlimited support to this struggle until Jerusalem is liberated and a Palestinian state is established.

Given the present serious circumstances, we salute the Palestinian people who in Jerusalem and in all the territories of occupied Palestine are heroically resisting the policy of terror, repression, genocide and banishment carried out by Israel. We affirm to them the respect and regard of the nation of Islam which supports and backs them in their holy struggle for the liberation of Palestine and Jerusalem under the leadership of the PLO.

We issue an appeal to the nation of Islam, which is showing Islamic solidarity with the Palestinian people on this occasion of the commemoration of the El Aqsa mosque fire, to work to translate into deeds its

anger and bitterness, and to take serious and effective initiatives to free the El Aqsa mosque from Zionist occupation and to alleviate the misfortunes Moslems are subjected to.

The Islamic Conference organization, set up just after the El Aqsa mosque fire, is also issuing an appeal to the Christian world to save Christ's native land as well as to all peoples who love peace and justice, to stand up to Israel's arrogance and its scorn for all feeling, for international law, for human rights, and for the holy places in occupied Palestine."

9631

CSO: 4400

USE OF MODERN WEAPONS AGAINST ENEMY DEEMED IMMINENT

Beirut AL-HURRIYAH in Arabic 1 Sep 80 pp 23-25

[Interview with Lt Col Mamduh Nufal, Commander of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, by Sami Shahin; date not given]

[Text] In an important interview with AL-HURRIYAH Magazine, the commander of the armed forces of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Lt Col Mamduh Nufal evaluated from a military point of view the Israeli enemy's operation in al-Shaqif, Arnon and Kafr Tabanit. He also dealt in general with the military situation of the resistance in Lebanon: its positive points and its gaps. He warned against broader Israeli raids and eruptions coordinated by Israel with the Phalangists and the Deuxieme Bureau [Lebanese Government Intelligence Agency].

The text of the questions and Brother Mamduh's answers follow.

The Enemy Chose a Style Closer to That of Guerrilla Warfare

[Question] What is your evaluation of the battle of al-Shaqif, Arnon and Kafr Tabanit and of the overall recent Israeli military operations in the South?

[Answer] The al-Shaqif, Arnon, Kafr Tabanit battle is considered one of the most notable defense operations in which the forces of the Palestinian Revolution and the Lebanese National Movement were involved successfully. It has been known for quite some time that the enemy has been launching a series of attacks against the forces of the Palestinian Revolution and the Lebanese National Movement on Lebanese territory and especially in the South. [It is also known] that the enemy has pursued in these operations a style that is closer to guerilla warfare than it is to regular attacks. The enemy chose this kind of operations against the forces of the revolution and the Lebanese National Movement after realizing through the battle of the south that took place in March 1978 and the series of attrition operations that were launched by the air force throughout 1979 that the effect of such operations on the forces

that oppose the Palestinian Revolution has become limited and that the forces of the revolution are now able to coexist and to live with this kind of operation. This kind of operations gave the forces of the revolution and of the national movement an Arab and an international moral position and of the national movement an Arab and an international moral position that helped reveal and disclose the terrorist practices of the enemy against the Palestinian people and the Lebanese people.

At that time, this kind of operations aroused world public opinion against Zionist military aggression, and, accordingly, the enemy chose this kind of guerrilla offensive operation, thinking that with this kind of operation he would be able to inflict major, direct material losses on the forces of the revolution and the National Lebanese Movement. The enemy thought that with this kind of operation he can avoid the political uproar and the international political reactions to his aggressive acts. With these operations the enemy has also been trying to establish the artificial image of the ideal, invincible Israeli soldier. The enemy has been trying to arouse terror in the ranks of Palestinian and Lebanese citizens, and he has also been trying to influence the morale of the forces of the revolution and the national movement. With this kind of operation the enemy has also been trying to raise the morale of his troops and to provide an opportunity for some of his troop formations to carry out the necessary drills and exercises to become acquainted with the terrain of the south in preparation for subsequent operations that would be undertaken by the forces of the Zionist enemy.

The Enemy Was Forced To Enter into Serious Combat

Hence we view the al-Shaqif, Arnon and Kafr Tabanit operation to be part of the open war of attrition against the forces of the revolution; it is a war that has been going on for a long time. We can say in this defensive battle that the forces of the revolution and of the Lebanese National Movement forced the enemy to engage in serious combat. This had not happened in the al-Qasimiyah operation and in the operations that had preceded it such as the landings that took place along the beach and in the area of Dayr al-Zahrani. The fighters of the revolution and the Lebanese National Movement succeeded in forcing the enemy to engage in serious combat for more than 4 full hours, and they also succeeded in inflicting heavy losses on the enemy's ranks. This may be considered a preliminary step that was essential for the forces of the revolution and the National Movement, [enabling them] to shift from a state of passive defense to one of active defense in preparation for regaining the initiative and the offensive against the forces of the enemy by means of launching offensive, combat operations inside the occupied homeland.

Through this success, the forces of the revolution are reaffirming that they are capable of taking the initiative and that they can embark upon this kind of operation, that is, launching a raid and responding to a raid. The forces of the revolution had launched a series of operations

that were more successful than the Israeli military operations which the enemy had recently carried out. The operations at Ma'alot, Bisan, Nahariya and al-Khalsah, as well as other military operations that were carried out by the fighters of the Palestinian Revolution in past years, were more successful than the operations that were carried out by the enemy in the area of al-Sarafand, al-Sa'diyyat, Dayr al-Zahrani or the Arnon Citadel. The al-Shaqif, Arnon, Kafr Tabanit battle occurs in the context of the Camp David plan which seeks to exhaust and to weaken the forces of the Palestinian Revolution.

The defense combat capability of the forces of the revolution and the Lebanese National Movement proved to have grown and improved during the al-Shaqif, Arnon and Kafr Tabanit battle. Small groups of the revolution's troops in a number of defense positions were able to foil an attack by an Israeli force which was thought to have been a battalion that was supported by the best Israeli troops. This was equal to five times the Palestinian and Lebanese defense troops. Despite the superiority that the enemy enjoyed in equipment, materiel and numbers these small groups were able to inflict heavy losses on the enemy who acknowledged that he had sustained 15 injuries even though information from the battlefield and from elsewhere indicated that the enemy's losses were many times that figure.

But the al-Shaqif, Arnon, Kafr Tabanit battle also revealed numerous basic and secondary weaknesses in the work of the forces of the revolution and the National Movement. Among these weaknesses was the fact that the defense combat capability of the forces of the revolution and of the Lebanese National Movement was still in need of further development and progress. The battle affirmed that the revolutionary forces were better at offensive operations than they were at defensive operations. The groups that had started out from the rear mobilization centers in the direction of the battlefield succeeded in entering the battle and in directing a series of effective blows against the forces of the enemy on the battlefield and during combat.

The al-Shaqif, Arnon, Kafr Tabanit battle also affirmed that it would have been possible to inflict heavier losses among the enemy's ranks had there been relatively larger reserve troops under the control of the local command and had there also been a firing plan that had been previously coordinated with the forward defense units and with the artillery formations and the rear support weapons. It may also be said that this battle did affirm that when the Palestinian or Lebanese soldier can make a political decision to use everything he has to resist and to oppose [the enemy], this soldier is capable of taking action, of influencing the struggle and of confronting the forces of the enemy regardless of the size of these forces, their level of training and the kind of equipment they own. Our troops were not able during the battle to complete the second part of the mobilization position which is represented in forcing the enemy to leave some of his casualties and his wounded on the battlefield.

The battle revealed that the defensive combat in which the forces of the revolution were engaged was not carried out according to a defense plan that covered all locations -- a plan in which the defensive task of every one of these positions was determined in the context of a single plan for all positions in the area. The battle proved that the defense forces had waged their battle without serious fortifications that would have helped them withstand for a longer period and would have spared them the airplane raids and the pounding of the artillery. The battle also revealed that telecommunications between the forces of the revolution and the forces of the National Movement were poor. Besides a shortage in equipment, the communications devices were not standardized into a single network. At the decisive moments when the circumstances of the battle required that the area of operations be lit, there was no illumination because of a shortage in flares and other devices. The battle affirmed the importance of amassing larger forces in one location. It affirmed that scattered positions that have few people do not help oppose large attacking forces even though they may reduce losses during air raids.

The battle revealed the importance of having the fighters of the Palestinian Revolution and the Lebanese National Movement, who are working in the same area, acquainted with each other's positions. It affirmed the importance of the availability of air defense agents on all the lines of combat.

In addition, essential military equipment is to be made available to enable the fighters to prepare themselves in advance and to put them in a state of alert before the forces of the enemy advance. Advanced equipment and night vision devices can enable an entrenched soldier on the front lines to discover enemy forces advancing on foot. Besides, the battle affirmed the necessity of reconsidering the defense system that the forces of the revolution and of the National Movement are following. This system is based on assigning combat duties on one line and on one boundary to forces whose training has been dissimilar and whose organization and formation are different. We believe that dividing the confrontation front with the enemy, whether that be the coast which extends from Beirut to south of Tyre and also the areas of the north, or the confrontation front which extends from Tyre to Jabal al-Shaykh and to the liens and military boundaries, and making every platoon of the Palestinian Revolution bear the responsibility for defending one of them, does represent an advanced step on the road to organizing defenses that are stronger and more organized. Such a distribution of responsibilities actually helps develop the forms of defense of the Palestinian Resistance.

By determining the responsibility of every one of the revolution's platoons and by determining the duties of every platoon in defending this or that line, this platoon or the other will find itself facing a moral and a material mission that would force it to place major capabilities to develop the defense on the line that had been determined for it. This [defense mode] would also create forces whose training, armaments and furnishings are unified and subject to one, clear and specific combat order. The

al-Shaqif, Arnon, Kafr Tabanit battle indicated that the variety and the difference in the kind and level of training and armaments of the forces that are defending the area as well as the weak level of coordination between them had a limited negative effect which did not contribute to the development or improvement of the standard of defense from that of a dynamic, positive defense to that of pursuing and hunting the enemy. Besides all this, any objective evaluation of the al-Shaqif, Arnon, Kafr Tabanit battle cannot but take note of the heroism and bravery of the defenders. The fact that the enemy amassed this number and this kind of troops to attack the fighters of the revolution and the Lebanese National Movement on this line does in itself represent a testimonial for them--for the fact that they do represent an effective force that carries weight in the ongoing struggle with the enemy.

The Enemy Will Escalate; We Have To Improve Coordination and Effectiveness

[Question] Do you expect Israeli Military attacks to escalate and Israeli tactics to develop? What are the measures that the joint forces are taking to confront this escalation and these tactics?

[Answer] Commenting on the al-Shaqif, Arnon, Kafr Tabanit battle Menahem Begin said, "We will continue our military operations, and we will maintain our preemptive strikes against the saboteurs. We will not wait for them to carry out their operations against our settlements and our military positions before we direct our strikes against them. We will rather continue to strike against them wherever possible." This candid, obvious position enables us to say that the enemy will certainly repeat his military attacks against the forces of the revolution and the national movement. Besides, we expect more blows and more attacks because the parties to Camp David are seeking to force the Palestinian Revolution to capitulate, and they are seeking to force the revolution and the PLO to abandon the national objectives of the Palestinian people.

A state of capitulation and surrender cannot be forced on the Palestinian people unless the vital, fighting force of the Palestinian Revolution is shattered and the Arab positions of opposition and resistance, especially Syria, are shattered. The military operations that are expected may assume various forms. In addition to guerrilla operations and mobile ambushes behind the lines, we can expect the enemy to resume his heavy use of the air force. We can also expect the enemy to use the artillery to force the largest possible number of Palestinians and Lebanese who are residents of South Lebanon to leave so as to create more problems for the revolution and for the Lebanese National Movement. In addition, the enemy will probably undertake special, relatively broad operations in which naval forces would participate with paratroopers who would be transported by air and by the air force itself. We also have to expect the enemy to carry out some operations against the rear command positions and offices and against the leading figures of the Palestinian Revolution and the Lebanese National Movement.

The measures that are taken by these joint forces to confront these escalations and these new tactics are still to a large extent dependent on the measures that are taken by each one of the revolution's platoons. Joint measures and tactics come in second place, not because they are less important, but rather because this is realistic. This most certainly places us in a situation that is more complicated, more dangerous and more difficult with regard to confrontation. It places us in front of joint military and security missions, the most important of which is to upgrade the standard of military and security coordination among the various forces of the revolution's platoons. This means defense lines are to be reconsidered, and joint military commands on regional and linear levels are to be given more authority. More capabilities are to be allocated to them so they can play their leadership role. This also requires that the greatest energies and capabilities be amassed in the defense battle against the enemy to force him from his offensive position into a defensive one.

In this regard, the military command of the revolution did pause after the al-Shaqif, Arnon, Kafr Tabanit battle to take preliminary measures that would relatively strengthen the leadership role of the joint military command. The command also took a few preliminary steps to amass and mobilize the energies of our people on the Lebanese scene; it subjected the students of secondary and preparatory schools to compulsory training. A serious effort has also been approved to furnish some of the requirements and the technical equipment, which if well used and distributed can provide better combat opportunities for the fighters of the revolution and the national movement. I believe that the moment is at hand for using few of the kinds of modern and heavy equipment which the forces of the revolution have--and our troops are among them. We cannot continue [to act as] spectators, watching the Israeli artillery and air force bombard the camps of our people and the Lebanese villages at a time when we have effective weapons that can reach the Zionist villages, cities and settlements and can inflict tremendous destruction on them. The fact that the enemy continues to bombard us with his artillery compels us to respond in a similar manner with all the kinds of heavy or light weapons that we have.

Phalangists and Deuxieme Bureau in Collusion with Israel

[Question] Do you think there is a possibility that the Phalangists and the other client forces may enter the line of battle during the next few months against the resistance and coordinate their entry with Israel? What are the possibilities for this, and what are the means for confronting it?

[Answer] The Phalangists and the other client forces have entered into the line of battle; this is an existing fact and not a possibility and a supposition. It is in front of the magnitude with which the Phalangists and the client forces will enter the line during the coming period that we can pause, inquire and make a careful investigation. The events and the details of executing the Arnon, al-Shaqif, Kafr Tabanit battle--and

before the battle of al-Qadisiyah and most of the Israeli military operations that were waged against the Palestinian Revolution and the Lebanese National Movement, such as the landing at al-Sa'dyat, at Dayr al-Zalirani and at al-Sarafand--affirm that the other reactionary client forces on Lebanese territory--and this includes the Phalangists--played a role of assisting Israel. Most certainly the clients of the Deuxieme Bureau and the other client forces played and are still playing an intelligence role, and they are helping the forces of the enemy. The coordination between Israel, the Phalangists, the Deuxieme Bureau and the other client forces on Lebanon's territory has been in existence for a long time, to say nothing of the role of the client Sa'd Haddad who not only offered aid and support to the enemy and facilitated the movement of the Israeli troops, but he also participated directly throughout the past period in shelling the positions of the revolution and the national movement in the south.

In the next few months we expect an escalation in the role played by the Phalangists and the other client forces, and we expect a development in their level of participation; [we expect this escalation and development to take place] in the military operations they will carry out against the resistance and against the Lebanese National Movement. Preliminary information indicates that there is more than an Israeli motorized infantry brigade in the area of Muthalath al-Matallah, Dayr Maymas-Marja'yun. Besides this motorized infantry brigade, the enemy's forces also have an artillery regiment in that area; this has been confirmed by the UN emergency troops. This concentration of Israeli troops is most certainly a preparatory step that is being made to carry out a few broad operations against the Palestinian Resistance and the Lebanese National Movement in the South and especially on the al-'Ayshiyah, al-Jarmaq, al-Rayhan line and on the al-Nabatiyyah, Arnon, Kafr Tabanit line.

We are not to think it unlikely that the Zionist enemy will in the next few months make a limited military push when circumstances permit for the purpose of occupying these areas and delivering them to the troops of Sa'd Haddad, or at least internationalizing them or delivering them to the UN forces so that the client Sa'd Haddad can expand the sphere of influence of his state and so that the client Haddad can have greater opportunities not only for geographic expansion, but also for attempting to establish communications with the Phalangists and with the other client forces inside Lebanon, and especially in the area of Jazir. It is Arab weakness and alliance that is tempting many Israeli generals to carry out such an operation. Besides, Israel has always dreamed and wanted to remove the resistance forces, and especially their heavy weapons, from [positions where] it would be possible for them to shell the settlements. It is known throughout this area--that is, the al-Nabatiyyah sector and the eastern sector--that the forces of the revolution and of the national movement can reach the enemy's settlements and principal cities with their heavy weapons. With this operation the enemy too would be able to exert

further military and moral pressure on Syria and to lure its forces, which are in Lebanon, and force them into a battle whose time and place he himself determines. The purpose of such a battle would be to deal a blow to these troops, especially in the western al-Biqā' region, and in the other areas as well where they hinder the Phalangists from expanding and from communicating with Sa'd Haddad's state.

When the situation is evaluated in the next few months, what happened in the eastern area in July must also be taken into consideration. The 7 July operation which was carried out by the Fascist Phalangist party against its historical ally, the National Liberal Party, clearly indicates that the Facist Phalangist party is determined not only to control its area, that is the al-Kantun area which is represented by East Beirut and the areas of Kasrawan al-Jabal, but it is also determined, as it proclaims daily in the words of Bashir al-Jumayyil and Pierre al-Jumayyil and the leaders and commanders of the Phalangist party "to liberate Lebanon from all foreigners." By foreigners, the Phalangist party means the Palestinian Resistance, Syria and the Lebanese national and progressive forces. As we know the Phalangist party did establish a close relationship with Israel during the years of the Lebanese civil war and afterwards. We also know that Israel is using all its capabilities and its energies to develop the combat capability of the Phalangist party and the client forces in Lebanon. Israel relies on them as basic forces inside Lebanon to direct blows against the forces of the revolution and the Arab deterrent forces.

Bashir al-Jumayyil's Statements and the Anticipated Explosions

In this context we believe that the next few months will bring about explosions on a broad scale. The parties to Camp David and all the hostile forces are preparing for a heated round of combat which they hope will be decisive. They hope it will exhaust the forces of the revolution and of Syria and make them incapable of rejecting the European initiatives and the other initiatives that are complementary to Camp David. In this context too we are not to think it improbable that the forces of the Phalangists and the other client forces will launch a series of operations against the forces of the revolution and the Lebanese National Movement in Beirut and in al-Jabal. The statements that Bashir al-Jumayyil made in the last few days, holding the Palestinian forces responsible for some of the explosions that occurred in the eastern region, indicate, if they indicate anything at all, that there are deliberate hostile intentions against the resistance and against the Lebanese National Movement.

The means for confronting these possible developments lie first in strengthening the Palestinian-Syrian-Lebanese national relationship and establishing that relationship on clear and firm bases. This would enable these three powers not only to oppose this plot which is supported and put into action by the parties to Camp David, it will also enable them to strike at it and to abort it. Confronting this hostile plan also requires

that the forces of the Palestinian Revolution conduct a larger scale mobilization of their material and human capabilities and their military combat energies to prepare for confronting all expected developments and possibilities. It also requires that the Lebanese National Movement prepare its own military forces for such possibilities so it would assume its pioneering role in opposing [the enemy] and in leading the battle against the client forces. In addition, the energies of the masses are to be mobilized, and their level of preparedness to sacrifice and to confront all possibilities is to be improved. This is to be done not only by stopping all excesses, but also basically by giving the masses a clear and a specific political position that would place them face to face with their enemies and side by side with their allies and friends. Besides their defensive combat missions the escalation of the armed struggle and the expansion of specific combat operations remain the more prominent missions for which the forces of the Palestinian Revolution are responsible.

8592

CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

ARAB LEAGUE COUNCIL MEETING--The 74th regular session of the Council of Ministers of the League of Arab States began its work in Tunis yesterday afternoon, attended by Qais Abdul Munim Al-Zawawi, Oman's minister of state for foreign affairs, Farouk Kaddoumi, head of the Political Department of the Palestine Liberation Organization, and Chedli Klibi, secretary general of the League of Arab States. Qais Abdul Munim Al-Zawawi, who presided over the 73d session of the Council, delivered an opening address in which he emphasized that the current phase in which the Arab nation and the Palestinian cause are going through requires that the Arab nation unify its efforts to consolidate joint Arab action in the service of Arab causes. He expressed satisfaction with the fact that Palestine will preside over the 74th session for the first time in the history of the League. He then turned over the presidency to Farouk Kaddoumi. Following the opening session, the Council of the League of Arab States held a closed meeting devoted to the adoption of the agenda for the session. Work will resume at 1000 hours this morning in meetings of committees formed by the League Council, to wit: the political committee, the economic committee, the social and cultural committee, the administrative and financial committee and the legal committee. [Text] [Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 14 Sep 80 p 5] 11,464

CSO: 4400

NORTH AFRICAN AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

MAURITANIAN-ALGERIAN COMMISSION—The fifth session of the Mauritanian-Algerian joint commission for cooperation ended this evening in Nouakchott. The meetings of this session centered on trade relations, mines, mining research, sugar refinery, oil refinery, fishing and maritime transport. It has been agreed to set up a Mauritanian-Algerian company for maritime navigation and to revive the Mauritanian-Algerian company for sea fishing. It has also been agreed on the need to exchange information and experiences in the fields of culture and information in addition to Algerian help to the Mauritanian Press Agency and to the Mauritanian establishment for (?industry). In the fields of health and communications, it has been agreed to revive cooperation in these two sectors. Thus, an Algerian health mission will arrive in Nouakchott shortly. Algeria will also build a communication station linking Nouakchott with Nouadhibou. The two sides decided on new cooperation in the field of agriculture. Algerian universities will this year receive a number of Mauritanian students. [Text] [LD280916 Nouakchott Domestic Service in Arabic 2030 GMT 27 Sep 80]

CSO: 4402

KPD PAPER PRAISES KARMAL'S MEASURES

Duesseldorf UNSERE ZEIT in German 15 Sep 80 p 4

[Interview by Michael Opperskalski: "Solving Problems Jointly with People"]

[Text] Journalists Michael Opperskalski and Guenter Neuberger joined by photographer Gerhard Paul recently spent more than 3 weeks in Afghanistan, looking for rebels, talking to mullahs and bazaar shopkeepers. One of the most interesting experiences they had was a conversation with the secretary-general of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, Babrak Karmal. Major excerpts from the interview conducted by Michael Opperskalski are given below.

Opperskalski: After the Amin regime fell on 27 December 1979, a violent hate campaign against Afghanistan commenced in the western press. Even today, the bourgeois newspapers are full of distortions and false accusations. What changes have taken place in Afghanistan since that day ?

Karmal: 15,000 political prisoners were not only released but saved from certain death; all democratic freedoms were secured and protected; freedom of worship is since assured and Islam is being protected. Furthermore, the Soviet Union has extended economic aid amounting to more than R 100 million in various forms which we have used to rebuild our country and, above all, to give help where there was the greatest devastation.

Numerous conferences and meetings have been held in which all segments of the population have participated, above all including the clergy. This has created a basis and has led to the formation of a National Patriotic Front under the leadership of the DPPA.

Another very important development was the reestablishment of party unity on the basis of democratic principles. The party was reconstituted as a party of a new type. For the first time in history, democratic rights were and are being secured and revolutionary justice was and is being meted out in the ADR.

The big gangs that had entered our country from the outside were to a large extent destroyed. The government was reformed; parasites and corrupt followers of Amin were removed. The government is here to serve the people. We introduced the second stage of the land reform program. Our peasants received generous help; they were given free seed and free tools. As a result, there have already been bigger harvests in a number of areas.

Another important task for the future is to improve literacy and popular education. In this field, too, we have already made appreciable gains. Nonetheless, of course, we still face a lot of problems and difficulties; but we are optimistic about solving them gradually and unhurriedly, in close cooperation with our people.

Opperskalski: How did Hafisullah Amin fall? What was the background?

Karmal: Let me explain to you in full detail why Amin was brought down and why the people, under the leadership of the DPPA, destroyed the Amin regime. But to do this, I must go back in time a little.

When the reactionary, feudal Daud regime collapsed in 1978, this was a blow against the aggressive strategy of imperialism. The victory of the Afghan revolution put an end to U.S. plans of welding together Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran which at the time was still suffering under the tyranny of the Shah into a pact system opposed to progress and the liberation movements of the region.

Following the victory of the Afghan revolution, international reaction and imperialism altered their tactics. The CIA and its accomplices attempted to turn the social deprivation of Afghanistan to their advantage-- above all the massive problems connected with this backwardness.

Opperskalski: What forms of interference were actually employed?

Karmal: In Pakistan alone, imperialism and reaction established 57 camps, eight inside China along the border to Afghanistan and several others in Iran where agents and counter-revolutionaries were and still are being recruited and trained. So, interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan started just a short time after the victory of the revolution.

And, there was a heavy flow of arms and equipment reaching the counter-revolutionaries. These goods come from Egypt, the United States, from China, Pakistan and Israel. The petro-dollars of the reactionary Arab regimes are making this possible: thousands of tons of arms and many instructors are so being dispatched to Pakistan.

Amin was one more tool of imperialism. He and his followers arrested thousands of innocent people --workers, peasants, businessmen, members of the clergy and of the DPPA-- subjected them to fascist methods of torture and killed them. Acting according to the age-old "divide and conquer" strategy of imperialism, Amin sowed discord among the different tribes and nationalities and carried on an aggressive hate campaign against the neighboring countries.

Prior to 27 December, a total of 14 calls for help went out to the Soviet Union. But the Soviet Union knew that the Afghan army was strong enough to resist the imperialist mercenaries and therefore did not respond. But the Amin regime systematically paralyzed all military and popular power in Afghanistan. Defending the country against military aggression and the imperialist hate campaign thus became almost impossible.

Opperskalski: What was the policy Amin followed inside the DPPA and how did his downfall come about ?

Karmal: After the victory of the April revolution, I discharged my duties as "No 2 man" in the party, the government and the revolutionary council. There were not only 1,500 partymembers who fell victim to Amin's conspiracy against the party; many others were arrested or disappeared; still others were driven into exile after being appointed to ambassadorships. I was made ambassador to the CSSR.

Although there still were some party members holding on to positions in the party and the government, all fields had already been infiltrated by the Amin bandits. After comrade Taraki was murdered, we entered Afghanistan illegally,

going to Paktia province. Those of our comrades who were still close to Amin supplied us with information about that crook's contacts to the CIA and to counter-revolutionary elements. We also got word that the Amin clique was making plans for a plot in January of this year which would have surpassed all their previous misdeeds. The majority of the revolutionary council as well as comrades from the party and the army then decided at an illegally held conference to make every effort to topple the Amin regime.

But prior to that, the majority of the revolutionary council as well as of the party and the army pressed Amin to ask for Soviet military assistance. At that time, Afghanistan was in acute danger. There were more than 60,000 bandits under arms inside Afghanistan. The Pakistani army had been alerted and substantial parts had been moved to the Afghan border. At the same time, American military presence in the Persian Gulf was substantially increased.

About 4 or 5 days prior to the fall of Amin on 27 December, our request for assistance was answered. The news from the Amin camp was becoming more and more alarming. Amin was planning to have all political prisoners put to death, to throw tens of thousands more into jail and to commit genocide on three to four million people.

With the help of our comrades in the army and in the revolutionary council and with the help of thousands of armed party members, we brought Amin down, arrested him and placed him before a revolutionary tribunal, which sentenced him to death. Soviet assistance, both overall and militarily, has preserved Afghanistan's sovereignty, has prevented both war and civil war from breaking out and has kept Afghanistan out of the grasp of imperialism. In this way, the Soviet Union's assistance also served to protect the liberation movements of the region. All in all, one can say that the assistance by the Soviet Union has saved the world from terrible consequences.

Opperskalski: Regrettably, the FRG plays a rather inglorious role in supporting Afghan counter-revolutionary elements and in the hate campaign against Afghanistan. What chances are there for good relations between the FRG and the DRA in the future in your estimation?

Karmal: The DRA is very much interested in good and friendly relations with the FRG based on the principles of coexistence. FRG policy toward us depends in the first instance upon the desires of the FRG leadership.

I ask myself why the FRG, which is among the world leaders culturally and economically, could not occupy a front rank in the fight for peace, disarmament and friendly cooperation.

But I do not believe anything much can be achieved by pleading or uttering pleasantries. The improvement of relations to the DRA, among others, will depend on the amount of pressure applied on the ruling circles of the FRG by progressive elements and above all the working class of your country. How can lies and vituperations be reconciled with the culture and the progress of the FRG ?

I have heard broadcasts of Deutsche Welle and RFE. How can a civilized country like the FRG permit the existence of such lie factories ? My message is: Let the FRG assume first place in the fight for disarmament, peace and international cooperation!

9478

CSO: 4403

AFGHANISTAN

OVER 64,000 OPPONENTS OF KARMAL IN PRISON

Karachi MORNING NEWS in English 17 Sep 80 p 1

[Text] Frankfurt, Sept. 16--Tabibullah Balchi, chief pilot of Afghan airline Ariana's DC 10, one of the crews who defected to West Germany on Sunday, said in an interview with a Frankfurt newspaper that the Afghan people would "fight to death" to defeat the Soviet and allied occupation troops, whose strength he put at 2,00,000.

Balchi estimated that 64,000 opponents of the regime were being held in Kabul's Central Prison and at a military airbase near the capital.

Many had been tortured and some had been buried alive, he said.

The plane by which Balchi was to have returned to Kabul landed here on Sunday with yet another defector, pilot Abdul Rachman.

Rachman told newsmen here that East German specialists were in Afghanistan to build up the secret service. He said there were East German, Vietnamese, South Yemeni and Cuban troops in Afghanistan, in addition to the Soviets.

He said Soviet units, armed with some 2,000 tanks, were at present engaged in heavy fighting with rebel forces in the Panjshir Valley, north of Kabul.

He estimated that a million Afghans had been killed since the Soviet invasion late last December. Some 1,00,000 had been executed.

Schoolgirls' Murder

Meanwhile, the murder of two schoolgirls in Afghanistan was described in a BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation) television interview in London last night by an Afghan airline's pilot who has sought refuge in West Germany.

Capt Abedi said he witnessed the incident in April. Girls from a high school were screaming "Russians leave Afghanistan," he added.

A Russian officer gave the command to a soldier to shoot them, but the soldier, who was an Afghan, refused to do so, Capt Abedi recounted.

Then the officer talked to another Afghan, wearing civilian clothes, with a light machine-gun. He was a party member, of course, and he shot them right in the head six or seven times.

Another pilot, Capt Zia Ahmed Parwiz, told the BBC that Russians were in control of the planes, because Afghan Air Force pilots had fled or had been arrested or were in jail, or even had been killed.--DPA AFP

CSO: 4920

AFGHANISTAN

MUJAHIDIN DESTROY 90 USSR TROOPS, 100 TANKS

Lahore THE PAKISTAN TIMES in English 15 Sep 80 pp 1, 8

[Text] An Afghan Army officer who has now joined the freedom fighters has said the Mujahideen have destroyed some 100 Soviet tanks and armoured vehicles and killed more than 50 Soviet troops 107 k.m. south of Kabul, reports Radio Pakistan, quoting AFP.

The agency also reported that the Mujahideen have trapped some 150 Soviet tanks by closing the only entrance of a narrow pass surrounded by high mountains.

PPI reports from Peshawar:

The Mujahideen have killed 40 Soviet soldiers and destroyed 9 Soviet armoured cars and five tanks in Herat. The Soviets retaliated by killing and wounding 120 people. They also resorted to indiscriminate bombing of a gathering at a mosque in Herat city.

In Parwan Province, Soviet bombers destroyed 21 villages, killing 115 villagers. Fierce fighting was also reported between the Mujahideen and Soviet forces at Kohistan in the north of Bagram airport.

In Nadyan Province, Soviet and Afghan forces facing tough resistance from the Mujahideen, bombed and destroyed many villages and killed a large number of innocent civilians along with their livestock.

The Soviet and Afghan forces were suffering such heavy casualties at the hands of the Mujahideen that a new coffin factory had been established in Kabul city where 250 carpenters have been employed to make 300 coffins daily for carrying bodies of Soviet and Afghan troops.

Two Afghan Ministers and two high-ranking officials were shot dead by the Mujahideen of the Hizbe Islami after their summary trial in village Said-khel, Paktia Province on Thursday.

This was announced by Maulvi Mohammad Yunus Khalis, Chief of the Hizbe Islami, a component of the Islamic Alliance for the Liberation of Afghanistan in Peshawar today.

The announcement named them as Faiz Mohammad Minister for Borders, Engineer Nasir Mohammad, Minister for Public Welfare, Habib Olaswal and Khan Mir Prihoti.

According to the announcement the two Ministers along with some high ranking officials were busy in parties with two tribes, namely Masey and Dreykhal in village Saidkhal when they were besieged by the commando groups of Hizbe Islami, led by Maulvi Jalaluddin Haqqani. They arrested the two Ministers and some officials and put them under summary trial. The Mujahideen summary court awarded death sentence to them and the verdict was put into action immediately.

A very highly reliable report from Peshawar, Parwan Province, gives the details about the fighting in that area from August 20 to September 11.

According to a Press release of Islamic Alliance for the Liberation of Afghanistan after a day of preparation in Gollubow, Russian troops started their attack on Paktiahr on August 26. The Mujahideen killed 20 Russians and 10 tanks the Mujahideen killed 14 Soviet troops.

In Chantal Warda, one of strong holds of the Mujahideen, seven tanks and five trucks were destroyed. In Nasirak 20 Russians were killed.

According to the report, one Afghan army officer and one Tajik Russian joined the Mujahideen. Three injured and fifty persons were killed and three tanks, one ammunition truck, one tanker were destroyed in Paragda, near Marikhabad.

Mujahideen casualties were relatively low. The Russians killed defenceless villagers in Barak and in many other parts. Thirty women and children were martyred in Barak and 40 in Ghaja.

Russian troops were using heavy tank artillery, helicopters, jet-bombers and rockets fired from planes and several types of new weapons unknown to the Mujahideen. About 2000 artillery and rockets were fired in one day by Russian forces.

A Press release of Hizbe Islami, quoting reports from Takhar Province, said the Mujahideen have been involved in widespread operations in the centre of Takhar province. In these operations, two tanks were destroyed, 20 Russians and 50 Purchases were killed.

Reports from Godesen Masjeed front of Wardak Province say during this month 600 Russian and militia troops were killed and a number of tanks and armoured cars were destroyed in these conflicts. About 600 Mujahideen were martyred.

An Afghan helicopter crashed near Chantal area, Kabul radio said last night.

The copter was on a routine when it crashed due to some technical fault, the Radio said while announcing the death of the pilot Abdul Rauf.

APA reports from New Delhi: Afghanistan Government Radio confirmed on Saturday that the Government has demanded the return of an American Television reporter on charges of ordering "the torture and stoning to death" of three Afghan farmers.

A Kabul broadcast heard in India quoted confessions by two accused Afghans and witness accounts as saying that the three peasants were fatally stoned in Pashabad village of Mangarhar province's Surkhrood district on the orders of "an American in a group of journalists."

MUJAHIDEEN KILL 60 SOVIET, FIVE BABRAK SOLDIERS

Karachi MORNING NEWS in English 17 Sep 80 p 3

[Text]

PESHAWAR, Sept. 16: Mujahideen destroyed three tanks and killed 60 Russian soldiers and five Babrak soldiers, according to a reliable report from Peshawar in a fighting that took place between Mujahideen and Russian troops in Dera Isma'il Khan on Aug. 16.

A Press Release of Islamic Alliance for Liberation of Afghanistan, says the invading troops were forced back but they destroyed most of houses in Qandahar by heavy bombardment.

According to another report from Peshawar, Mujahideen shot down one Russian helicopter in Qandahar west of Peshawar city on Sept. 3, eight Russians were killed in this operation.

According to a report from Kunar, Mujahideen captured Russian troops who were going from Amur to Buriat. During heavy fighting, Mujahideen destroyed 10 of the 18 tanks in the convoy as well as destroying six trucks.

The life casualty of the invading troops was 100 Russian and Babrak soldiers, dead and 12 Afghan soldiers joined the Mujahideen. In the fighting 10 of the Mujahideen were martyred.

A report from IALA Mujahideen in Adak of Shinghar Province, says that as a result

of continuous efforts and heroic sacrifices of freedom loving Mujahideen who had taken away rest and peace from the enemy the last Panchamas and Khatke of Shinghar left their houses and villages and under the support of their military helicopters, jets, artillery and tanks took refuge in Adak city, provincial capital. But the houses of history followed them there as well.

The heroic and victorious attack by Mujahideen on Sept. 4 and on the Adak city, they hit strong, smoking circles on the enemy and forced the self calling slaves to flee from the city.

The masters also failed to support them although they did not hesitate to use any kind of weapon.

Mujahideen by their most modern as well as ancient weapons of "Allah Akbar" entered the city they even had the Governor's and general commander's headquarters under their control for a while.

Enemy's casualty was high, but from Mujahideen just one person was injured.

Mujahideen also destroyed one tank and captured 10 pieces of heavy and light arms and some communications. Some food supply and logistic supplies also fell in the hands of Mujahideen.—PTI

USSR REPORTEDLY SUFFERS CASUALTIES IN PANJSHER

Karachi MORNING NEWS in English 15 Sep 80 p 1

[Text] New Delhi, Sept. 14--Soviet forces may be giving up their latest attempt to wrest the Panjsher Valley from Guerilla tribesmen after losing about 1,500 dead and several hundred wounded in their two-week offensive near the mouth of the strategic gorge in northeast Afghanistan, a report from Kabul said today.

Despite heavy air and armoured support, special counter-guerilla units and Afghan mercenaries, the Soviets were unable to advance beyond Rokha, 30 kilometres into the 160-kilometre long valley, said the report from a source with access to insurgent and Government information who in the past had been accurate.

At Rokha, insurgents blasted boulders down the mountain sides, halting the advance and trapping some of the Soviet units for days, the report said. The Russians on Thursday fought their way out of the trap through heavy fire from guerillas holding the mountainsides, suffering heavy casualties and the loss of more than 10 tanks and artillery pieces, it added.

The fighting later slackened, possibly signalling the end of the 13th attempt to take Panjsher Valley from insurgents.

Indiscriminate Bombing

According to latest reports, Mujahideen killed 40 Soviet soldiers and destroyed nine Soviet armoured cars and five tanks in Herat. The Soviets retaliated by killing and wounding 120 people when they resorted to indiscriminate bombing of a gathering at a mosque in Herat city.

In Parwan Province, Soviet bombers destroyed 21 villages, killing 115 villagers. Pierce fighting is also reported between Mujahideen and Soviet forces at Kohistan in the north of Bagram airport.

In Naryn Province, Soviet and Afghan forces who are facing tough resistance from the Mujahideen, bombed and destroyed many villages and killed a large number of innocent civilians along with their livestock.

Meanwhile, the Soviet and Afghan forces are suffering such heavy casualties at the hands of Mujahideen that a new coffin factory has been established in Kabul city where 300 coffins are made daily.--APA PPI

CSO: 4920

AFGHANISTAN

ADDITIONAL REPORTS ON PANJSHER FIGHTING

Change in Tactics

Karachi DAWN in English 15 Sep 80 p 1

[Text] New Delhi, Sept. 14--Soviet forces may be giving up their latest attempt to wrest the Panjshir valley from guerilla tribesmen after losing about 1,500 dead and several hundred wounded in their two-week offensive near the mouth of the strategic gorge in northeast Afghanistan, a report from Kabul said today.

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In Madyan province, Soviet and Afghan forces who are facing tough resistance from Mujahideen, bombed and destroyed many villages and killed a large number of innocent civilians along with their livestock.

In New Delhi, a spokesman of the US embassy said that those 200 Afghan refugees who had taken refuge temporarily in India are expected to be resettled in the United States, reports BBC.--APA/PPI/Reuter

Fighting Appears Over

Karachi DAWN in English 20 Sep 80 pp 1, 10

[Text] New Delhi, Sept. 19--Afghan rebels inflicted heavy casualties on a Soviet armoured force trapped in the Panjshir Valley northeast of Kabul, according to reports reaching the Afghan capital quoted by diplomatic sources here today.

The sources said most reports circulating in Kabul considered that a Soviet military offensive in the strategic valley had failed.

But they said some observers said the operation had been a partial success for the Soviet troops who had managed to contain the rebels and isolate them from other guerilla groups east of Kabul and south of Panjshir.

The sources, however, said there was no hard information on the fighting in the valley which appeared to have ended last week.

Fresh fighting took place around Sarobi, about 40 kilometres (25 miles) east of Kabul, two days ago when anti-government rebels attacked army units, according to the sources.

They said clashes also broke out at Karizner, 17 kilometres (10 miles) north of Kabul. But no details were immediately available.

According to State Department sources in Washington, Soviet casualties in Afghanistan — counting dead, wounded, and troops on the sick list, particularly due to malaria — may have approached the level of 10,000 to 15,000.

The spokesman, who had been questioned about a report in a US newspaper, said he had no confirmation of the figures.

He added that the State Department had indications that the Soviet army was no longer repatriating all of its dead to the USSR, and was burying some of them in Afghanistan.

Meanwhile, in London, today's edition of "The Times" said in a Kabul-dated article that the Soviet forces were changing their tactics and their troops in Afghanistan.

The independent daily said conscripted recruits were being replaced by older and more experienced Soviet soldiers,

and that Cuban and Vietnamese advisers had been brought in to help red army units against Muslim guerilla rebels.

The Times said that, with the first snowfalls due over the rugged Afghan terrain within six weeks, the Soviets were making rapid preparations for a long stay in the country.

SURVEILLANCE

Meanwhile, telephone lines have been cut to the American embassy building in Kabul and military helicopters continue hovering overhead in what appears to be stepped-up surveillance of non communist embassies there, sources close to the Indian Foreign Ministry said today.

The security precautions follow the United States refusal to turn over to Soviet authorities a Soviet soldier who sought refuge in the embassy on Monday, and demanded political asylum in the United States.

The source, who asked to remain anonymous, said the number of Afghan police and armed militiamen stationed near the embassy had doubled since Wednesday, and the entire area had been closed to ordinary traffic.

Plain clothes Afghan police were tailing cars with diplomatic licence plates, and visitors were being discouraged from approaching the embassy, he said.

The Indian Ministry in Kabul sent a detailed report to the Ministry here expressing concern that the US refusal to turn the soldier over to Soviet authorities could trigger a major incident, it was reported.

The ministry source pointed out that the incident marked the second, delicate diplomatic incident for the American embassy in Kabul since Afghanistan turned to communist rule in a bloody military coup in April, 1978.

When the US Ambassador Adolf Dubois was killed in February last year, the Americans were faced with a major dilemma, he said, and now again they have a very complex problem to solve. The reports said there are 18 American staff members at the US embassy in Kabul and six US marine guards. The building is 1.3 kilometres (less than one mile) from Kabul International airport.

Britain has protested to Afghanistan over what it considers unusual surveillance of its diplomats in Kabul, a foreign office spokesman said today.

He confirmed that Britain's Charge d'Affaires Michael Powell had made a low level protest to the Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The Soviet soldier who defected to the American embassy in Kabul this week is believed to be a 21-year old Tadlik and a driver in one of the armoured units of the Soviet army stationed at the outer perimeter of Afghan capital's international airport, a "Times report" from Kabul said.

It is believed that at a meeting chaired by Soviet 'adviser' at

Afghan Interior Ministry which was also attended by Afghan Deputy Prime Minister, Mr Sultan Ali Khristmand, as well as by the Afghan Interior and Defence Ministers, a decision to refuse permission to take the Soviet defector out of Afghanistan was taken.

According to the Times report, a 'procedure of action' was being devised in meetings with the American, Indian and Polish diplomats in Kabul with the Afghan protocol chief.

The report said Mr George Griffin, the American Consul in Kabul is expected in New Delhi Friday and may hope to be able to bring the defector with him. —Reuter/APA.

Helicopter Downed

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 16 Sep 80 p 8

[Excerpt]

Meanwhile, reliable reports from Baman say, the guerillas destroyed three tanks and killed 60 Russian soldiers and five Babrak soldiers in fighting in Darra Shekari sometime in the end of last month.

A Press release of Islamic Alliance for Liberation of Afghanistan says the invading troops were forced back but they destroyed most of houses in Gundak by heavy bombardment.

According to another report from Baman the guerilla tribesmen shot down one Russian helicopter in Shahiban west of Baman city on Sept. 1. Eight Russians were killed in this operation. More news trickling in through the borders say the guerillas impeded Russian troops who were going from Amsar to Barikot in which 10 of the 15

tanks in the convoy as well as six trucks of the invading troops were destroyed.

The heavy fighting left 260 Russian and Babrak soldiers dead whereas only 10 guerillas lost their lives.

In Aibak of Samang province, as a result of continuous efforts and heroic sacrifices of freedom loving Afghans, the local Parchams and Khakis of Samangan left their houses and villages and under the support of their masters' helicopters, jets, artillery, and tanks took refuge in Aibak city.

But the heroic and victorious attack by the guerilla tribesmen on Sep. 4 on Aibak City, forced the Parchams and Khakis to flee.

POLITICAL ASYLUM: Crews of a state-owned Ariane Afghan airlines plane said yesterday they

would ask for political asylum in West Germany, a television report said.

The ARB network news broadcast quoted the chief pilot as saying more than 252 of the airlines personnel had already defected. The airline had only seven pilots left and could not maintain its international schedule, he said.

The pilot said the crew were to have taken over a DC-10 airliner at Frankfurt to fly it to Kabul but they all intended to stay in West Germany.

He and other Ariane colleagues claimed that the Soviet-backed Afghan Government had forced them to fly arms, ammunition and troops to areas where fighting was going on with Afghan Mujahideen, the network said. —APA/PPI/Reuter

SOVIETS HAVING TOUGH TIME IN TAKHAR

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 18 Sep 80 p 8

[Text]

PESHAWAR, Sept. 17: Mujahideen of Hube Islami Afghanistan under the leadership of Engineer Gulabuddin Hikmatyar are involved in widespread guerrilla operations in Takhar Province.

The guerrilla operations carried out by the Mujahideen against the Russian forces have been outlined in a Press release issued by the Hube Islami here today.

On Sept. 7 a guerrilla group of Mujahideen attacked a tank and Russian jeep killed two high-ranking Russian advisers on the spot.

On the following day an armoured car containing weapons, bullets and some ammunitions was blasted as a result 10 persons in the armoured car died.

A tank came forward to defend the armoured car but it also met with the same fate.

On Mujahideen side one person was injured. House of a Mujahid Nik Mohammad s/o Quli Mohammad who helped the Mujahideen was destroyed by the Russian forces.

A report from Chahb of Takhar Province say that on Sept. 8 a group of Russians and Parchamis attacked the Mujahideen of HIA in this district. Conflicts took place between the two sides at night lasting four hours. As a result

Mohammad Wali Khan, the commander of the invading forces including two second lieutenants and 12 soldiers were killed while the Mujahideen captured 22 different kinds of weapons and 10 horses from the government forces.

The report adds that the clash took place between the Mujahideen and Russians in Chahb District again and as a result three soldiers were killed.

Reports received recently say that heavy fighting took place between the Mujahideen of HIA and Russian troops five kilometres in the north of Palkoona, the capital of Takhar Province. The fighting lasted four and a half hours. Four tanks were destroyed and 65 Russians were killed. As the Russians suffered a shameful defeat they called in new forces to support them against the Mujahideen from the surrounding province of Takhar. The strategic points were manned by the Mujahideen, six tanks were destroyed completely.

GOVT. BID FAILS: In New Delhi, diplomatic sources said today an attempt by the Afghan authorities to take advantage of tribal rivalries to defeat insurgents in the Panjshir Valley, north-east of Kabul, had failed.
-FPI/Reuters/AFP/APP

RUSSIAN CONVOY ATTACKED, DESTROYED

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 15 Sep 80 p 4

[Text]

PESHAWAR, Sept. 14: A Russian convoy was attacked by Mujahideen of Hizb-e-Islami, Afghanistan in Dera area while on its way to Urgon District from Ghazni in order to reoccupy the liberated areas. In this attack, six tanks were destroyed, 12 weapon-laden vehicles were burnt up and 300 soldiers of the puppet regime killed, said an HIA Press release.

Heathen forces were defeated greatly by the brave Mujahideen of HIA. In this attack the Russians faced heavy loss.

A reporter adds that heavy fighting is going on in Taree Pass, Khoon and Ghulung between Mujahideen and the Russian forces.

Reports from Sharan District of Pakhtia Province that the Russians landed infantry forces by helicopters in order to attack the centre of Mujahideen.

The Mujahideen killed 27 Russian para-troopers.

On the Mujahideen side one was killed and another was injured.

Seven tanks were destroyed and three armoured cars burnt up by explosions in Ghoorband District, says a report from Parwan Province.

As many as 81 Russians were also killed.

In an other report of Hizb-e-Islami Afghanistan, the Mujahideen under the command of Maulvi Mohammad Younas Khulis, attacked the helicopter carrying Fazl Mohammad, Minister for Frontier Affairs, Engineer Nazir

Mohammad Minister for Public Affairs and other high ranking army officers. As a result both the ministers alongwith other army officials were killed.

DEMAND: All Jammu and Kashmir Awami Majlis-e-Ahwal has demanded immediate withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan to strengthen the cause of peace and to end the chances of war in the region and emphasized the need for search of a political solution of the crisis.

A meeting of the office-bearers and workers of the Majlis in Srinagar on Tuesday under chairmanship of Mir Wajid Mohammad Farooq adopted a resolution which urged the Indian Government to work for permanent political solution of Afghanistan issue in collaboration with non-aligned nations particularly Pakistan and Iran.

American diplomats in Afghanistan said yesterday that Afghanistan has demanded the return of American Television reporter Dan Rather for trial on charges of participating in the "torture and fatal stoning" of three Afghans last March.

Rather, a CBS correspondent, said in New York "I deny these lies absolutely, completely and without equivocation." CBS news said in a statement the allegations were "totally preposterous and absolutely untrue."—PPI/APP/APA

OVER 100 CUBAN ADVISORS ARRIVE IN KABUL

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 13 Sep 80 p 8

[Text]

NEW DELHI, Sept. 12: A Cuban civilian advisory group arrived recently in Kabul, Western diplomatic sources said here today.

The sources said no information was available on the purpose of the group, but there were unconfirmed reports that it numbered about 100.

There was no evidence to support rumours that Cuban troops had arrived in Afghanistan, the sources said.

Soviet helicopter gunships and troop-carrying helicopters continued to make sorties from Kabul airport during the last few days, the sources said.

The helicopters were heading north, probably to the Panjshir Valley where heavy fighting has been reported and southwest to Wardak Province.

Soviet air transport planes continued to fly in and out of Kabul Airport day-and night though at a slightly reduced rate, the sources said.

The renewed appearance of Soviet troops patrolling Kabul had also been noticed in the Afghan capital, they said.

Night-time assassinations and kidnappings were reported to have increased in Kabul and conscription into the depleted Afghan Army would soon be extended without age limit.

The sources quoted official Kabul reports on Wednesday that 400 members of the Democratic Youth Organisation left for three

northern provinces to fight the Soviet troops.

All but the lowest quality of wheat has disappeared from the Kabul market and there has been an 8 per cent increase in the price of wheat in the last week, the sources said.

Small convoys of T-62 Soviet tanks and armoured personnel carriers were seen commuting between the Soviet Army garrisons in Kabul and the strategic power generating township of Sorobi, halfway between Kabul and the eastern town of Jalalabad, the sources said.

Vehicles of the regular Afghan Army have been immobilised in Kabul for unknown reasons, the sources said. Soviet-backed Afghan troops clashed with rebels around Kabul this week, they said. The Charikar-Kabul Road was closed for those two days and heavy fighting was reported in Guldara and Shahadara, two villages some 12 miles north of the capital.

Clashes were also reported from Kalakany and Mir Bacchakot, 30 miles north of Kabul, the sources said.

Several people were killed when a wedding party of a member of the Parcham faction of the ruling party was attacked last Friday at Galai Wahid, about six miles east of Kabul, the sources said.

The sources gave no details and refused to say whether the attack was mounted by members of the rival Khalq faction. —Reuters/AFP

AFGHANISTAN

BRIEFS

USSR LOSSES IN SHILGAR--Peshawar, Sept. 23--Heavy fighting is going on between the Mujahideen and the Russian forces in Shilgar, in Ghazni province. According to a Press release of Hizb-e-Islami Afghanistan, the Soviet forces suffered heavy casualties during these conflicts. The Russian attacked Shilgar, with one thousand tanks, armoured cars and other weapons. Fighting continued for four days. The Russians were supported by 30 helicopters and 13 jets. The Soviet forces attacked this area with savagery and brutality. They bombarded the entire district. In these air strikes many villages were devastated and innocent people, including children, women, and old men were killed. The Russians also burnt all the houses in the area. In some of the bloodiest encounters in the district 40 Russian soldiers and two high ranking officers were killed and seven tanks and four armoured cars were destroyed. As the fighting was on in Shilgar district, the Mujahideen attacked the Ghazni air base at night. In this attack six helicopters and two jets were burnt. The Mujahideen also destroyed the control tower of the airport.--PPI [Text] [Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 24 Sep 80 p 8]

CSO: 4920

SIGNIFICANCE, ROLE OF UGTA COMMENTED ON

Algiers REVOLUTION ET TRAVAIL in French 6 Sep 80 p 3

[Editorial: "What Remains to be Done"]

[Text] It is quite obvious that the political leadership is giving priority to settling the socioprofessional problems of workers and citizens. The last Interministerial Council, in which the UGTA [General Union of Algerian Workers] participated, which it salutes as devotion at the highest level to the virtue of dialog, and to which the National Secretariat made a loyal and responsible communication on the social, economic and political situation, is further evidence. The prime minister reminded the members of the government of the urgency and priority of swiftly applying all the measures taken by the political leadership to stabilize the situation and the social climate. This is understood to mean, in particular, the temporary measures, the worker sharing in the results of his business, connecting wages to production, but also texts aimed at improving living and working conditions in the public service sector, as well as application decrees enacted as part of the preparation of the conditions for applying the worker's general statute.

For the worker this is an experience that confirms the new and fundamental orientations of the party's congress, in which each and every one can discern the aspirations of the working class expressed in the resolutions of the fifth UGTA Congress. However, it may seem paradoxical to speak again of temporary measures which, having been taken in December 1979, should have been applied in March 1980, retroactive to January. There is a fundamental explanation for this, that must be considered in all its significance by union authorities and workers. This explanation, which is serious because it is eminently political, is that certain levels of decision execution in the political leadership react slowly, even balk or show inertia in making appeals.

In a word, the bureaucracy in all its political meaning continues to rule over the structures of the executive apparatus. And the UGTA verifies this every day by the troubles it has in imposing dialog and consultation, in accordance with the directives of the secretary general of the party and President Chadli Bendjedid. Well, union leaders and workers must read this explanation politically. Two facts then become obvious: the workers have increasing awareness of their problems and are demanding correct solutions to them.

On its side, the political leadership does not want development on credit, and intends that development to have the economic and social fallout for which it was designed and set up. Consequently, we have two convergent attitudes that can only evolve toward symbiosis. And in fact there is increasing symbiosis between the political leadership and the masses.

Consequently, any obstacle, any lack of concern or any curb on the execution of the political leadership's decisions can only be analyzed--outside of a political deviation from the party's statutes and resolutions--as an insidious process of undermining that convergence and that symbiosis between the base and the summit. We must not ignore the fact that in the executive structures there still are people who are politically and socially uninterested in what the working masses and political leadership are doing to continue--in profound unity and determination--the rigorous and methodical application of the National Charter. Those are the people whom the UGTA disturbs when it throws all its weight into imposing dialog and being the true cement that welds the base and the summit closely together. And those are the people who want to "break" the union by breaking up the dialog or orienting it toward a technician's path that would be prejudicial to the settling of the problems.

Also, the line of action and the progress of the union authorities and the workers in this 1980-1981 season opening, must be clear: it is first of all to take charge of the concerns of the laboring masses, according to a program that takes into account the urgency and extent of the question to be studied. And within this framework there is good reason to banish all demagogy and all sensationalism, which play into the reckless hands of those who are hostile to the revolution abroad (imperialism) as well as inside the country. And although, thanks to union democracy, which today has become a rule and a practice of the union movement, the gates of our organization are wide open to all initiatives for taking better charge of our current battle, the battle for production and management, the workers must close the door to the demagogic voices that practise a deceitful worker control, the better to smash the constructive momentum of the laboring masses and prepare the altar on which they will permanently and at the appropriate time sacrifice the workers themselves. In fact, the workers must learn a lesson from what happened seven years ago in Chile, and respond to the leadership's political determination to solve our development problems by showing in the field that they correctly perceive the political, economic, social and cultural facts of the country.

In the second place it is important at this opening to fight more than ever to impose at all levels the path of dialog, a responsible and effective dialog, a dialog in which are discussed (but not haggled over) the socioprofessional problems of the laboring masses, and through which solutions will really be found.

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CSO: 4400

ALGERIA STRIVES TO STRUCTURE SUCCESSFUL IMPORTS PROGRAM

Trade Situation Discussed

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 18 Aug 80 p 1

[Text] Yesterday morning, the minister of commerce, Mr Abdelaziz Khelif, chaired a meeting of wilaya business managers in the presence of the secretary of state for foreign trade, Mr Ali Oubouzar.

During this meeting they studied both the trade situation in general and questions relating to supply and distribution.

The reports which the wilaya business managers submitted made it possible to acquire an adequate comprehensive view of existing problems in the light of available funds on hand and consumption expectations.

This meeting was a continuation of previous meetings held during the Ramadan months between the minister of commerce and the executive councils of national trust corporations.

The purpose of these meetings, which aimed primarily at ensuring the Algerian citizen a better life, was to find the effective means for improving supply and distribution.

In the course of his address, Mr Khelif made known his ministerial department's wish to place at the wilaya's disposal every means necessary for achieving the objectives designed by the imports program.

The minister very especially stressed the role of business managers in the struggle against speculation with a view to protecting the consumer and safeguarding his purchasing power. For this purpose, he announced the establishment of a committee made up of four managers responsible for studying the problems in each wilaya management.

Mr. Khelif pointed out that the present objectives are ambitious for which reason there is a need for coordination in order to comply with priorities. Decentralization, he went on to say, for which we are striving, is to enable us to guarantee the anticipated results.

In conclusion, the minister appealed to the members to strive even harder, and emphasized that the lack of means must not constitute an excuse for any apathy at the expense of the common good.

Interview With Ali Oubouzar

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 26 Aug 80 p 3

[Interview with Ali Oubouzar, secretary of state for foreign trade]

[Text] On the occasion of the 17th International Trade Fair in Algiers, we set out to get a general view, which was not intended to be exhaustive, of the problems relating to imports and exports, by means of an interview with the secretary of state for foreign trade, Mr Ali Oubouzar, who willingly agreed to answering our questions. It is obvious from his replies that some steps, which will be touched on, are about to be taken at the Secretariat of State for Foreign Trade level.

[Question] What significance is attached to this year's 17th Algerian International Fair?

[Answer] The Algerian 17th International Fair is to be held a few months after the Party's Extraordinary Congress and, inasmuch as it is an occasion for promoting foreign trade, it will register its work in line with the Congress's resolutions and recommendations for a better life.

This means that national representatives at this Fair will highlight the efforts put forth for the quantitative and qualitative improvement of procuring supplies for the people, as also for the improvement in national economic achievements: within this framework, factors contributing to the increase of work productivity, to making previously made investments pay and to the development of activities supportive of production and consequently of the development of small and average business undertakings.

Although international representation is not basically changed, it is undoubtedly toward this very type of business and activities that relations of Algerian and foreign operators will move.

This should result particularly in a progressive development of longer-term cooperative relations between economic operators rather than simple pin-pointed business relations.

With this in mind, we should take note of the republication and profound study of the system of "technical days" and "company days" devoted to a certain number of selected topics as also, as a result of the activities begun at the fair level, the launching of specialized exhibits.

It seems to us that these various factors should make the Algiers 17th International Fair a promotion effort not only on behalf of business exchanges but also for production and development.

[Question] How does our balance of trade return look?

[Answer] Algerian trade exchanges abroad in 1979 showed a positive balance of 5.11 billion DA [Algerian Dinars]. Considering that the total foreign-trade volume amounts to 67.9 billion DA, the balance brings the import margin rate to 116 percent instead of the 73 percent in 1978.

The 1979 export increase is largely owing to the increase in value of "energy and lubricants;" but along with this there is also a considerable decline in the value of imports which average around 3 billion DA.

This decline overlaps a slight pinch in consumer-goods imports, but more importantly, a significant drop in equipment goods and semi-finished products, owing to the rather pronounced interruption in investments during the transition period between two plans as also to the completion delays caused by the general situation at the time.

These delays were to be over by 1980, not only within the framework of implementing the first annual section of the Five-Year Plan but also through the complementary importation program (+5 billion DA as compared with the general imports program). The favorable increase in oil prices was to make it possible to cover these increases; in any case, our endeavors will be conducive to our obtaining an at least equitable exchange balance.

[Question] What measures do you consider necessary to put an end to, or at least significantly reduce, the almost systematic dependence on imports?

[Answer] It is perhaps not quite accurate to think that there is an almost systematic dependence on imports.

Imports, especially because of their importance and their nature, have been encouraged by the choices by our country which selected as an economic development pattern one centered mainly on setting up a very important, multiform production system, such as is apparent throughout the various national development plans.

Consequently, if we bear in mind that our country inherited its independence from an economic situation in which industry was totally lacking, in which farming was carried out with conventional means, and moreover, if we recall their urgency to set up a productive device capable of answering to and satisfying the needs of the country and its people, we are obliged to acknowledge that the only way we could get equipment, raw materials and other useful intermediary expendable items was by resorting to imports.

This stage of setting up production equipment is not yet completely over. We must now learn to operate this equipment better, to manage it better

and better organize the output. It is only then that our national output will increasingly exceed imported products, and--why not?--produce over-surpluses intended for export.

Moreover, there are some imports which I shall classify as inelastic and which affect the very life of man, which are absolutely necessary and which will not as soon as all that be reduced: it is essentially a matter of foodstuffs: oil-yielding products, sugar, coffee, milk, butter, flour.

These imports, dependent at one and the same time on the increase in the population and on the revenues from our country's ability to produce substitute products, are virtually inevitable.

In short, therefore, I shall say that the decrease in our imports is connected with making the greatest possible use of our output capacity, for its improvement and its diversification.

[Question] What are the prospects for our exports? Are there any inducements to encourage our concerns to direct their course toward an output suitable for export purposes?

[Answer] The promotion of our exports is one of our greatest concerns and comes directly within the framework of our diversification policy. However, our economy's deeply extroverted character has not allowed the immediate restructuring of our export trade, the flow of which is still made up of 97 percent of hydrocarbons and the remainder largely divided among mining products, plums, wine and dates.

The explanation for this is the fact that the work our country agreed to in the output area was to result first of all in replacing imported products by national output.

This explains why our country's new products in both the area of foodstuffs and equipment are entirely absorbed by national demand which after all regularly expands with the increase in population and the increase in income.

Nevertheless, exportation is still one of our objectives for which we are now taking the necessary steps for its implementation.

At the output level, a rather strict control will be balanced by a better utilization of production capacities and therefore by an increase in output. This output, for some years to come, will be conducive to absorbing the deficits accumulated in our country, but will then release exportable amounts (in the petrochemical and in the processing industry sector, some heavy industry...).

On the market level, the settlement of business agreements, participation in fairs, or the coming opening of business agencies in the international market will make it possible to find outlets for these products. Moreover, inducements such as financial incentives are now being studied.

[Question] It is evident from observing markets that our purchasing agents sometime buy products indiscriminately, that is to say, without any demand or any useful purpose for our country and our nationals. They likewise do not always bear in mind the balance of payment. What should we infer from this?

[Answer] I think that we have to consider our purchasing agents untrained or unaware of the facts of everyday life and the restraints of our economy. There could be some deficiencies there particularly in the appraisal of needs, in the planning of supplies or in coping with a given product; but there is no general disorder as you imply.

In my opinion, the following observations will explain some of the deficiencies known to exist:

- Algeria does not yet have a clearly established consumption pattern;
- Algeria does not yet have a very strict foreign exchange plan;
- there are not as yet any automatic and mandatory unified regulations among Algerian importing firms.

The combination of these three phenomena could indeed lead to apparently useless imports which are poorly timed and in insufficient quantities. Nevertheless, the decisions which the Policy Board has made, particularly in planning matters, will correct these defects. As a matter of fact, the establishing of annual plans at all levels will encourage a better approach to needs and a better supply planning intended to satisfy them.

Moreover, the establishment of the Secretariat of State for Foreign Trade testifies to the Policy Board's desire to provide the country with a combined, coordinated and controlled operational foreign-trade plan.

These plans, at the foreign trade level, will be completed by plans to be made at the national level for a self-contained and systematic organization of national economy and the defining of a consumption pattern which takes into account at one and the same time our people's desires, our economy's actual economic possibilities and our country's basic choices for a socialist and social development.

Need for Import Planning

Algiers EL MOUJAHID in French 12 Aug 80 p 3

[Article by A. Benslama]

[Text] Ramadan is over. The sweltering heat which persistently and doggedly prevailed made it unbearable. But if the test was an arduous one, it was none the less stoically endured on the strength of religious faith.

Ramadan has left some traces and not only on the physical plane.

It was equally productive in all kinds of lessons and most especially in the socio-economic area. As a matter of fact, it is indisputably true that the people's life style, the consumption pattern and purchasing power are constantly undergoing change and every year at the same period, they are established on new terms. This is, of course, a subject of meditation for sociologists and planners and lies beyond our competence.

However, it is not absolutely necessary that one be an acknowledge expert to notice that the purchasing and consumption capacity of every household, regardless of its social status, has appreciably increased. National offices and organizations in charge of supplies have undoubtedly noted those who are no longer to be satisfied with basing their estimates only on the number of inhabitants but also on other collective standards.

In fact, and despite the tremendous efforts they have made this year to satisfy the citizens' need, purchasing agents have given the impression if not of being short of breath at least of acting impulsively to fill in the gaps.

Save some imported products which arrived late, strictly speaking, there was no serious shortage, but some periodic tensions regarding one or other product which accentuated the mistakes noted in the planning; mistakes not solely because of unusual circumstances but meant to ensure permanent supplies regardless of these circumstances.

The problem is obviously quite an intricate one, but it is mainly a problem dealing with organization and men.

It is true that we are no longer in the experimental stage but rather in a period of very strict and serious planning. And in this respect, the retail trade with its complete and final stabilization, more than ever demands our attention. The reentries in the new national trade register can no longer be delayed, for they are prepared to cut down very appreciably the operations of unscrupulous business men whose trade operations and speculative deals present the facts in a wrong light.

In this area, the APC [People's Commercial Assemblies] have a role of prime importance to play fully and straightforwardly by steering clear of any subjectivism and laxism. They should display a spirit of initiative, play an effective part in recentralization and control. The bad example given not too long ago by Constantine who illegally approved the opening, reversion or provisional expansion of 30 businesses is to be outlawed forever.

The new registrations should also be in conformity with the law not only on the legal plane but also in their purposes and their distribution. To return to this Ramadan 80, we point out that the marks it has left are not like those we further back referred to as solely of a physical nature. The money markets have also in fact lowered the exorbitant prices of some products, mainly those of meat and some fruits.

However, semolina and beverages which are so much in demand at this time have not always been available at retail dealers, but let us not be too demanding, for on the whole, the situation which could have been better has distinctly changed for the better compared with that of past years.

It now remains to roll up our sleeves and make a special effort to engage strenuously once more in the production battle.

It also remains to pursue the development of numerous projects already drawn up in various plans, particularly those of the PCD [expansion unknown] dealing very especially with housing, water supply and socio-cultural substructures.

8879

CSO: 4400

ALGERIA

DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET-ALGERIAN EXCHANGES DISCUSSED

Algiers REVOLUTION ET TRAVAIL in French 6 Sep 80 p 11

[Text] On the eve of the official opening of the FIA [Algiers International Fair], those in charge of the Soviet pavilion held a press conference in which they analyzed the area, the depth and the interest of the mutually advantageous cooperation between Algeria and the Soviet Union and declared themselves united in their common struggle for a new international economic order.

One of the oldest in the existence of the FIA, the Soviet participation is also centered, this year, on equipment goods, which everyone knows the country needs badly. This steadfastness is reassuring, inasmuch as, though many firms and countries have been guided by the same analysis of the development, some others unfortunately are offering us this year an opportunity to see that their representation tends to cause, stimulate or develop some aspects of the class consumption the country does not need. Once more, therefore, the Soviet Union is exhibiting at the fair equipment and technology in the subject in which it is tried and tested and in which we Algerians have experimented in the field, even though many are unaware of it.

In fact Algerian-Soviet cooperation is just as old as it is important.

The first economic and technical agreement between the USSR and Algeria was signed in 1963, one year after the victory won by the Algerian people in its heroic struggle for national liberation. That agreement was the continuation of the selfless aid given by the Soviet people to the Algerian people during its struggle for independence.

During that period, simultaneously with the solution of the most urgent tasks, foundations were laid for cooperation in solving the long-term important problems like the development of industry--steel first of all--, the discovery and rational utilization of Algeria's natural resources, the training of national cadres. On 3 July 1964 two fundamental Soviet-Algerian agreements were signed that were the basis for cooperation in the areas of steel and training national cadres.

In accordance with the intergovernmental agreements and the contracts signed by the Soviet organizations and the national companies, projects were carried out related to nearly 100 works.

The commitments contracted for for 65 of them have already been fulfilled, which has contributed tangible results very important for Algeria's economy.

Soviet-Algerian cooperation in the oil and gas industry, a principal branch of Algeria's economy that provided the major part of the foreign currency necessary for the country's economic expansion, began in 1966. In accordance with the terms of the contracts concluded between V/O [expansion unknown] "Techno-export" and SONATRACH, Soviet specialists were sent to Algeria to contribute to the realization of geologic, geophysical and petroleum seismic prospecting projects; the Soviet Union furnished equipment for the appropriate prospecting teams. Of great importance to this branch is the creation of the central laboratory at Boumerdes, partly equipped with Soviet equipment. For this laboratory the USSR delivered calculating equipment, including the "Minsk-32" computer.

Highly qualified Soviet specialists have been working since 1971 in Algeria's Energy and Petrochemicals Ministry and at SONATRACH. In all, nearly 250 Soviet oil specialists are currently working in Algeria.

The largest work built under Soviet-Algerian cooperation, whose ceremonial opening took place in 1971, is the steel mill with a capacity of 410,000 tons of steel per year, built at the El-Hadjar metallurgy plant. When this project went into operation Algeria virtually set up its steel industry; before that, in Oran, there had been a refining plant with a capacity of nearly 20,000 tons of steel per year. The new steel mill laid the foundations for development of national production of ferrous laminates necessary for various sectors of economic development--above all, for construction of pipelines and gas pipelines.

On the basis of the mercury deposits prospected in the course of the cooperation by Soviet and Algerian geologists, a mining and metallurgy firm was created, supplying 317 tons of mercury per year (it was expanded later). This plant was built according to the plan by the Tachkent Sredazniprotsvetmet Plans Institute. The firm has enabled Algeria to become one of the world's largest exporters of mercury.

Nearly 1,000 Soviet teachers are working in the technical institutes and colleges created with the help of Soviet organizations in the universities of Algiers, Oran, Constantine, etc., with the participation of the Soviet Institute for Establishing Higher Educational Projects (Gulprovouz), which drew up a whole series of plans for technologic equipment for teaching establishments created in the course of the cooperation. Plans are currently being prepared for expanding and modernizing the Oil, Gas and Chemical Institute.

The teaching of new specialities is being introduced in the National Light Industry Institute. To that end new laboratories and workshops are being constructed, and a system of training scientists and teachers is being put in place.

8946

CSO: 4400

BANI-SADR CRITICIZES REVOLUTION COURTS, MOSADDEQ CRITICS

Paris NAME-YE RUZ in Persian 8 Sep 80 p 11

[Text] In an interview with ENQELAB-E ESLAMI newspaper, President Bani-Sadr said that he hoped that a small part of what had transpired in the past 18 months in the name of Islam were defensible. In most cases nobody defended what had happened but everybody aspired to "become Islamic," he said. For instance, "it is hoped that our courts are 'Islamicized'," he added. He cited a "living" case in which a person had been condemned to death in Hamadan, the President's own birthplace. His case was referred to Qom where it was judged, upon seeing the case, that neither the person's properties could be confiscated nor he could be executed. The verdict had apparently been issued 11 months ago. Those who had insisted on the death sentence in Hamadan knew that Qom would not be impressed with their judgment but that it would overrule it. Three days prior to Qom's verdict upsetting the previous judgment, the victim was executed against the law, in contradiction of Islam and in contempt of all principles. "Well, it is obvious that the perpetrator is a killer. Now, we shall see whether or not in the Islamic Republic this person would be punished as a murderer. If he is punished, we shall thank God and we shall know that the others will realize that there are certain criteria and rules in the Islamic Republic after all. For that is what makes security. If it is possible to condemn and kill only to find out later that the convicted person was not guilty after all, and if it is possible that nobody asks who caught the man and who killed him, then this republic will not be a proper republic. They began their injustice in meting out punishment to the oppressors in the previous regime. Otherwise, they would obviously have been found out if they had not started with the oppressors. But now they are gradually getting around to the oppressed. Now look who the regular customers of these organizations are. Are they the oppressors? No, they are mostly from among the masses, the workers, the farmers. It is the turn of these groups to be decimated."

"Therefore, if we want justice to prevail, we must put our feet down firmly at the very start, at the trials of the oppressors, and prevent injustice right there. If it is done at that stage, it will be done in later stages as well. I mean, it is the enforcement of the law that can

change the social system. That is it. Otherwise, force shall perpetuate the previous social system."

Criticizing those who attack Dr Mosaddeq and nationalism, Bani-Sadr, himself once a follower of Dr Mosaddeq as a youth, said, "I believe Dr Mosaddeq does not represent nationalism in its Western concept. He represents what he himself said: that "I defend the Islamic and Iranian values." He meant that he would defend the Iranian independent identity within Islam. I came to know him as such and with that attribute I rate him as an extremely cherishable personality in the contemporary history of Iran. I believe that those who want to destroy his image and wilfully capitalize on certain statements in order to achieve this purpose are the same people who want to undermine the foundation of our solidarity and resistance."

9695

CS0: 4906

CABINET APPROVES NEW REGULATIONS ON FOREIGN MISSIONARIES

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 4 Sep 80 p 9

[Text] At a meeting on 27/5/59 [18 Aug 80], the cabinet issued a decree approving a Ministry of National Guidance proposal requiring all foreign missionaries, coming to Iran for educational, religious, medical and charity activities, to submit their application for entry and residency in Iran to the Ministry of National Guidance 2 months prior to their intended travel to Iran. Applications should be forwarded to the Ministry of National Guidance through embassies of the Islamic Republic. According to the new regulations, the number of people in every mission in the country will be limited to the minimum number needed by various missions in the country. Missionaries are not permitted to engage in any political activity other than specifically allowed by law. Violators will be expelled at the first notice. Missionaries are also required to report to the Ministry of National Guidance their addresses, place of work and the name of the countries of which they are citizens of immediately after arrival. Any changes in the address or the place of work must be reported immediately. Under the new regulations, foreign missionaries are allowed to attend, by invitation, Islamic seminars and conferences. They are free to perform their religious rites and ceremonies to the same extent religious minority groups are permitted under the constitution. Host organizations, assisted by the government, will help in providing the needed facilities.

Under article 6 of the new regulations, missionaries may work subject to approval of the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare and in accordance with the employment regulations for non-Iranians. If missionaries are paid from the fund raised by the country's religious minorities, their total pay must not exceed the amount needed for an average standard of living which will be determined by the Ministry of National Guidance. As for sending money abroad, missionaries are subject to the existing exchange regulations. Exceptions could be made by special cabinet permission. Should a missionary decide to leave the country before his time is up, his substitute will be subject to the same regulations.

Violators of the new regulations, in addition to being expelled, are also subject to a fine as well as punishment defined in article 59 of the Labor Law.

Police Department and the Ministries of Labor and National Guidance are responsible for the implementation of the new regulations.

9561

CSO: 4906

MULLAHS TIGHTEN GRIP ON PROSTRATE COUNTRY

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 5 Sep 80 p 5

[Article by Andreas Kohlschuetter: "Can Iran Be Governed? The Mullahs Advance: After the Formation of the Cabinet: The Power Struggle of the Elite Rages Behind the Scene"]

[Text] Has Iran, shaken by revolutionary fever, threatened by chaos and national destruction, now become governable again and capable of reaching decisions through the installation of a new cabinet? From an organizational point of view at least the political and constitutional reestablishment of that power is completed which came to power through the revolution of the masses against the government of the shah. At the end of March 1979 the Islamic Republic as a form of government was approved by plebiscite, in December the Islamic constitution was adopted by referendum. In January the election of Abdul Hassan Bani-Sadr as chief of state followed, in March and May the election of the parliament, in August finally the selection of the new head of the government, Mohammad Ali Radjai, who was forced upon Bani-Sadr by the clerics. Triumphant the Ayatollah and Imam Khomeyni speaks of the "unprecedented success" of the revolution, which "in a period of only 18 months has managed to mobilize for the new republic all the necessary institutions."

However, there can be no real talk of a consolidation of power in Khomeyni's kingdom. It resides nowhere, wanders about, remains diffuse and ineffective. The impression prevails of a tense, vascillating situation in which nothing is certain, everything is continually questioned and upset again and again. For the revolution within the revolution goes on, and the militant radical clerics are advancing in the name of God and the "disfranchised" (Mostazafin), in the sign of religious and class struggle. They hunt down not only henchmen of the shah, but they also seek out new groups of enemies, like the "counterrevolutionary" middle class, the "Westernized" intellectuals, liberals, democrats, technocrats, ethnic and religious minorities, like the Kurds and disciples of the Bahai sect.

The scene is dominated by fear of persecution and imprisonment, of secret vehmic and summary courts without any central control. Wild rumors of insurrections and conspiracies and the specter of a bloody civil war circulate. Bombs explode on the oilfields and in government buildings. Sharp shooters attack barracks and military convoys. President Bani-Sadr warns of a "takeover of anarchy." Even Khomeyni sometimes indicates that he also sees the continual danger of revolutionary self-destruction: "No one from the outside needs to do us any harm; we are cutting our own throats and destroying ourselves."

The reasons why Khomeyni's Islamic Republic cannot rest after the natural catastrophe of the fall of the shah lie, on the one hand, in the total lack of political experience and tradition of this country wracked by despotism and foreign domination; on the other hand, in the complex nature of this multinational state laden with minorities, whose divergent interests could always only be contained by an iron hand; above all, however, in the birth defects, weaknesses and contradictions which characterize the revolutionary Khomeyni regime.

Khomeyni has long become a monument as a towering and moreover uncontested fuehrer personality, disassociated from everyone yet at the center of everything. As stimulator, motor, whip, referee, and final judge of the Iranian revolution the Ayatollah escapes every narrow institutionalization and organizational pigeon-holing. He sees himself as the founder of the republic and an antidespot. He has allowed himself, however, to be groomed as the religious-political commander-in-chief (Velayat Faqih), as the "religious shah" with practically unlimited rights to exercise power and to intervene, which explodes any republican context. He appears in the middle of everything, continually starts new revolutionary fires on his own, wherever it suits him, makes decisions on purges, American hostages, the selection of the head of the government and the composition of the cabinet--the distribution of constitutional powers here or there.

Fanatic and dogged, at the expense of permanent unrest and an unhealthy radicalization, Khomeyni pursues his goal of establishing the "first truly Islamic nation" on earth: "We must return to the former Islam; the Koran contains everything that we need." With this motto he subverted up to now all attempts to return to governmental and political normalcy. The oppressive statement: "Khomeyni is a genius where there are things to destroy, and a fool where there are things to construct," comes from the late Ayatollah Talaghani, that irreplaceable integrating figure of the Iranian revolution.

Behind the external facade of a complementary national and governmental apparatus lies concealed the irreconcilably deep split of the revolutionary elite, who banded together to topple the shah. Their irreconcilable political views did not unleash the constitutional and power struggle

which is by no means over between the chief of state, Bani-Sadr, and the parliament dominated by the Islamic Republic Party--it is led by the Ayatollah Mohammed Beheshti, a powerful hatcher of plots. On the one hand, there are the Islamic modernists and technocrats who speak for modern problem solving techniques on as broad a base as possible. According to Bani-Sadr, "competent people must govern; we need a leadership which represents all interests, not just those of one group to lead the country truly." On the other hand, there are the Islamic fundamentalists and doctrinaire mullahs who, supported by the illiterate masses overwhelmed by modern times, seek refuge in the old ways of faith and the secure world of the prophets. Khomeyni spoke to these people and from the heart when he demanded of the new government that it be "100-percent Islamic, doctrinaire, and revolutionary."

Shock Troops In Action

The conflict between the democratic republican facade and the autocratic grab of the mullahs for a monopoly of power characteristic of the political process in Iran since the fall of the shah is growing more pronounced. The political pluralism which opened up during the Tehran Spring has been eliminated step by step by the Shiite clergy. First came the liberals around the former head of the government, Bazargan, then the national-communist left of the "Fedayin Khalk." Then the shock troops of the "Hishollahi," "God's fellow travelers," were let loose against the Islamic socialist "Mojaheddin Khalk," and finally the universities were closed for an indefinite period to purge "un-Islamic" and "counterrevolutionary" professors and students. Then the drums were beaten against Bani-Sadr, whose election by an overwhelming popular majority amounts up to now to the only setback on the road to a mullah dictatorship. Khomeyni underscored the theologian tyranny in which this Islamic Republic is engaged and which condemns it to harsher and harsher repressive measures when he recently commanded the newly commissioned "Council of Safety," which has as its assignment the examination of laws passed by the parliament for their Islamic purity: "You are only to respect God, not the people."

The chaotic polycentricity of the power structure which confounded Bazargan and caused his downfall and has also prevented any effective governing under Bani-Sadr has by no means been eliminated. Like a plague of rats the armed revolutionary committees, revolutionary guards, revolutionary tribunals and "Hishollahi" gangs have spread across the country. All establish their authority in Khomeyni--of course, not in the government--in most all cases, however, they act, administer, and execute on their own. The state agencies with actual jurisdiction can consider themselves lucky if they are informed at all after the fact about decisions reached by the Islamic Mafia collectives. Thus, Bani-Sadr and his administrative apparatus, for example, must helplessly witness the outrages of revolutionary lynch and murder justice. The president, in fact, courageously and openly denounces the mass executions, which "are largely unjustified," but he cannot stop them.

In the backdrop of seeming governmental normalcy Khomeyni and his mullahs, as dogged and unyielding as ever, strive for total clerical control, for the construction of an Islamic government "of Shiite stamp according to the will of God" and therefore unattainable--in the name of God and the Imam hidden for more than 1,000 years. But the Khomeyni revolution lacks any national plan of action; it is politically without content. Through the destruction of the Shah's empire and the purging crusades against all Western influences empty spaces have developed which somehow must be filled. The mullahs, weak in cadre and totally inexperienced in political, economic, administrative and military matters, with their Koran verses and their motto "Islamization" are unequal to the task.

Very serious social crises are developing in this Iran of 4 million unemployed, 50 percent inflation, stagnant industries, and rapidly sinking oil incomes, which are hardly sufficient to fill the hungry mouths. The unrealistic, theocratic politics of "100-percent Islam" will not be able to divert and suppress the concentrated existential cry of the underprivileged masses much longer--in the 1980 budget there is 14 times more money for religious and religion-based things than for work-related and social matters. The more ruthlessly Khomeyni tries to set up his Shiite Imamate utopia--and nothing would indicate a change of heart in this regard--all the more bitter is the resistance of Sunnites, ethnic minorities, oppressed opposition forces, and also the discord between the various clerical factions struggling for positions of power and succession to Khomeyni--the more of this the greater the internal discord.

International Vacuum

The internal political emptiness corresponds to the international vacuum into which the wildly flailing Khomeyni has driven his Islamic Republic. The Islamic revolution did not bring Iran any closer to its Arabic neighbors. On the contrary, it drove, above all, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain to collective defense against the Khomeyni plague. It is indicative of this that the Gulf state Iran, just like during the coldest isolation under the Shah, has been excluded from all recent summit meetings of Arabic states that line the Gulf. Khomeyni sees his theocratic Iran as the "avant-garde of an international movement of oppressed." And Beheshti went so far as to claim: "The Islamic revolution is not a regional revolution, but a world revolution." Just as Lenin once had to, so too must the Iranian exporters of revolution modify their goals.

The "Splendid Isolation" of the Khomeyni empire appears much more consequential to the outside world with an eye toward the Soviet Union which is patiently waiting to spring. The Kremlin undoubtedly has not abandoned hope of transforming the American power deficit in Iran into a Soviet power credit. The bill has up to now not come due. Only a short while ago a spokesman of the Islamic Republic Party warned: "The revolution will deal with the Soviet Union if it does not desist in its 'three conspiracies' against Iran." And he named "the provocations of the

(communist) Tudeh Party, the arms shipments to Iraq, the murder of our Afghan brothers." At the same time Foreign Minister Gotbzadeh fired off a furious letter to Gromyko in which the Russians were charged with "unpardonable border provocations," also "supporting the counterrevolution in Kurdistan," as well as the deployment of the Tudeh Party "as a fifth column." Finally, Khomeyni himself personally criticized after America the Soviet Union as a "Satanic world power."

The clerical radicalization of the Iranian revolution, its lack of political order, the rabid exclusion of the moderate liberal middle, dammed up social and economic tensions, the bridges to America and Europe broken by the hostage drama and the sanctions, the flood of anti-Western resentment from the wash of which the Islamic Republic was born--all these factors taken together weaken, despite all the anti-Soviet verbage, the immunity of this Iran vis-a-vis the Russian world power neighbor which is just waiting its chance. Before he left office Foreign Minister Gotbzadeh, supported by Bani-Sadr and the remaining bunch of rationally and empirically oriented politicians, evoked in dramatic words the danger of the Russian colossus on the other side of the more than 1,000-kilometer common border: "He wants to drive us into the corner and see us helpless, so that out of desperation we will turn to the north. His policy is unmistakable: to force Iran to its knees and then to set conditions for it according to whim." It is more than questionable that the Ayatollah Khomeyni, the "Superman" and "Representative of God," according to Radio Tehran, equipped with his divan-given guarantee for success, will recognize this danger soon enough and will draw from it the necessary internal and external consequences.

9485

CSO: 4403

'LE MONDE' VIEWS DIVISIONS AMONG IRANIAN OPPOSITION

LD291053 Paris LE MONDE in French 28-29 Sep 80 p 3

[Article by Paul Balta: "The Iranian Opposition in Exile Seems too Divided To Take Advantage of the Situation"]

[Text] On Friday, for the first time since the proclamation of the Islamic Republic in April 1979, Iranian Radio and television played the former national anthem, not the shah's national anthem but the one which the nationalists preferred under the monarchy since it sang glory to "eternal Iran" and not to the monarch. This anthem had virtually been banned by Imam Khomeyni who, also for the first time, launched an appeal for a holy alliance not in Islam's name but for Iran in order to contain the Iraqi invader.

In Paris, however, Baghdad's offensive is causing some exiles to smile: "It is no accident," they say, "that Saddam Husayn has placed his airforce in safety in Jordan and that his army gives the impression of having failed in its lightning strike. The reason it is marking time is to more effectively immobilize the Iranian Army. This is an attempt to create a diversion aimed at preparing the ground for an offensive by the opposition forces who are awaiting a signal on D day." According to others these opposition troops have already penetrated Iran taking advantage of the explosive situation constituted by the presence of Iraqi forces around Abadan and at various points along the border.

For the past few days there have been many reports on this subject, some conflicting. The LONDON TIMES announced that a group of officers in exile, under Marshal (Aryana), think that Khomeyni's regime is about to collapse at any time and are preparing to charter an airplane for Tehran. The marshal, a former chief of staff sacked by the shah in 1969 for having failed to organize an effective response to Iraqi Army attacks, is almost 80 years old and does not have much support in the various opposition groups which he has courted more than they have put him forward as a leader.

General Oveysi's Army

A more serious contender is General Oveysi who, according to the TIMES, has just returned to Iraq from the United States to lead 5,000 dissident soldiers.

According to the Hamburg weekly STERN he has at his disposal 45,000 men trained by some 10 officers in 20 camps situated along the Iranian-Iraqi border and 25,000 more scattered throughout the Gulf Emirates. In particular Bahrain and Oman and 3,000 more in Cairo. All are apparently awaiting orders from the Paris headquarters whence the general is apparently coordinating preparations. The next few days or weeks will show how much credence should be given to these assertions.

According to well-informed oppositionists it is very difficult to put forward specific figures and virtually impossible to assess the size of the various groups since many soldiers are forming a "floating mass" vacillating between several leaders and having multiple or successive alliances. For instance, officers faithful to the Pahlavis are also offering their services to former Prime Minister Shahpur Bakhtiar, because they feel that he has most chance of restoring the dynasty. Others, however, favor Mr Bakhtiar as a nationalist leader, threatening to withdraw their support if he were to envisage a restoration rather than proclaiming a republic.

To find your way in this maze you have to consider the army as it was when the monarchy fell in February 1979. The crack forces--50,000 to 60,000 men--belonged to the Imperial Guard and the paratroopers in the army. In the airforce they belonged to the fighter pilot corps and to the Homafarim (technicians trained in the United States), and in the navy they belonged to the marine fusiliers contingent. Many--but nobody knows exactly how many--managed to emigrate while others are hiding in Iran. On the whole they have remained loyal to the Pahlavis.

In addition to this crack force there are professional infantry, armored division and technical services officers who were generally hostile to Imam Khomeyni without necessarily being unconditional supporters of the shah. Indeed these groups contained a considerable proportion of nationalists and Mossadeqist who rallied to Mr Bakhtiar.

"Oveysi is to Bakhtiar what Beheshit is to Bani-sadr," some exiles say to stress the splits which exist both in the government and the opposition, deploring the fact that the opposition is sometimes portrayed as one bloc when it is more divided than ever. The former premier minister's supporters admit that contacts have been made with General Oveysi but they maintain that the two men do not have a great deal in common.

According to them the man who was nicknamed "the butcher of Tehran" is also in touch with the Pahlavis but, like Mr Bakhtiar, would conclude tactical alliances in order to have more chance of winning power for himself. They point out that this methodical man comes originally from Qom and that, despite the energies he devotes to "the state's service" he is a convinced and practising Muslim and hence could hope to win over religious men in the present regime should it collapse. In short there is rivalry rather than alliance among the three factions.

The "Pahlavi Clan"

Still on the military plane there are some 20,000 to 30,000 armed Kurds who are ready to sell their services but who in the final analysis are Kurds and pay some of their money into the nationalist movement. Finally, the 60,000 or so Savak agents are still the main unknown quantity. Some have been eliminated and others have been won over by the regime. Some of remaining masses have joined forces with Mr Bakhtiar and others with General Oveysi and the Pahlavis without anybody knowing in what proportion they have done so.

At political level the monarchists can be divided into three groups: the "anti-Pahlavists" who want the (Qadjar) Dynasty to be restored. There are very few of them. The "Pahlavi Clan" itself contains two groups: that of Princess Azadeh, Princess Ashraf's daughter, supported by young officers who publish the weekly FREE IRAN and think that the family ought to regain its right naturally, and the group supporting former Empress Farah Diba, whose Paris representative, former minister (Houchang Nahavandi), is the leading figure in the Iran Liberation Front. He favors a constitutional monarchy in which Republicans and Democrats could be associated.

The noncommunist left contains former members of the national front, Mossadeq's heirs, Iran Liberation Movement members and former Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan, social democrats and also bazaar traders. The bazaar traders who had supported Imam Khomeyni fully have since changed their stance and many have gone into opposition or support Ayatollah Shari'at Madari since the regime, at President Bani-sadr's instigation but with the imam's approval, has nationalized foreign trade, thereby preventing them from importing directly and making substantial profits.

"In the Wake of the Iraqi Army"

These opponents are to be found either in the people's movement for the liberation of Iran or in the union for freedom whose members are prepared to cooperate with Mr Hasan Mazeh but reject any alliance with Mr Bakhtiar who they regard as too deeply compromised with the former regime.

However, for some time now, relations between the former prime minister--he has just made a short visit to Egypt whose object is not known--and the Pahlavis have deteriorated considerably. The Pahlavis suggest that Bakhtiar has "sold himself to Iraq" and maintain that they will never agree to "return to Iran in the wake of the Iraqi Army." Mr Bakhtiar's friends proudly retort that those accusations are ridiculous.

At the beginning of the summer oppositionists in Paris maintained that: "In 3 or 4 months there will be an uprising in Iran and the mullahs' regime will collapse." By launching their offensive almost 1 week ago the Iraqi forces clearly intended to encourage such a collapse although the few reports coming from Tehran do not suggest that the provincial populations demanding autonomy, notably in Kordestan and Khuzestan, have

taken advantage of the opportunity--at least not yet--to carry out a mass uprising. Quite the reverse; the impression is that the Islamic government has built a new union around it while the opposition groups abroad remain particularly divided.

CSO: 4900

PRIME MINISTER MOHAMMAD 'ALI RAJA'I BIOGRAPHY

Paris NAME-YE RUZ in Persian 4 Sep 80 p 4

[Text] Mohammad 'Ali Raja'i, Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran, was born in 1312 [21 Mar 1933-20 Apr 1934] in Qazvin. He lost his father in 1316 [21 Mar 1937-20 Apr 1938] and completed his primary education in the same city under the keeping of his brother. At the age of 14 he went to Tehran and worked in the Bazaar for a few years. At the age of 17 he was employed by the Air Force on a fixed-term contract. His acquaintance with Ayatollah Taleqhani and Feda'iyān-e Eslām, familiarized him with the original line of the humanizing ideology of Islam.

Raja'i's attendance in the meetings of the Feda'iyān-e Eslām taught him ideological struggle. His resignation from the Air Force in 1332 [21 Mar 1953-20 Apr 1954] coincided with his graduation from high school. He turned to education by becoming a primary school teacher in Bijar city region (shahrestan). He never separated from the task of educating except in the years he was in prison. He began his political activity when he was a student at the Teacher Training College. His acquaintance with Engineer Bazargan and Dr Sahabi came about in this period. In 1339 [21 Mar 1960-20 Apr 1961] he was a high-school teacher of mathematics in Khansar. Later on when he studied for his M.A. in statistics, he also taught at Kamal School. He was then transferred to Qazvin.

In 1342 [21 Mar 1963-20 Apr 1964] Raja'i was arrested and put behind bars on charges of distributing the statements and publications of the Freedom Movement (Nahzat-e Azadi) and of membership in that organization. When he was released from prison, he formed a group for politico-cultural activity in cooperation with Jala'leddin Farsi and Dr Bāhonar. The establishment of Refah Girls School was the product of the "Islamic Welfare and Cooperation Foundation" (Bonyad-e Refah va Ta'avon-e Eslami) which was made possible with the cooperation of a large number of strugglers who were believers in the 15 Khordad Movement. When Jala'leddin Farsi left Iran in 1349 [21 Mar 1970-20 Apr 1971] to form the nucleus of a guerrilla organization, Raja'i acted as his liaison with the members of the organization in Iran. He went to Damascus once to exchange information with Jala'leddin Farsi. His return to Iran coincided with the arrest of a number of the

members of the Sazeman-e Mojahedin-e Khalq. It was at this point that he came into contact with Hanifnezhad. This acquaintance made it possible for Raja'i to keep in contact with the members of the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization out of prison through the family members of those Mojahedins who were incarcerated. His weekly meetings with Hanifnezhad and Ahmad Reza'i and later on with Reza Reza'i took place regularly for a long time. After the martyrdom of Rez Reza'i, he was in contact with Bahram Aram and Lotfollah Meysami and cooperated in the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization. In the month of Azar 1352 [22 Nov to 21 Dec 1973], he was once more arrested and imprisoned. Interrogation from him took as long as 15 months. SAVAK failed to pump any information out of him. But when Afroukhteh's group was betrayed, Raja'i, too, was betrayed by Manizheh Ashrafzadeh Kermani, whereby SAVAK learned that Raja'i was in possession of extensive information which he had not revealed before. Interrogation was resumed and Raja'i was transferred to Evin Prison. While in prison, Raja'i tried to get the range of the difference between the thinking of the Mojahedins and that of the Marxists, but he failed. On Eid-e Thadir festival [in commemoration of the Prophet appointing Ali, his son-in-law, as his successor] in 1357 [21 Mar 1978-20 Apr 1979], he was released from prison as a result of the unrelenting struggles of the Moslem people. That put a seal on 4 years of suffering as a result of incarceration and torture at the hand of the previous abominable regime.

Raja'i is now 47 years old. He was married in 1340 [21 Mar 1961-20 Apr 1962] and has two children.

9695

CSO: 4906

PRESENT TEHRAN SCENE CONTRASTED WITH PAST

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 15 Sep 80 p 9

[Article by Ulrich Tilgner: "Iran's Capital No Longer Manageable"]

[Text] Fruit stands, bakeries, meat markets, hardware shops and furniture stores. Behind the bazaar in Djawadiye in the south of Tehran, people are crowding around the fruit stands. There is more than enough available even if the high prices scare many a veiled would-be customer away.

The owners have happy faces. In front of a bird-seller's shop three elderly men are sitting on the curb drinking tea out of small glasses. Their answers to the question of what changes have taken place are almost identical: "Khomeini has liberated the country from imperialism." A small boy cries: Neither East, nor West-- Islamic republic."

I am looking for a more precise answer. Things are "good" now, the owner of a snack bar selling hamburgers and Coca Cola says. What changes are there in everyday life ? The answer is much the same. "Everything has gotten better." There is water and electricity in this part of town, yes. But then a schoolboy comes up with a more detailed answer. Both at the head and at the bottom of this long street a new school has been built. And, there now is a sports field and a public health station. The boy also tells me how life has changed. "We have grown more conscious of things, step by step," he says. "Things are different now." An old woman says: "I know what has changed. Prostitution is gone once and for all and young people no longer become heroin addicts." And an old man says: "Lest we forget, SAVAK is no longer around."

This part of town is totally overpopulated; the narrow alleys are teeming with little children. There is no sign of any large-scale urban renewal efforts having taken place after the revolution. But the people are content. They, too, are affected by the terrible unemployment in Tehran. Many

of those who are working have gotten wage increases since the revolution. Also, they do not grumble in front of a foreigner. "Keep up the boycott for all I care," a 45 year-old man says, folding his hands on his stomach. "I have not gone hungry yet. We have everything we need and sooner than depend on others again we will all go on a fast. God will not forsake us." Those who are listening to us conclude the conversation by saying "Allah akbar"-- Allah is great. The world is still in order here and there is Islamic identity. People live close together and help each other. Here, the extended family takes on the role of an unemployment insurance and social security scheme.

During the afternoon rush hour it takes 45 minutes to cover the three kilometers to the southern edge of the city. This is where the Mustasafin, those deprived of all rights, live in utter squalor; the poorest of the poor who have built their own huts which do not even afford protection from the wind and the rain.

In the year following the revolution, many of the huts were replaced by stone houses, many of them equipped with water and electricity. Some of the slum dwellers have moved into these houses or have even occupied them outright. Not only was their place taken over by new arrivals; new huts were built on the edge of the old "settlement" and electric power lines were illegally laid.

Under the Shah, the police would go into action in such cases. There were dead and wounded in the course of altercations with the municipal eviction squads. These days, the new laws calling for fines and prison terms still do not keep the population from building shelters. Government support is scanty; frequently there are committees which extend financial aid and bring in food. The people are hoping for an improvement in their living conditions. But, alongside much criticism directed against the government and the politicians, there is a deep faith in Ayatollah Khomeini. There is a great deal of public construction going on in this part of the city. Roads are being paved; sewage drains are being dug. Part of the sewage no longer seeps into the ground right in front of the houses as it used to do.

Muhammad Tavassoli, lord mayor of Tehran, wants to use his 40,000 city employees to do away with the worst of the problems. From his office on the 24th floor of city hall originally built to house the Shah's unity party, he can survey

the southern sections of the city. Enumerating the history and the problems of the city, he cites a number of pertinent statistics.

During the Shah's dictatorship, Tehran was built up as the capital of the country; in time, it got much too big. There was a veritable population explosion in Tehran following the Shah's so-called land reform in the sixties. There was no industry to speak of in the city. In the factories on the edge of town, which were not put up right next to the army barracks by sheer accident, goods were assembled but not really manufactured.

Nor did the revolution serve to turn the population trend around. Ill-considered promises made by the revolutionary leadership had in fact led to an additional increase of 1 1/2 million people. By now, there are 6 million living in Tehran-- one million families, 300,000 of which do not possess adequate housing. Tehran's problems, the mayor said, are incredible.

The 42 year-old mayor, who has been active in the Islamic revolutionary movement since the early sixties and went to jail because of this for a year in the early seventies, is proud of the gains he has made in the fight against the city's chaotic traffic conditions. For several months now, the inner city has been closed to passenger cars until 10 am. One million vehicles cannot enter until that time.

The only vehicles that may are buses and taxis but they must carry up to five passengers at a time with no additional passengers permitted to board. The mayor is also proud of the fact that the city bus transport system, employing 12,000 workers and twice the number of buses, is transporting 800,000 more people daily than it did under the Shah.

Tavassoli says that the main problem after the revolution was to reduce popular antagonism against the employees of the city administration. A start was made by a large-scale street cleaning program. 15,000 sanitation workers are on the job early every morning, picking up refuse. They are paid DM 17 per day, which is four times as much as before the revolution. But in view of the inflation, this is not enough to feed a family in Tehran.

The mayor is not sure how Tehran can be rehabilitated. The problem, he says, is how all of Iran is to be rehabilitated. To be sure, it is prohibited by law to set up administrative facilities or new industry in a 120-kilometer radius around Tehran but it will take economic progress in the provinces and in the other cities of the country to reverse the population trends. The city has little money and is deliberately not starting to rehabilitate by putting up new housing.

As far as Tavassoli is concerned, priority must be given to sewerage, road building, the construction of schools and public health facilities as well as of municipal fruit markets (to fight inflation). Over the past few months, one million trees were planted in the southern part of the city both in order to help improve climatic conditions and to forestall the erection of further slums in the open spaces still available there. For the present, penalties for illegal construction are not being invoked; the ordinances of the revolutionary council are merely being promulgated as a deterrent. But they may very well be invoked, if efforts to resettle people in the country do not succeed.

But Tehran is not only a city of the Orient with its veiled women in the south, its huge, roofed-in bazaar in the old center of town; it is not only a city of indescribable poverty but also a center of wealth and western life style. In the higher-lying districts north of the city center, there are unmistakable signs of Western influence. The streets are wider here; there are pleasant parks and comfortable houses in the main, many of them with large gardens and some with swimming pools.

Half of the earnings of all of Iran are concentrated here. Supermarkets and stores a good deal more expensive than those in the southern part of town signalize the difference in life styles. Many an Iranian restaurant has had to make way for a pizzeria. Those who live in these sections of the city are offering resistance to Islamization. But this spirit of resistance cannot take hold among the masses because the poor on the edges of town view these people up here in the north as symbolizing the era of the Shah and as the enemy camp in terms of the domestic political conflict.

After the revolution, rents and prices for houses collapsed; now they are climbing again just as in "the good old days." In the north of the city, the uncertainty that followed on the heels of the revolution has passed. People are

taking their Mercedes 450's, which are four times as expensive in Tehran than in the FRG, out of the garage again; in the evenings, there are parties even if alcoholic beverages are only dispensed on the sly.

But the pre-revolutionary night life of the city no longer exists. Instead, the number of weddings has increased since the revolution. And when long lines of cars honking their horns roll through the deserted streets at midnight, then these are not intoxicated soccer fans celebrating the victory of their team but wedding guests conducting the newlyweds to their new apartment.

9478
CSO: 4403

RELATIONS WITH U.S. EXAMINED

Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 23 Jul 80 p 13

[Article by Fred Halliday*: "Washington and the Iraqi Card"]

[Text] America is interested in Iraq for three reasons--its economic strength, its hostility to the Soviets, and the stability of its regime.

There are two things which prevent a resumption of diplomatic relations between Iraq and America--America's position concerning Palestine, and America's support of the Kurds. During the last few months rumors have been streaming out of Washington, the upshot of which is that the Carter administration is interested in setting up a new alliance with Iraq. It has been said about Brzezinski that, at a meeting of the Council of Foreign Affairs last March, he made a point of the fact that Iraq has already become the most influential country in the Arab world. And on 16 April he stated that there is no basic conflict between Iraq and the United States. And although there have not been diplomatic relations between the two countries since Iraq severed them after the 1967 War between the Arabs and the Israelis, this has not prevented American policy planners from counting on a new cooperation with Iraq by means of which Iraq, with its growing wealth, self-confidence, and hostility to the Soviet Union, could exercise influence which the United States' other allies, such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, are not able to exercise. And Iraq could take the place of Iran under the shah as the leader of opposition to communism in the Middle East.

According to American thinking there are three principal reasons why Iraq should play this role. The first reason is that Iraq is on its way toward becoming a significant economic power. Its petroleum reserves are estimated at about 100 billion barrels, and in this respect it occupies second place after Saudi Arabia. Its income from oil, in the year 1978, was estimated at about 24 billion dollars. Also, Iraq has

*Fred Halliday, a colleague in the Trans-National Institute in Amsterdam, visited Iran in April and wrote this exclusive article for AL-SAFIR.

make efforts to limit OPEC's price increases and has undertaken to raise its oil production to 3.5 million barrels a day in order to make up for large quantities of oil no longer produced by Iran. In 1980, Iraq will be spending 17 billion dollars on development. Although Japan and West Germany occupy first place in Iraq's foreign trade, it nevertheless exports 100,000 barrels a day to the United States. Also, Iraq is importing more and more American products, including Boeing airplanes. And a number of American firms operate in Iraq. In addition to this, it is believed that Iraq has invested up to 5 billion dollars in U.S. treasury bonds.

The second reason for America's interest in Iraq is the fact that Iraq has become an influential diplomatic power in the Third World. In November of 1978 Iraq hosted the Arab summit conference which was in opposition to the policy of Sadat. Also, Iraq has reached unannounced security agreements with Saudi Arabia. And it has been decided that Iraq, in 1982, will host the summit conference of non-aligned nations. In addition to this, Iraq is utilizing its petroleum reserves in order to secure aid for countries in the Third World which are friendly to it. But it is not merely a matter of Iraq--with its income and its population totalling 18 million people--being able to undertake an effective role in the Arab world and set itself up as the "fortress of the Arab revolution." There is also the fact that Iraq increasingly sees itself as an enemy of two forces in the region which the United States also regards as enemies--the Soviet Union and Iran. Although the Soviet-Iraqi friendship treaty, which was signed in 1972, is still in effect, Iraq is continuing to criticize the role of the Soviet Union in Ethiopia, Democratic Yemen, and Afghanistan. During the last two years, the rulers of Iraq have executed dozens of communists, even though the Iraqi Communist Party has been participating in the government. Their pretexts have not been restricted to the fact that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan gives the United States a legitimate excuse to engage in similar intervention. They have also been making the claim, perhaps a bit exaggerated, that the Soviet Union might try the same thing in Iraq. An Iraqi official in Baghdad said to me: "Since Babrak Karmal was able to invite the Soviets into Afghanistan, what is there to prevent the Iraqi Communist Party from attempting to do the same thing?"

Iraqi-Iranian relations have been deteriorating ever since Khomeini came to power, and both governments are broadcasting statements which demand the overthrow of the other government. At the same time that Khomeini has been giving secret support to Iraqi Shiites who are against the regime in Iraq, Iraq has been providing Iranian opposition forces with military facilities and radio stations.

This Iranian opposition, which includes in its ranks some of the former Shah's generals and followers of former Prime Minister Bakhidar, is still not able to mount an all-out offensive inside Iran. But there is little doubt that the Iraqi government would offer its full support if the

opposition in Iran tried to overturn the Khomeini regime. The third reason for America being interested in Iraq is the fact that the Americans are convinced that the Iraqi regime, at least according to the criteria of the Middle East, is a relatively stable regime. And in spite of the fact that Iraq's agriculture and industry are not at all effective, the regime's oil wealth has enabled it to provide social services for most of Iraq's inhabitants. The regime has managed to liquidate all of its opposition (more than 100 people have been executed this year) and it has been using its cash in order to create party cadres which are loyal to the regime. President Saddam Husayn, who is 43 years of age, has concentrated all the power in his hands. He has created an atmosphere of whole-hearted dedication, and he is capable of acting like a man of the people, in contrast to the ostentation and cult of personality with which he is surrounded officially. Although nobody is able to guarantee total security against repeated attempts to engage in conspiracies against the regime, nevertheless repression, oil, and strong leadership have contributed toward making the Ba'thist government a model of political stability.

Iraq Does Not Want To

The problem with the American view is that America supposes that the Iraqis would like to enter into this game. But the fact that the Iraqi government right now is taking a position which is critical of Moscow does not simply and automatically mean that it is going to be pro-Western.

Iraq's oil wealth has enabled it to adopt a policy which is to some degree independent and politically distinct from that of either the Eastern or Western bloc. The diversity of policies in the Western nations has enabled President Saddam Husayn to establish extensive commercial relations with France and to buy 64 Mirage planes without falling victim to the plan which the West had made for Iraq.

The main obstacle to an Iraqi-American rapprochement is Washington. Saddam Husayn recently stated: "The United States is occupying Arab land because Israel is occupying Palestine by virtue of America's power. And as long as the United States continues to occupy our lands, we will always have to consider the United States as an enemy of the Arabs." And concerning the subject of diplomatic relations, he said: "We will not beg America to send its envoys to us. During the last 3 years, not one year has passed without the United States trying at least twice and sometimes ten times to use all possible means to resume diplomatic relations with us. But we have rejected all of these efforts, not because of fear but because of love for the Arab nation."

Relations in Absence of Diplomatic Relations

The Iraqis do not need actual diplomatic relations in order to have dealings with the United States. Informal relations are continuing even though there are no ambassadors. And the foreign minister of Iraq,

Salim Hamadi, who was educated in the United States, met with Cyrus Vance, the former American secretary of state, on more than one occasion at the UN. Also, Saudi Arabia is considered to be an appropriate channel for the exchange of messages between the two parties. The United States is mistaken if it imagines that Iraq's position is merely one of rhetoric. The fact is that its position regarding Palestine is the expression of a deep-seated feeling. Also, this position taken by Iraq is considered to be an appropriate means by which the rulers of Baghdad can set themselves up as heroes who are fighting for the causes of the Arabs.

Cooperation Between America and the Ba'athists?

The thing which draws one's attention is the fact that, in spite of the recent conflicts between Baghdad and Washington, in the past they have cooperated with each other concerning many issues. In the mid-fifties the Iraqi government, which was a monarchy at that time, helped to establish the Baghdad Pact and was the pivot around which revolved the alliance of countries in the area which were supported by America in order to oppose communism. When in 1958 the leftist republican regime, supported by the Iraqi Communist Party took power, it was violently opposed both by the Ba'athists and the United States. In February of 1963 the Ba'athists and their allies were able to overthrow this regime. By doing this they were able to inflict a bloody defeat on the Iraqi Communist Party—a defeat from which the communists are still suffering. Hundreds of communists were killed during 3 days of slaughter that went on in the streets of Iraq's cities. Likewise, hundreds more communists were killed later on in prison after about 18,000 of them had been arrested. This defeat was an overwhelming one for the communist movement in the Middle East, and was a greater defeat than was the one which occurred after the 1953 overthrow of the Mossadeq government in Iran. The facts concerning the American-Ba'athist cooperation at that time have still not been revealed. But many observers, including Jordan's King Hussein, have mentioned that the CIA provided the Ba'athist forces of revenge with lists of the names and addresses of Iraq's communists. In fact the leader of the Ba'athists' group, 'Ali Salih al-Ba'di, briefly referred to the role played by the United States when he said: "We came to power on an American train."

The Ba'athists were kicked out of power during the latter part of 1963, but they returned to take over the reins of power for good in July of 1968. Moreover, reports have pointed to the fact that America also played a role in this coup d'etat. But there is no doubt that relations between the Ba'ath Party and the United States deteriorated and weakened in 1970 after the CIA discovered for itself a new role in Iraq. This role was that of supporting the Kurdish opposition, in a huge secret operation in cooperation with the Shah of Iran, in order to make Baghdad more pliable to Iranian demands. It is possible that the Iraqis, because of regional pressures, might revise their position and resume diplomatic relations with Washington. But it is not possible for easy reconciliation to take place. — on the two governments, nor is it possible for Iraq to hastily turn back and blindly praise which American-Iranian cooperation is taking place. — it is but a few weeks ago.

Perhaps the best way to view the Ba'athists is to see them as an Arab version of what the Kuomintang Party was in China during the twenties of this century--a highly nationalistic party, dependent on armed forces and yet not subordinate to them, hostile to all racial minorities, and capable of besieging its communist allies whenever such a move would be appropriate. And if a party such as this one has demonstrated that it cannot be a firm ally of the Soviet Union, it would nevertheless also be a worrisome partner to the United States even if Washington were now prepared to ignore Baghdad's human rights violations. Perhaps events will eventually force the Ba'athists to make a choice just as the Kuomintang was forced to make a choice. But if Washington cherishes any hopes that there will be a quick end to Iraqi hostility toward America, it should know that these hopes probably will not be realized.

9468

CS01 4802

OIL MINISTER DISCUSSES VARIOUS OIL-RELATED ISSUES

Kuwait AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM in Arabic 5 Jul 80 p 18

[Interview with Tayib 'Abd al-Karim, Iraq's oil minister, in Baghdad, by 'Abdallah al-Qaq; date not given]

[Text] "We will sign a technical cooperation agreement with Kuwait within the framework of OPEC."

"We will present a working paper to the economic summit conference of the OPEC nations."

"Unifying OPEC's oil price structure is more important than increasing the prices."

"We support the use of oil as a weapon in order to deal with challenges and provocations."

"We reject the fragmentation of the Arab world's political and economic interests."

Mr Tayib 'Abd al-Karim, a member of the Iraqi Revolution Command Council and oil minister, said that arriving at a formula for unifying OPEC's oil price structure, and examining the extent to which corrective action must be undertaken in order to maintain actual price levels, is much more important than raising the prices of oil, because this will help OPEC set a long-range strategy for itself. He added that regulating oil production is the only step which can enable the OPEC countries to deal with the plans of the Western countries which aim at continually upsetting the balance of supply and demand by means of their stockpiling of oil. He went on to say that Iraq will present a working paper to the economic summit conference of the OPEC nations which is to be held in Baghdad next October and which will deal with "the sum total of the topics currently brought up, international economic issues, international relations, and the future dimensions of OPEC's role as model experience for the Third World." Then he added that Iraq knows the truth about American aims and threats and "we will not permit America to prevent us from fully exercising our legitimate rights, either with regard to our oil policy or with regard to issues which affect our future."

He said that Iraq considers it "necessary to use oil as a weapon in order to confront present-day challenges and provocations and in order to resist blatant intervention by the great powers in matters and affairs concerning oil." He said that Iraq's position with regard to the dialogue between the Gulf countries and the European countries is one of principle "based on the desire to maintain unity in the ranks of the Arabs and based on rejection of fragmentation of the Arab world's political and economic interests, both on national and regional bases."

He denied that his country has already made contacts with other countries in order to engage in the bartering of oil in exchange for nuclear reactors to be used for peaceful purposes. He said: "We have never resorted to any form of bartering at any time."

Mr Tayih 'Abd al-Karim gave this interview to AL-RAY AL-'AMM's correspondent during the latter's recent visit to Baghdad. In the interview, he touched upon a number of economic issues concerning the Arabs and the rest of the world. Asked about the fact that the foreign press has dubbed him as one of OPEC's prominent "hawks," he answered: "We are all hawks. We cannot surrender to the interests of the great powers. This is because our goal is to serve the interests of our Arab countries and our Arab nation, to preserve our petroleum resources, both on the national and pan-Arab level, for as long a period as possible, and to develop alternate sources of energy."

Iraq's Position Concerning Kuwait's Decision to Reduce Oil Production

The first question which was put to the minister concerned his opinion about the decision Kuwait has taken to reduce its oil production.

[Question] Do all of the OPEC Countries support this? And how much surplus oil is there on the world market?

[Answer] I want to remind you that Iraq has taken a firm position with regard to the subject of oil production. From our point of view, the important thing is not whether production is reduced or increased. The important thing is to regulate and plan production in order to achieve a balance in international supply and demand so that the basic needs of the world, particularly the needs of the developing countries, are provided for. Regulation of oil production is the only step which will enable us to deal with plans made by the Western countries which aim at continually upsetting the balance of supply and demand by stockpiling oil.

The fact that some oil-exporting countries are reducing their production basically reflects these countries' assessment of their oil situation and production policies, on the one hand, and their assessment of the current status of the world's oil market, on the other hand. There is no doubt that this reduction in oil production will tend to contribute toward

preventing a surplus in oil supply. But what we need at this critical stage is to arrive at a formula for regulating production, within the framework of the OPEC organization, in order to guarantee market stability.

An Iraqi Working Paper

[Question] Iraq is getting ready to hold an OPEC summit conference next October on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the founding of OPEC. Could you tell whether or not Iraq will be submitting a working paper during this conference? And how do you visualize OPEC during the next 10 years? Do you expect OPEC's effectiveness to increase? Or do you think OPEC will fall apart, as the American Department of Energy is always predicting?

[Answer] Yes, Iraq will be submitting a working paper to the OPEC summit conference. It will contain the country's views concerning all of the topics currently brought up, international economic issues, international relations, and the future dimensions of OPEC's role as model experience for the Third World.

The International Energy Agency [sic], which was basically set up as an organization to deal with the oil-exporting countries, has planned, and is still planning, to achieve its dream of bringing about the downfall of OPEC. But the solidarity of the OPEC nations has proven that OPEC is stronger than all of these efforts directed against it. The decade of the eighties will definitely see an increase in the scope and nature of OPEC's effectiveness. The oil-exporting countries right now are entering into a new struggle--the struggle to achieve comprehensive economic and social growth--after having achieved their victory in the struggle to regain their petroleum wealth from the clutches of the international oil monopolies. The struggle to achieve growth requires broader formulas of cooperation between the OPEC member nations on all levels. In addition to this there is the fact that the status which the oil-producing nations occupy among the nations of the Third World has invested these countries with new international responsibilities.

American Threats and Iraq's Position

[Question] By means of following your public statements, your meetings with people at OPEC conferences, and through my frequent visits to Iraq, I have learned that Iraq rejects the constant threats directed toward it by foreign countries. But it seems to me that these threats, especially threats from the United States, have been carried to the extreme lately with regard to the possibility of occupying the oil fields. What is your opinion about these statements, and what position do you think the Arabs should take regarding this at the present time?

[Answer] Saddam Husayn, who is our leader and president of the republic, has emphasized that Iraq resolutely rejects all imperialist threats against the Arab nation and against the oil-producing countries. And he issued the warning that "any aggression against any Arab or oil-producing country will set the region's oil fields ablaze and will, first and foremost, burn the heads and tails of the aggressors." We in Iraq know the truth about, and the aims of, these threats. And we will not permit them to prevent us from fully exercising our legitimate rights, either with regard to our oil policy or with regard to issues which affect our future.

The position which the Arabs must take at the present time is one of total commitment to the principles and bases of the statement made to the Arab world by our president and militant leader, Saddam Husayn, and their position should be one of keeping the Arab countries outside of all of the various international conflicts.

The Effectiveness of Using Oil As a Weapon

[Question] Do you believe that oil can be used effectively as a weapon in the conflict which is going on at the present time? And if this question arises, what do you think the response of the Arab OPEC countries will be?

[Answer] The use of economic resources to defend the political and economic interests of the countries which possess these resources, as well as to protect their national security, is a legitimate right which is sanctioned by international law and tradition. Since it was founded, the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party has stressed the importance of Arab oil as a weapon, in our decisive national conflicts, in order to achieve the liberation of Arab lands which have been usurped and in order to achieve the building of the edifice of the economic and political unity which we so desire. And if the large countries do not hesitate to use their economic power in order to exert pressure on the smaller countries, then the Arab countries should also not hesitate to use their principal weapon, which is that of oil, in order to confront the challenges and provocations which they are currently faced with and in order to resist blatant intervention in the region's affairs by the great powers. The steady growth of awareness and insistence on the part of the masses throughout the Arab world has made us increasingly confident of the fact that all of the Arab oil-exporting countries are full aware of these facts.

Cooperation Between The Gulf Countries Concerning Oil

[Question] Could you please tell us what Iraq's daily oil production is? And what plans does Iraq have for future development of its production and for discovering new oil fields? And what hopes does Iraq have for cooperation between the Gulf countries concerning oil?

[Answer] Our current production capacity is more than 4 million barrels a day, and it is constantly increasing due to the efforts made by our Iraqi personnel. Our actual level of production varies between 3 and 3.7 million barrels a day, depending on the situation in the international oil market, on the one hand, and depending on our need for capital to finance our development plans and our financial commitments to other countries in the world. We have undertaken drilling and exploration operations both in order to discover new oil fields and to develop our present ones. So far the results have been promising and this has been reflected in what our president and leader has said about the fact that Iraq will produce one of the last two barrels of oil which the world produces.

As for cooperation with our fellow-Arab countries in the Gulf area, we are pursuing this on three levels. We are doing this on the bilateral level, for example, with Kuwait. Our oil ministry is going to conclude a technical cooperation agreement in the field of petroleum production with the Kuwaiti oil ministry. We are also pursuing such cooperation with the Gulf countries through OAPEC and through OPEC.

We believe that these three levels of cooperation among the countries of the Arabian Gulf, particularly in the field of oil production, are a clear and graphic way to demonstrate fraternal relations between these countries.

The Soviet Union and the Importing of Oil

[question] It is said that the Soviet Union may become an importer of oil during the next 20 years. And it is said that this is what has impelled it to occasionally take action to move toward the waters of the Arabian Gulf, via Afghanistan. What comments do you have regarding this?

[Answer] It is virtually a unanimous opinion that the world will be suffering from a shortage in energy supply beginning in the mid-eighties unless rapid and effective steps are taken to limit wasteful consumption of this vital resource and to develop alternate sources of energy.

As for the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, Iraq has strongly condemned it on the basis of Iraq's adherence to the principle of equality among nations, mutual respect of nations for each other, and non-intervention in the internal affairs of others. We strongly reject any attempts on the part of any foreign party to intervene in the Arabian Gulf, no matter what form this intervention might take.

The imperialists are attempting to exploit the mistake which has been made by the Soviet Union in its invasion of Afghanistan. They are trying to obtain military facilities in the form of air and sea bases, and they are beefing up their naval presence. They are using the carrot-and-stick method. Already they have filled the waters of the Arabian Sea with their armed naval units. This exposes the region to the probability of a

confrontation between the two giants or to the probability of these two giants concluding an agreement to divide the region up into spheres of influence. In either case, this is not at all in the interests of our Arab nation and people.

The Charter of National Action, announced by our president and leader, Saddam Husayn, expresses the aspirations of the people of the area. It emphasizes the necessity of keeping the Arabian Gulf area outside the realm of conflict and stresses that the area should be free of any foreign military presence and that the matter of the area's defense and protection should be left to the peoples of the area themselves. What this means is that we, who reject Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, also strongly reject attempts and maneuvers on the part of American imperialism.

The North Sea and Its Danger to OPEC Production

[Question] Do you see the production of oil in the North Sea as being a danger to the oil production of the OPEC countries? How do you assess the effect of its production on the other oil-producing countries?

[Answer] The development of new sources of oil would lighten the burden which is being assumed by the member states of OPEC. This burden consists in the fact that they are maintaining high rates of oil production and quickly exhausting their petroleum reserves due to their desire to provide for the world's needs for this vital resource. In light of this fact, OPEC has stressed, and is still stressing, the necessity of developing both traditional and non-traditional sources of energy in order to help prolong, as long as possible, the life of the petroleum reserves which have been granted to the world. The development of oil fields in the North Sea and in other areas does not at all constitute a danger to OPEC. In fact, it lifts from its shoulders a part of the burden of providing for the world's increasing oil requirements. The danger lies in the fact that the development of oil fields in these other areas may lead the principal industrial oil-consumer nations to continue their wasteful consumption of oil and to neglect implementing programs for developing alternate sources of energy and energy conservation programs.

The North-South Dialogue

[Question] It appears that the North-South dialogue still has not yielded any results. What is your opinion regarding the reactivation of this dialogue? And we would also like to ask you about the dialogue on oil production which is being conducted by the Gulf countries? Do you think that this dialogue will take the place of the Arab-European dialogue? That is to say, do you think that there still be a dialogue between the Gulf countries and the European countries involving uniform cooperation between these countries without sufficient participation on the part of the other members of the Arab League?

[Answer] The North-South dialogue ended in failure in 1977 due to stubbornness on the part of the principal industrial countries, especially the United States, and due to their refusal to offer even a minimum of concessions for the sake of setting up a new world economic order. And as long as the principal industrial countries are showing no initiatives to review and rectify their positions with regard to all of the economic problems from which the world is suffering, it is impossible to expect success from any attempt to resume the North-South dialogue, whether in the form of the Paris dialogue or in the form of comprehensive international negotiations within the framework of the UN.

As for the dialogue between the Gulf countries and the European countries, Iraq's position with regard to it is clearly a position of principle. It is based on Iraq's rejection of the fragmentation of the Arab world's political and economic interests, both on the national and pan-Arab levels.

Carter's Program to Stop Inflation

[Question] President Carter recently has suggested a new program to put a stop to inflation. This program was received with a feeling of relief by some countries, whereas others saw it as being something which would only benefit the American economy. Could you please tell us Iraq's position with regard to this?

[Answer] The measures which were recently announced by President Carter are aimed exclusively at helping the American economy. This is because the rates of inflation and unemployment in the United States have reached very high levels in comparison with the other industrial countries. These steps should not be interpreted as being an attempt on the part of the American government to support international economic stability, in general, or to support the economies of the developing countries, including the oil-exporting countries, in particular. The important thing is not the fact that the measures are being taken, but rather the extent to which these measures will be seriously applied and the results which they achieve. OPEC's experience since 1973, and in particular since 1976, has shown that the United States is not seriously prepared to take steps which would guarantee long term solutions to the problem of inflation and the decline of the exchange rate of the dollar on the world money market. We have seen that the United States has encouraged sharp declines in the rate of the dollar since 1976 in order to exhaust the financial resources of the oil-exporting countries, on the one hand, and in order to consolidate its position in international trade at the expense of the principal industrial countries, on the other hand.

No Bartering for Nuclear Reactors

[Question] Some foreign newspapers have referred to the fact that Iraq has decided to obtain nuclear reactors to use them for peaceful purposes, and will offer oil to some European countries in exchange for these reactors. What is your opinion with regard to this? And have contacts been made in an effort to obtain these reactors?

[Answer] We feel that it is our duty, and that we owe it to our future generations, both on the national and on the pan-Arab level, to preserve our petroleum wealth in Iraq for as long a time as possible. One of the most important means of conserving this wealth of ours is to develop alternate sources of energy, and this includes atomic power. Right now our goal is to set up an electric power plant which runs on nuclear power.

But as for bartering oil for nuclear reactors to be used for peaceful purposes, we have never resorted to bartering with any country. Before we take the decision to sell oil to any country, we carefully weigh our political, economic, and technological relations, taken as a whole, with this country which wishes to buy oil from us.

Differences Within OPEC

[Question] In spite of the OPEC conference which was held in Algeria, there are still differences in points of view between the OPEC countries concerning oil prices. What is your opinion about settling these differences and about creating the solutions necessary to achieve this?

[Answer] Iraq was the first country which made an appeal to have a uniform price structure for OPEC oil and to work toward achieving stability in the oil market. Iraq has made efforts in the direction of arriving at a formula for uniform prices which would guarantee the interests of the oil-exporting countries. We are confident that the circumstances that have been encountered by the oil market since the beginning of 1979 have made it abundantly clear how important this matter is. And we are sure that all of the member countries in OPEC are aware of the importance of being able to control prices by means of a uniform price structure and by not leaving the prices free to be determined by speculation engaged in by the oil companies and middlemen. On the basis of this premise we expect the conference of OPEC ministers, in its next regular meeting in Algeria, to arrive at a formula for a uniform price structure.

[Question] May we ask your opinion with regard to the fact that the two-price system continues to proliferate? Does this affect the OPEC nations? And what are your thoughts concerning finding a solution to this difference in points of view?

[Answer] There is no doubt that the diversity of prices and the lack of a clear basis for setting prices for the oil of the OPEC countries do not serve the interests of these countries. I say this in view of the fact that this increases the intensity of the instability which the world oil market has been subjected to since the beginning of 1979. Naturally, the negative effects brought about by the continuation of the diversity in oil prices will be even more dangerous in the long run. In our opinion, the ideal solution is to agree upon a formula for a uniform

general price structure for oil which would take into consideration the actual price level and then would involve planning production in such a way as to guarantee the permanence of this uniform formula. At the same time, it would guarantee that prices would gradually increase to a level which reflects the fact that oil is a depletable resource and would reflect its economic value in uses other than its uses as a source of energy. It would also reflect the costs of developing alternate sources of energy and the continual rates of inflation in the prices of goods imported by the OPEC countries from the industrial countries.

In addition to all of this, it should reflect the instability of the exchange rates of the principal currencies in the international currency market. The most important thing is first of all to arrive at a formula for a uniform price structure. Then the thing to do is to examine the scope of rectification which must be undertaken in oil prices in order to maintain the actual price level in accordance with the principles which are included in the long-term strategy of the OPEC nations. With regard to the present rates of inflation, everything seems to indicate that, during 1980, these rates of inflation will be higher than they were in 1979. Indications also show that the principal industrial countries, in particular the United States, have not succeeded in putting a stop to the fluctuations which occur in the currency markets. And we have no reason to feel optimistic that the situation in these currency markets will change for the better during this year.

946B

ESD: 48C2

STUDY OF IRAQ'S OIL PRODUCTION POLICY CITED

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 15 Jul 80 p 12

[Article: "Oil Fields Are Producing Only 20 Percent of What Iraq Can Produce"]

[Text] In a study which came out recently it was said that Iraq's oil production up till 1973 did not exceed 1.5 million barrels a day, that is, about 75 million tons per year. But due to constant efforts on the part of Iraqi personnel, there has been further development in fields which are actually producing oil. Also, many new discoveries of oil have been made, and this has brought production up to 3.7 million barrels a day by the first part of this year. The study also says that Iraqi oil production has been increased for the purpose of dealing with the requirements of Iraq's development plans, on the one hand, and in order to help the countries of the Third World, on the other hand. This is why Iraq, up till 1978, engaged in searching for loans to finance its ambitious development plans. Because of its production commitments to the world oil market, and in light of the various quotas, Iraq was not able to provide for the needs of its development plan. All of this was true until 1978. But now Iraq's oil policy, which includes increased production, is based fundamentally on the necessity to program and organize this production in accordance with the actual requirements of the world market. The policy is no longer designed to go along with speculation and bidding by the oil monopolies for available quantities of oil.

Helping the Developing Countries

The study says that, at the same time, this policy has borne in mind the interests of the consumer nations in the Third World, especially the poor, developing countries toward which Iraq feels that it has moral obligations. And this is not at all in conflict with the aim and desire of Iraq's leaders to preserve this national resource.

The study has also revealed that Iraq's oil fields which are actually producing oil at the present time are producing only 20 percent of what Iraq actually has the capability of producing. The study referred to what the

Iraqi president, Saddam Husayn, had previously said about the fact that one of the last two barrels of oil produced in the world should be a barrel of Iraqi oil.

Gas

Concerning natural gas in Iraq, the study, which was prepared by the Iraqi Informational Studies Office, said that the decade 1970-80 had been a phase in which Iraq had utilized 20 percent of its flare gas after showing great interest in the utilization of such gas.

The study says that in 1982 a stop will be put to the practice of wasting gas by flaring it. This will conserve about 5 million tons of gas, from the fields in both the north and the south, which will then be exported after local market needs have been taken care of.

The dry gas which is separated will enable Iraq to conserve from 9 to 10 million tons of petroleum by-products because it will serve as fuel for all of the industrial projects in the northern, middle, and southern parts of the country.

Setting Prices

As for setting oil prices, the study says that Iraq is following an independent policy which is based fundamentally on the need to rectify these prices so that they will be compatible with the rates of imported inflation as well as with losses which result from drops in the exchange rate of the dollar, which is the unit of value used in the oil market.

The Iraqi oil minister says that Iraq is against freezing oil prices. He is also against sudden increases in oil prices because that would upset the economies of other countries, especially the developing countries.

The minister says: "We are in favor of gradual increases in oil prices which take into consideration the rates of inflation as well as the decline in the exchange rate of the dollar."

"Iraq is still seeking to arrive at stable oil prices because this would free the oil market of confusion and would prevent the speculation undertaken by the oil monopolies in order to earn huge profits."

Oil Policy On the National Level

The Study says that Iraq's oil policy is based on two principal hypotheses:

1. Oil is a depletable resource, and there is no doubt that it is running out.
2. Of the last two barrels of oil which the world produces, one of them should be a barrel of Iraqi oil.

For this reason, the principal goal which Iraqi oil policy is striving to achieve on the national level is the goal of carrying out the operation of transforming Iraq's economic structure as well as its production activities as quickly as possible. Iraq wants to derive the most benefit possible from its oil revenues by means of utilizing them to achieve its ambitious development plans and thus enable itself to be less dependent on oil as a primary source of national income.

For the purpose of achieving this rapid growth rate, Iraq, in 1977, allocated the sum of 966 million dinars to its industrial sector, whereas allocations to this sector during the planning period 1970-74 totalled no more than 391 million dinars. The result of this huge increase in allocations has been that the industrial sector's rapid rate of growth, during the period from 1968 to 1979, has been approximately 18.4 percent per year.

Likewise, allocations to Iraq's agricultural sector in the year 1977 amounted to 390 million dinars, whereas allocations to this sector during the planning period 1970-74 amounted to no more than 366 million dinars, for the entire 4-year period.

The study says that the purpose behind Iraq's oil policy has been to provide for Iraq's welfare, to guarantee its future, and to guarantee the life of its future generations. And the study says that in order that Iraq's citizens not turn into being merely wealthy consumers, there has been effective organization and well thought-out programmed planning for the coordination of Iraq's investment policy with the consumer needs of its citizens. Thus the largest allocations have gone to Iraq's national development plans and its investment needs. At the same time, though, Iraq's citizens have been achieving a better life and a more decent standard of living. In this regard, the study points out the great increase which has taken place in individual income--from 100 dinars per year in 1969 to more than 700 dinars per year by the end of 1978. Also, the average income of an Iraqi industrial worker has jumped from 250 dinars a year in 1969 to 834 dinars a year in 1979.

9468

CSO: 4807

DECLINE IN VEGETABLE HARVEST REPORTED

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 8 Sep 80 p 3

[Text] Shortcomings by state organisations have led to a surprising fall in harvests of fruit and vegetables in Iraq this summer despite favourable weather, the official daily ATH-THAWRA charged last week. The newspaper, the organ of Iraq's ruling Baath Party, said crop yields were down by from 20 to 50 per cent. It added that lower output had occurred even though there had been increased efforts by the public authorities to improve distribution, notably by eliminating middlemen.

ATH-THAWRA points an accusing finger at three main state-controlled organisations. First, the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform which, it says, should step up its information services advising farmers to adopt multiple-crop agriculture. Second, ATH-THAWRA points out, the General Union of Peasant and Cooperative Societies should do more to encourage the peasants to grow more than one kind of product. Lastly, blame is directed at the General Agricultural Marketing Organisation, which, the daily says, has failed to provide cold storage facilities which it has been promising for five years.

Citing figures for vegetable production this summer, ATH-THAWRA reports a 50 per cent drop in tomato production during July as compared with the same month of last year. From 10,123 tonnes in July 1979, tomato output fell to 5,211 tonnes this summer. Similarly, the production of okra declined by nearly 60 per cent, going from 1,750 tonnes in July 1979 to 750 tonnes two months ago. Onions, aubergines as well as other fruit and vegetables were also in short supply.

It would appear furthermore that state-appointed agents of the Marketing Organisation responsible for the balanced distribution of agricultural output on the public markets, have themselves become new middlemen. ATH-THAWRA indicts these vehemently on the grounds that they are often selective in buying the farmers' crops and tend to choose only those which sell for the highest price. Consequently, the farmers are left with a surplus of produce, shunned by the agents, while consumers are faced with a shortage of certain products. Moreover, ATH-THAWRA reveals that because of the lack of a special market for

restaurant owners, farmers and agents often make private contracts and presumably illicit deals with restaurateurs to provide these with their needs. Such deals escape the supervision of the Central Inspection Bureau and go unnoticed by the inspectors of the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform.

CSO: 4820

BRIEFS

CHINESE BUILD JAPANESE REFINERY--Chiyoda of Japan has been contracted by Iraq to build a refinery using Chinese labour. Some 700 Chinese labourers will be employed to do the work. This is the first time a Japanese company uses Chinese labourers for an overseas contract. The project consists of building a refinery capable of treating 150,000 barrels of crude daily. The refinery, which will cost some ¥ 124 million will be built in Busija and will be on stream by March 1982. In Beijing Mitsui signed a technical co-operation agreement with Communist China, a spokesman for Mitsui announced last week. The spokesman said the agreement was signed by Mr. Wang Yateng representing the Chinese Council for International Trade Promotion and Yushizu Okida Mitsui's chairman. Under the agreement Mitsui will provide technical assistance to Chinese firms in light industry, agricultural production, energy, chemicals and foodstuffs. [Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English 9 Aug 80 p 9]

TRADE PACT WITH SINGAPORE--The government of Singapore is to sign a trade agreement with Iraq in October covering oil supplies and commercial links between the two countries, the Singapore magazine BUSINESS WEEK reported last week. It said the agreement would be signed in the Iraqi capital during a visit by a Singaporean delegation to the Baghdad International Fair. The delegation will later visit Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Oman. The total value of trade exchanges between Iraq and Singapore rose from \$394 million in 1978 to \$714 million last year. Iraq exported to Singapore 4.1 million tonnes of crude oil and 55,000 tonnes of fuel oil in 1979. Iraqi exports to Singapore were worth \$647 million last year, 99 per cent of this sum from petroleum; Singapore exported rubber, vegetable oils and timber to Iraq. [Excerpt] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 25 Aug 80 p 4]

OIL DEAL WITH SWISS FIRMS--Iraq, the second-largest exporter in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries is negotiating what was described as an unusual deal to sell its crude oil to Switzerland. The deal, if it goes through, will get round the problem of Iraq's insistence on negotiating only with State companies, following its break with the oil multinationals. Switzerland has no state companies. The proposal is for Iraqi oil to be sold to a group of private Swiss firms with the backing of the Swiss Government. An official Swiss spokesman said the government would be ready to give

its support to the deal. The details of the deal might be discussed at next month's Swiss-Iraqi Trade Commission talks in Bern. The commission first met in 1978 and met again last November. Iraq has not sold oil to Switzerland for nearly a decade. Last year it imported Swiss goods worth about 144 million US dollars, but, by contrast, its exports to Switzerland totalled less than 200,000 dollars. [Text] [Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English 30 Aug 80 p 14]

DEAL WITH THOMSON-CSF--Paris reports that the major French company Thomson-CSF had snatched a 400 million sterling pounds contract in Iraq from the British company Plessey were neither confirmed nor denied by the French company. After two years of negotiations, Plessey was almost certain to have obtained the major electronics contract to supply Iraq with a wide range of electronic equipment. Political relations between Baghdad and London have been strained for sometimes, but it is understood that the French are offering a much better credit deal backed by the government's export credit organization, Coface. Quite apart from credit terms, Franco-Iraqi ties are improving rapidly. Iraq is now France's second supplier of crude. France is supplying Iraq with a nuclear research reactor and is heavily involved in helping the development of Iraqi agriculture. [Text] [Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English 30 Aug 80 p 14]

COOPERATION WITH INDONESIA--Iraq and Indonesia have agreed to step up economic and technical cooperation after week-long talks last week in Djakarta. The chairman of the Indonesian Middle East coordinating team said that there were many opportunities for his country to participate in Iraqi development projects, especially in the construction field. The leader of the Iraqi delegation said his country was interested in stepping up trade but there were problems still to be solved in sea transport. Iraq has offered to import palm oil, natural rubber, tea, coffee, timber and textiles and Indonesia has offered to buy sulphur, dates. [Text] [Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English 30 Aug 80 p 14]

PHILIPPINES WINS ROAD CONTRACT--The Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines has won a \$258 million contract to build a 140-kilometre expressway between Baghdad and the Gulf port of Basrah. The six-lane, asphalted road is part of a projected 1,200-km highway, known as Iraq Expressway No 1, linking Syria and Kuwait. The Philippine National Bank is putting up \$40 million in guarantees for the contract. Announcing the deal last week, CDCP's president, Rodolfo Cuenca, said that work would begin as soon as the Iraqi authorities had given clearance for 1,700 Filipino workers. He gave no completion date for the work. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 8 Sep 80 p 12]

CSO: 4820

KNESSET WARNED ON IRAQI NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT

Tel Aviv BAMAHAHEH in Hebrew 6 Aug 80 pp 8-9

[Report on exclusive interview with Professor Moshe Arnes, chairman of the Knesset Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defense by Reporter Yanon Shenker: "Efforts To Prevent Development of the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor Must Not Slacken"; date of interview not given]

[Excerpt] The Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee [FADC] of the Knesset is one of the important and influential committees in the Israeli legislative house. Its members are in the first line of political life in Israel. Almost all of the deliberations of the FADC are secret and privileged, and only at rare intervals does the secretary of the committee transmit an official announcement to the press, which brings to light the barest hint of the deliberation on a topic of special public interest.

On the occasion of the adjournment of the summer session, the correspondent of BAMAHAHEH in the Knesset met with the chairman of FADC, Knesset Member [MK] Moshe Arnes, and heard from him about the work of the committee, its powers, and his opinions on the central issues occupying the committee these days; with the focus of the interview on the defense budget, the peace process with Egypt and the nuclear reactor in Iraq.

The following is an excerpt from the full text of the interview.

[Question] Israel has always stressed that it will not be the first to introduce unconventional weapons to the Middle East. Since it is clear that the aim of Iraq is to develop nuclear weaponry with the aid of the reactor it is about to build--doesn't Israel have to change its approach?

[Answer] There is no need for that, since Israel is a country much further advanced than Iraq in the technological and scientific area. We are considered to be among the advanced countries of the world in nuclear technology, and it is no secret that we have two experimental reactors and faculties in nuclear physics and nuclear engineering, and that those are among the best in the world.

But it is important to remember that the creation of a "nuclear Middle East" or what is labeled possibly erroneously the "balance of terror" in the region does not solve the problem. The nuclear weaponry, if it does reach Iraq, will be in such hands, that I very much fear are not to be depended upon, and I mean thereby that it is possible that on the other side there will be no consideration of the worth of use of this weapon. Thus, it is so important to take steps that will prevent a situation in which Iraq will hold nuclear weaponry.

[Question] What, then, are the immediate actions that Israel must undertake in order to prevent the development of an Iraqi reactor?

[Answer] Activities in the diplomatic area are not devoid of hope and prospect. Iraq is one of the unstable countries in the world, perhaps even of the unstable ones among the Arab countries--all of which are unstable. I think it is clear that nuclear weaponry in the hands of rulers of a country such as this constitutes a hazard to the world, and not only to the State of Israel. Thus, I believe, that informational activities and diplomatic activities have a prospect. Pressure must be brought upon France not to bring the matter to fruition. Nor is Iraq a developed country from the technological and scientific standpoint, fortunately for us and for the world. Therefore, it is clear to us that Iraq will need ongoing support, for a relatively long period on the part of a country such as France. In spite of what has already been supplied to Iraq, we should attempt to bring about the cessation of such support. Thus, it will be possible at least to postpone the development of nuclear weaponry in Iraq for a sufficiently long time.

[Question] On the matter of Jordan's arming--is the FADC able to operate against this arming process, since the supplying countries are the U.S., Britain and other countries having contacts with Israel?

[Answer] We are faced by the problem of the arming of Jordan and Syria and, in effect, all of the Arab nations. Let's deal with them one at a time: Iraq and Syria get their arms mainly from the USSR. But not from it alone. Iraq procures warplanes from France, Syria has British attack helicopters with French anti-tank missiles. These are but a few examples of arms in considerable quantity and of high quality which reach Iraq and Syria. Jordan is currently arming itself with Western weaponry only, from England and the U.S. and from France, and we have even heard about feelers that have been put out to the Eastern Bloc. Saudi Arabia arms itself with American, British and French weapons. Egypt--most of whose weaponry is Soviet--is currently beginning to receive a very great deal of arms particularly from the U.S. This preparation constitutes a problem for us. It is possible that the preparation by Egypt does not pose a threat to Israel, because of the peace agreement that has been signed. This is not the case when we speak of Syria, which proclaims its intention to enter into an additional confrontation with Israel. Furthermore, I believe that every Israeli understands that Egyptian arms may pose a threat one of these days. Therefore, we are required to consider those arms and to prepare ourselves accordingly. We must not disregard it.

What can the FADC do on this matter? First of all, the FADC is involved and participates in deliberations on the issue of the arms race and the policy of arms procurement for Israeli security, while at the same time attempting to find solutions to various questions, such as: what should we procure, how are we to prepare ourselves, what do we do to formulate strategy, war science, and all of this so that we shall be able to match ourselves with the flow of armaments, with the inventor whom we shall be facing.

The members of the committee, or certainly several of them, are also active in the informational and diplomatic area. I, for example, visit the Senate and the House of Representatives on almost every trip to the U.S. meeting with those whose function is similar to mine, the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, and attempt to explain that this army constitutes a threat to the State of Israel but in addition to that, it does not serve the interests of the U.S. in the region

The Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee is one of 10 permanent committees in the Knesset, and it has three functions (not necessarily in their order of importance): First, legislative functions. Every law touching on the defense system, on the security services or on the foreign policy of Israel is worked up in the committee in preparation for its being brought to a second and third reading before the full Knesset. Second, the committee has the function of overseeing the executive branch (the government) in the area of security and foreign policy. And thirdly, the committee is the factor involved in one form or another in the process of formulating policy in the aforementioned matters.

The division of time which the committee devotes to dealing with matters of security and matters of foreign policy is at the ratio of 3 to 2. And this ratio is also expressed in the sub-committees of the committee itself. On matters of foreign policy there is only one sub-committee whose concern is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its personnel, whereas on matters of security several sub-committees deal with such topics as: Lebanon, intelligence services, arms procurement and manufacture of security products, headquarters of field forces and more.

[Question] How is the connection maintained between the committee and the defense establishment?

[Answer] According to the rules of the Knesset, a request by the committee for information or for the appearance of a representative of the Ministry of Defense must be transmitted through the Minister of Defense and, in effect, he controls the decision as to whom to send to the committee. In general, there are no problems. The committee applies to the Office of the Minister of Defense with a request that he himself or the Director General of the Ministry of Defense or the Chief of Staff or any commanding officer at all or any head of service at all, appear. Most of the time, the people whom we request do appear before the committee.

Further, there are regular surveys: of the defense minister, of the chief of staff, and of the heads of the Intelligence Services. There are almost regular tours by the committee to the commands and to the arms of the IDF--so that there is a specific tempo adjusted to our need for more urgent reports, in accordance with the situation in the area or with events in the region.

[Question] Are you satisfied with the manner in which this contact is being maintained?

[Answer] Yes. The contact is carried on well, and in my view neither the committee nor its head has any cause for complaint about not having at hand all the required information for the fulfillment of their functions.

At very infrequent intervals we come upon a problem, that information required by us is not forthcoming. In general, this is a matter of time: the information reaches the committee in 2 or 3 days, at most within a week after the committee has requested it. For the rules of the Knesset require the minister to appear before the committee or to provide it with the information.

The true problem is, in effect, another one: It is perhaps possible to ask, does the committee know what to request? It is possible that there are things, decisions, that the committee knows nothing about and therefore does not request them. It is possible that some decisions had been taken in the Ministry of Defense but were not brought to the attention of the committee. It is possible that in the area of defense services things were done, and the committee was not in the picture. Today such a prospect is small, especially because of the formation of sub-committees. These are small committees, and based upon the experience of the last three years the people of the defense establishment have no reason to allege that they do not wish to deliver information to them for fear that it might be revealed. There has not been a single instance of leakage from the sub-committees! In the sub-committees we also attain a certain degree of expertise.

[Question] Does the committee have any power of decision at all on various matters in the security establishment?

[Answer] The committee has decision power on two matters only: on the matter of legislation, that is, in deliberating for the second and third reading in the Knesset, on topics of foreign policy and security. And on topics of security budget, a topic with which the committee deals together with finance committee through a joint sub-committee composed of members of both committees. This sub-committee deals with details of the security budget, and at a joint meeting of both full committees they approve or disapprove, in accordance with conditions, the security budget.

[Question] And the possibilities for recommendation?

[Answer] The committee may recommend, but the government is not required to accept its recommendations. There is here possibly a moral power and the recommendations of the committee must be taken into account. The most obvious example for differences of opinion between the committee and the government (and it must be borne in mind that the committee is not a unified body, there are representatives of the various factions in it, and for the most part its recommendations are not arrived at unanimously) is the Aryeh aircraft, regarding which the committee decided almost unanimously with but two abstentions 2 years ago to recommend to the government that it begin development. The matter was presented to the prime minister but the government did not accept the recommendation. By the law of the land, the government need not accept the recommendations.

[Question] The cut in the defense budget is still causing waves in the IDF. What is your position on this issue?

[Answer] It is possible to say something general, comprehensive, and therefore not meaningful: in every body, in every system, especially if it is a large system, it is possible with effort to find ways to increase efficiency; this means, in other words, cuts in the defense budget.

Perhaps I should elaborate upon the problems we face as we approach the matter of economies in the defense establishment. First of all, we must concentrate on those cuts which are likely to contribute to the war against inflation, and on those cuts which are likely to improve the balance of payments of Israel. And what are those? With respect to the balance of payments, especially, these are cuts in arms procurement from abroad. In my view, there is room for such cuts. In many cases, perhaps in most cases, there should be substitution by locally manufactured systems. This is a change, an immediate improvement in our balance of payments, and another important thing--diminishing dependence upon others. In my view a significant number of systems which we procure abroad can be shown to be worth cutting and reducing and replacing with systems developed and manufactured and ordered from Israeli industry. We must bear in mind that the defense arms procurement abroad is an exceedingly important, perhaps dominant factor in our trade balance deficit. That is at a time when we have one of the best defense industries.

[Question] But you are talking about development of means of waging war, of investment over many years. Is it possible to maintain the tempo in light of the immediate requirements for arms in the defense system?

[Answer] The answer is positive, if we give our attention to these matters in enough time. We have an advantage over the Americans from the standpoint of delineation of the systems, inasmuch as we are more experienced, to our sorrow, than the Americans in warfare. In anything associated with the forecast, the appearance of the future battlefield, the character of the future aircraft, the future tank and the future weapon of war--in my opinion we are simply waiving an advantage of knowledge, by the very decision to procure arms in the U.S. instead of beginning the process of development and manufacture in this country, at a time when in almost all of the cases it would appear that this is far cheaper. Two shining examples of this are the Kfir aircraft and the Gabriel missile.

From the standpoint of the war against inflation: the cuts which are likely to bring about an improvement in the structure of the Israeli economy are a contribution to the war against inflation. For example, reducing the number of reserve service days, or the length of service, is damaging to security, to the degree that these people invest service time or reserve time in productive work in the economy; this will contribute to the war against inflation. In my view, under the present situation, we cannot permit ourselves a reduction in the length of service, even if it were to contribute.

8090

CSO: 4805

BEGIN MAY LOSE BOTH PEACE . ELECTIONS

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 8 Aug 80 p 13

[Commentary by Amnon Rubinstein: "There Is no Chance that Begin's Attack on the Opposition Will Succeed. It May, However, Be Harmful to the Whole Country."]

[Text] Today it is already clear to all: Prime Minister Begin decided to base the next election campaign on one central issue--that of the Land of Israel. The first shells have already been fired at the Alignment. It will be followed by all out attacks and then the whole front will clamor. The accusation is clearcut and incisive in its simplicity--the election of the Alignment means the establishment of a PLO state in the heart of the Land of Israel. In order to prevent the danger of being stabbed by the PLO knife the public has to give its mandate and support to Likud.

Mr Begin, who is a seasoned politician, navigates Likud's ship in this offensive direction because he knows full well that on internal and economic issues he cannot present the electorate with impressive achievements, to say the least. Indeed, it is going to be very difficult to convince the public to support the perpetrators of a 500 percent plus inflation so they can continue their job. Actually, there is not one internal area where Likud can point to a real accomplishment. During its tenure many of the negative phenomena intensified, those phenomena which Likud was committed to fight if elected. Anarchy and crime have reached frightening proportions. Dependence on foreign money increased and nothing is left of our posture except talk, and we are going to pay for that, too.

The best proof of the government's inability to convince the public of its accomplishments can be seen in the general disdain which the list of its achievements--as prepared by general manager of the prime minister's office, Mr Matityahu Shmulevitz--was received. It is therefore only natural that Likud faces the voter with its sword raised against its adversaries, not pointing to its own merits.

Nevertheless, it is doubtful whether even this move will help the party in power. There are some objective obstacles which will not render the job any easier.

It is difficult to believe that a large audience will believe Likud's accusations regarding the "PLO knife" which the Alignment is preparing. After all, the Alignment is a known entity and its leadership has not changed since it lost power. Recently, hawkish tendencies within it have increased, and Galili's appointment does not portend a change toward concessions and dovishness.

There are two ministers within the government--Yadin and Katz--who support, at least theoretically, the same policy of territorial concessions which Begin regards as "a knife in the back," and other such awful pronouncements. If indeed an agreement for concessions on the West Bank has the one outcome of a Palestinian state, then how can Begin appoint as his deputy and acting prime minister someone who supports this dangerous view? (The question of how Prof Yadin can continue as a cabinet member of a government as this, is no longer being asked).

Moreover, there is no proof that there is any electoral chance for an election campaign based on a no-concession policy on foreign affairs. Actually, there are many arguments to the contrary.

Ben-Gurion led his party to victory in the fourth Knesset (47 members of Knesset compared with 40 in the third Knesset) following the withdrawal from the Sinai and the Gaza Strip--a withdrawal under pressure and without peace. The parties opposing withdrawal lost the election. Hawkish Adhdat Ha'Avoda lost three of 10 members of Knesset; Herut gained two seats, but the rightist wing--GAHAL--went from 27 down to 25. All told the parties which supported Ben-Gurion and the withdrawal gained 10 seats and the right sank to a new low only to remain isolated and weak. Those impressive demonstrations which Begin organized did not at all strengthen his position, but rather, weakened it.

Following the Yom Kippur War the Alignment managed to remain in power--in spite of the ineptness, in spite of the failure--particularly because of the establishment of the Geneva Conference which the Alignment presented in its campaign as the key to peace.

Yitzhaq Rabin attained a strong position within his party and the nation in the fall of 1976 following the second Sinai interim agreement which actually meant a unilateral withdrawal from large and important sections of the Sinai and its oilfields. The feeling of success was such that many in the Alignment wondered if it would be prudent to take advantage of the situation and call for new elections.

Mr Begin attained the height of popularity and public sympathy at a time when he made the most concessions: immediately after Sadat's visit. When he published his plan for withdrawal from the Sinai his popularity

in public opinion surveys climbed and by mid December it reached 78.3 percent (1)--an increase of 22.5 percent in one month. When the Camp David period arrived he was already on the decline, but still, following the signing of the agreement, and when the dimensions of the concession became clear, his popularity rose 5.7 percent, and in May reached 83.4 percent.

Likud itself came to power not because of its campaign on the Land-of-Israel issue, but on the contrary: while playing down this very issue. The stress was on internal and economic issues. The adherence to the idea of a whole Israel was lowered to second position.

Does the cumulative meaning of the above statements meant that the public is dovish and moderate? Not necessarily. As in other places, the Israeli voter's first concern is with immediate problems--the economy, livelihood, housing, law and order--while counting on the leaders for foreign affairs. The voter follows the leaders on defense and foreign affairs with the belief--not always justified--that they know what they are doing in these areas. These are too much for laymen. In this context extremism is meaningless and there are signs which point to the electoral advantage of a moderate approach, capable of concessions.

Likud's electoral chances are its own affair and if it were not for a national interest it could be left alone to stick to its own dreams and roll in defeat. But the way that the prime minister is showing his party is full of dangers from the standpoint of national interest--and on these matters, in spite of his position as prime minister, his word is not questioned. His new attack and basing the campaign on a rigid approach have already caused two negative results.

First, the Labor Party reacts to Mr Begin's attack not with any self-confidence, as behoves a party in power, but with fear and anxiety, by way of "what will the neighbors say?" The unfortunate and shocking decision to vote for the Jerusalem Act of MaTekhiva, showed the panic that has taken hold of the party's Knesset delegation. Labor Party leaders reiterated the danger of the law, but decided, as if forced to, to vote for it. Actually, the Alignment is like the Knesset--a rainbow of opinions starting with Gush Emunim and ending with SHELI. Because of this heterogeneity and because of the absence of a confident leadership with clearcut policies there are growing fears that Begin's attack on the Alignment will not only influence the public, but will also strengthen the already strong hawkish element within the Alignment.

Second, the prime minister's new approach mandates a further hardening of positions that Israel has taken in the autonomy talks, as on other issues related to the peace process with Egypt. These developments, coupled with Egypt's increasing isolation in the Arab world and the United States' weakness, reduce the chances of stability and strength of the peace process. These facts are obvious and well known; there is

no need to expound on them. It means that we are desperately approaching the worst danger of them all--that we will have neither the Sinai nor peace.

At the same time Likud will be losing the one and only card with which it could come to the voter--that of peace with Egypt. In other words, the route which Begin's government is pursuing ensures two losses: Israel will lose both the Sinai and peace; Likud will miss out on its only success and historical accomplishment.

This is what they call a policy. This is what they refer to as politics.

8646

CSO: 4809

DAVAR' VIEWS AL-SADAT CREDIBILITY, CHANCES FOR GENUINE PEACE

TA031151 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 3 Oct 80 pp 11, 14

[Commentary by Hagay Eshed: "Can There Be an 'Israeli Peace'"]

[Text] In one of his latest interviews President al-Sadat disclosed that King Husayn had called him at Camp David during the talks on the peace agreement and had expressed his willingness to join in the talks and the agreement. Al-Sadat scolded Husayn, stopped him from coming to Camp David and told him to wait for him in Morocco, as though he was deaf, insane and a child, or diseased and suffering from leprosy. Why did al-Sadat keep Jordan away from the peace agreement? He claimed that this is how he saved the peace talks because King Husayn would have foiled their success. But it is more reasonable to assume that President al-Sadat did not want to share the beginning of the peace with King Husayn in the eyes of history and U.S. public opinion. It is a fact that President al-Sadat dismisses not only Husayn, but the PLO, too.

This behavior by the Egyptian president has been repeated over and over again. Whenever it seemed that there was a moderation in the position of Jordan, Saudi Arabia or the PLO, al-Sadat hurried to set up obstacles in their way, first by insulting them (one was a "lunatic," the other just a "dwarf," the third a "black sheep" and the fourth an unconscionable liar) and then putting them off and sending them away. Al-Sadat repeats to the Americans that he is the only ally they have and can have in the Middle East. None of the other candidates want to or can be efficient, reliable allies. This applies to all the other Arab countries and to Israel. Al-Sadat aspires to being the only one in his relations with the United States, not only in the immediate range of getting economic aid, but also by implanting his image in the consciousness and subconsciousness of the United States as a man of peace and the only ally in war.

If this evaluation of al-Sadat's intentions is correct, then the conclusion to be drawn from it is that the president is not genuinely interested in completing the peace agreement with Israel; neither through incorporating Jordan nor through incorporating the PLO. Al-Sadat finds it more convenient

for Israel to remain a moral and strategic debtor in the eyes of the United States--one that does not want, nor is capable of fulfilling its commitments in the two fields where Egypt has the advantage--both in the realm of making peace, in achieving a solution to the Palestinian problem and in the "strategic pact" against the Soviet Union. Israel is incapable of playing a strategic role within an Arab or Muslim establishment--or even against it. Israel is neither withdrawing from all the territories nor making sufficient concessions, either to Jordan or to the Palestinians; in addition to the fact that it is establishing settlements and annexing Jerusalem. From time to time al-Sadat gives Israel a grace period in order to repay its commitments, or perhaps to expose its weaknesses and shortcomings which cannot be corrected. The longer this situation continues, the more Israel's main base of strength--its (former) preferred status in U.S. public opinion--is undermined, both as a strategic asset and as a moral value. The more Israel's status is undermined, the more Egypt's status is strengthened.

President al-Sadat will not blow up the U.S.-Egyptian peace process. Al-Sadat will consolidate and deepen the process as he is doing now preferring the Camp David agreement to remain partial, temporary, fragile and undermined, without Jordan, without the PLO, without the Europeans and without the Soviets. Al-Sadat prefers that Israel's face should continue to be blackened and the feeling of U.S. dependence on its only ally in the Middle East--which is Egypt--to be strengthened and deepened. He also prefers the U.S. awareness of gratitude for the tolerance and forgiveness shown by al-Sadat, the man of peace, to Menahem Begin the refuser, who offends the Americans and entire world public opinion, should be strengthened. Al-Sadat will be interested in the continuation of this process at least until after the completion of the Israeli withdrawal from all of Sinai in April 1982.

This peace process, which is primarily a "U.S.-Egyptian peace," is founded on an Israeli error springing from a deep yearning for peace now--full, comprehensive, genuine peace. This deep yearning for peace now has existed as long as the state of Israel. It has existed since the days of the Ben-Gurion illusion that a peace agreement could be attained with al-Nasir after a 5 minute face-to-face talk, and since the days of Golda Me'ir's "shopping basket" in the Cairo suburbs. After the Yom Kippur war a strategy of a prolonged transition period with many stages, from a situation of war to one of peace, was formulated. This future peace situation should have been based on a new map and defensible borders, whether in accordance with the "Allon Plan" or that of "fleshing-out the borders" prepared by the IDF planning division after the Yom Kippur war. This strategy of a transition period from war to peace was founded on three basic premises which are equally valid today.

The Arab oil dictate is so strong and definite that no Israeli withdrawal will be able to power the level of Palestinian expectations, to quench the thirst of the Arab world, to reduce the temptation to continue to weaken Israel and regard it as the scapegoat for all the internal Arab troubles.

The global and regional balance of forces between the two superpowers is far from being equal. The power of the United States will continue to weaken before, perhaps, it becomes stronger. The power of the Soviet Union will continue to become stronger before it may weaken from the inside. In any event, there is not yet any firm basis for detente--even in the Middle East. The Soviet Union has the motivation and the ability to undermine the foundations of any peace agreement to which it is not a full partner. The Soviet Union will consider any peace it is not a party to to be a peace against it. (The Soviet Union could accept a partial, temporary arrangement, which does not make any pretensions of being a permanent agreement.)

These are the three basic premises that prevent the foundation of a genuine, comprehensive peace agreement in the Middle East. What emerges from them is the unavoidable conclusion that any agreement claiming to be a permanent peace agreement contains within it these contradictions and deviations. This is the root of Israel's distress since it signed the Camp David agreement. This distress is caused by an increase in world hostility, in the rejectionist countries, the Third World countries, the Soviet Union and even Western Europe, an undermining of the U.S. position, a strengthening of the dangers of war on Israel's eastern front and, in any event, an increase in Israel's security and economic burden.

The political alternative "peace now" embodied in the Camp David agreements is a gradual return to the previous Israeli strategy of a transition period from war to peace until the Arab oil dictate is weakened, until the level of Palestinian expectations stabilizes at a realistic point of equilibrium and until regional and global equality is created between the two superpowers. The most desirable form this equality should take would be dividing the Middle East into two areas of influence as in Europe, based on direct Soviet and U.S. military presence. In such a format of stability and security, there could, perhaps, be a structure of stable, permanent peace between Israel and the Arab countries.

Until the foundations for the stable structure are built, the very fact of Israel's existence relies on the IDF and its proven operational ability. Confronted with the Arab oil dictate, Israel has no defense other than the IDF sword. The West European countries, which fear a flame of war in the Middle East that would set fire to the oil and give the Soviets an excuse for military intervention, must take into account that the attempt to sacrifice Israel in order to prevent these dangers could actually bring about the opposite result. Instead of Israel being the sacrifice, it will defend itself with its military might against the oil dictate and cause the oil to go up in flames and the Soviets to intervene. As stated, Israel will be pushed into this not intentionally, but because it will have no other way to defend itself. Until the end of the current transition period, Israel has no alternative but to live by its sword and to defend itself.

This is the essence of the Israeli need to postpone the policy of "peace now" until after the Arab oil dictate is weakened and equality is created

between the superpowers in the Middle East. This is not a policy of sit down and do nothing in the political sphere. This is a policy of many and various peace initiatives based on partial and temporary agreements, in accordance both with their contents and substance and the cost of the price involved in their implementation.

The chances for an alternative Israeli policy could improve as a result of the Iran-Iraq war. The war is a long way from its end, but even now it will necessarily act as an incentive to all the Western countries to increase their investments in searching for alternative sources of energy to Middle East oil. In any case, the urge to reduce the Arab oil dictate has increased. The Iraq-Iran war will also necessarily serve as an incentive for the United States to quicken attempt to strengthen its power and military presence in the Middle East and create equality between it and the Soviet Union before it is too late. This war will necessarily have an affect on lowering the level of Palestinian expectations, because it has already undermined the monopoly the PLO has had up to now--as the element capable of threatening peace and stability in the Middle East.

From now on we should prepare for a gradual change in Israeli policy. The strategy of "peace now" as embodied in the Camp David agreement which, in the final analysis, is "U.S.-Egyptian peace" paid for in full by Israel, should be abandoned cautiously. We should return, cautiously and gradually, to the previous strategy of a transition period between war and peace, which can only end when the regional and global foundations for a comprehensive, secure "Israeli Peace" are built. The Iraq-Iran war could contain military dangers for Israel if the eastern front is strengthened by the increasing strength of Iraq and Israel's economic situation could worsen if oil prices increase. However, it also foreshadows a possibility of shortening the dangerous, debilitating transition period from the current state of war to a state of Israeli peace in the Middle East in the future.

CSO: 4805

GOVERNMENT FAULTED FOR PRICE HIKES

Tel Aviv AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 13 Aug 80 p 3

[Commentary by Levi Morav: "Likud Government's Economic Policies Are Cynical and Irresponsible"]

[Text] The deeds and misdeeds of the Likud government are a continuous chain of cynicism and sheer stubbornness. The most recent link are the new price hikes which it initiated.

How many times over can one write about the bankruptcy of the so called "economic policy?" About massive revocation of real estate taxes and failing to collect taxes from industrialists, on the one hand, and about a determined refusal, verging on malice, to update allowances?

Anger is usually bad council, and this writer is trying to channel it in a constructive direction. But how can one be indifferent to explanations of the Finance Ministry that recent price hikes constitute "house cleaning" before the holidays? It is incomprehensible that Finance Ministry spokesmen see fit to add insult to injury. Are the price hikes not enough for them? Why do they have to be augmented with explanations? It is difficult to find more infuriating phrases than: "House cleaning" and "before the holidays" at that! This is "brain washing" and "tooth cleaning!"

The Histadrut reaction is also regretful. Senior officials reacted, or so the media reported, "with shock and anger." The anger is easily understood, but where does the shock come in? What can be expected of this "bunch" that these Histadrut circles still call "economic leadership?" It is doubly offensive to refer to them as leadership and append to it the undeserved title "economic." They have no idea what it is all about. This author accepts the testimony of 'Amiram Sivan, the outgoing general manager of the Finance Ministry, who said that the present finance minister not only does not understand economics but his behavior is unpredictable.

Now is the time, after salary and cost of living payments were agreed upon, for the Histadrut, together with the workers, to channel their anger and discontent to real action in order to shorten the days that this clique remains in office; the clique that leads us to world record inflation and that makes our lives in this country so miserable.

A Deal with Someone Responsible

The Histadrut ought to declare war to the end against this government. Not because of "political" considerations, but because of concern for the fate of this country--because of pure Zionist considerations. The Histadrut has the tools and the public's support to engage in this kind of a struggle. It has to be conducted in an unconventional manner. A special team has to be put together, to look, and undoubtedly to find, the best ways to hurt this government, to force it to stop this running amok against the workers.

The author's heart goes out to the Israel Bank commissioner who proposed the idea to arrive at an agreement among the government, the Histadrut and employers to stem the continued price hikes. Just one day after the Finance Ministry publicly announced its support of the "package deal" its mine exploded in the form of planned price hikes: frozen meat, poultry, flour, margarine, oil, communications, water and let us not forget fuel and electricity which went up just 2 weeks ago.

A package deal can be implemented with someone responsible who can appreciate the Histadrut's sacrifice--without regarding it as a sign of weakness.

It seems that the time has come to tell Hurvitz that Kupat Kholim is not a Finance Ministry hostage. Periodically, whenever the Finance Ministry has problems with the Histadrut, there are threats to cut Kupat Kholim's budget.

One must remind Yig'ael Hurvitz that there is an end to everything. Very soon he may find himself bared in Puerto Rico, in Tenah Nogah or West Bank land, in the slaughter house in Haifa or somewhere else where his sons have a business. Yig'ael ought to be reminded that people who live in glass houses should not throw stones.

We all remember the finance minister saying that we are a poor country. But there are many wealthy people here. They do not eat pita bread, they do not use oil and they hear about margarine only when prices go up.

When economic commentators on radio and television discuss the stock market they say that the public has a lot of money. Who is the public? Those who will pay another 12 percent for frozen meat?

Large Bank Depositors

The bank supervisor just published some very annoying statistics. His data show that 73 percent of savers have less than IL50,000. Another 20 percent had up to IL200,000. But 7 percent of depositors had sums between IL500,000 and IL5 million. Their number is 20,000. This is the public that has money. This is the public that buys savings bonds of "your state," the way Israel Bank advertises them. This public really does not care how much more public transportation will cost or what the price of 1 litre of milk is. This public only cares that the index goes up "nicely" so as to give them a realistic return on their investment.

This cynic exercise of the Finance Ministry to raise prices under its control immediately after the July raises will bring about an increase of more than 10 percent in the August index (according to economic estimates).

The rusty, used arsenal of the finance minister contains just one last tool to improve the economic picture--high unemployment. It is now clear that the attempt to stem price hikes, which had some encouraging signs, although only partial, has died a natural death. The government, which loosened all restraints, is raising the price of all products and services. It has effectively given up on stemming inflation. The latter will continue to bite into workers' real income.

When the Histadrut is threatened with cuts in Kupat Kholim budgets and workers are threatened with pink slips, Hurvitz hopes to have a free hand to meddle in this matter, which he insists, for some reason, to call an "economic plan."

The finance minister has violated the cease-fire. He has opened a massive attack on workers. They, together with the Histadrut, have to take advantage of the situation and take the war to his territory. It has to be understood and accepted that we are not dealing with an unfaithful ally but with an adversary who has nothing to lose. It has already lost its power. Now the enemy is conducting a cleanup operation.

8646
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RABIN AND SHARON--TWO RENEGADES

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 13 Aug 80 p 9

[Commentary by Eliyahu Salpeter: "Rabin and Sharon, Both too Outspoken, May Be an Asset, To Their Respective Opposing Parties"]

[Text] It should be hoped that the Labor Party knows how to appreciate the electoral treasure it has encountered in the person of Ari'el Sharon. There must be someone on 110 HaYarkon St. who is writing down everything that the agriculture minister says about the prime minister ("charlatan," "shallow," etc.) and what the prime minister and other ministers have to say about the danger to Israeli democracy should Sharon accept the Foreign Ministry.

The Labor Party will probably suggest that Likud explain to the voters how someone who is accused of being a charlatan, and someone who is suspected of dictatorial ambitions can serve together on the same government for 3-4 years. It will not be easy to find a satisfactory answer.

It would be better if leaders of the Labor Party not fool themselves into believing that the mutual praising of the prime minister and the agriculture minister outweigh the struggle between Messrs Rabin and Peres. One Rabin is worth to Likud what two Sharons are worth to the Alignment.

To begin with, with all due respect to Minister Sharon, his statements simply do not carry the same weight with the public as do Rabin's. Whether Messrs Peres and Begin like it or not, many take statements of the former prime minister more seriously than they do those of the present agriculture minister.

Secondly, what Sharon says and does only supplies ammunition--albeit heavy--to the Alignment's heavy propaganda, which has enough targets as is. On the other hand, Rabin's campaign against Peres is the very target for Likud's arrows. This is so because this feud is reminiscent of the internal struggle which contributed to the defeat of the Alignment at the polls in 1977, and also because it puts a question mark on Peres' leadership.

It is doubtful whether the public considers Peres' declarations, that Rabin will be able to participate in his government if "the cabinet acts as a team without feud," as well as being very wise and profound, politically. The question one hears from laymen, who do not delve deeply into the intricacies of the internal power struggle, is how can Peres be willing to tolerate what Rabin wrote about him in his book and what he has been saying about him since. People who are somewhat more sophisticated wonder if Peres may be convincing himself that he and Rabin can indeed work together in one government, as a team, and if so, what will this government be like?

The main contribution of the Rabin-Peres feud to Likud's propaganda is in the fact that Rabin has been adopting political stands close to those of Likud. Thus, he not only obliterates the differences between the opposition and the government, but he prods Peres to cooperate in this trend. It is difficult to say what Alignment people should complain about. Should they complain that Rabin criticizes his party's chief more than he does Likud's leader, or should they complain about Peres, who is incapable of changing this weird situation?

Things look strange to outsiders, too. The American historian, Arthur Schlesinger, who was on the White House staff during John Kennedy's administration (and who cannot forgive Rabin his support of Nixon) wrote an article a few weeks ago, following a visit to Israel. The Wall Street Journal is now the paper with the highest circulation in the United States. In that article he wrote: "A visitor from the United States is surprised at the surge of that maverick Yitzhaq Rabin, who, according to at least one public opinion poll, is more popular among Labor Party voters than is Peres. As the ambassador to the United States in 1972, Rabin unashamedly intervened in the American elections on Nixon's behalf--which certainly should not make any Democratic administration in Washington love him. It then seemed that a personal scandal removed him from Israeli politics. But just like his American hero, Rabin has the knack of returning (to the rink)."

As was mentioned, Prof Schlesinger loves neither Nixon nor Rabin. It may be interesting if he thought of the idea that in an American election year, Rabin's supporters may decide that what Democrats do not like must sit well with a Republican administration.

8646

CSO: 4805

LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE IN LABOR PARTY

Tel Aviv AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 15 Aug 80 pp 4, 11

[Commentary by Yehuda Yadin: "The Struggle Within the Labor Party Should Be Conducted in a Democratic Civilized Manner"]

[Text] Whatever the outcome of the struggle, the Alignment will face the crucial campaign with Likud headed by a collective leadership which symbolizes and expresses experience, realism and accomplishments in the construction, defense and policies of the Zionist-Socialist camp.

There is no need to treat too lightly the potentially serious consequences of the ongoing feud between Rabin and Peres. It is very easy to fall in its trap, to unnecessarily get involved, and to inadvertently even enmesh the Labor movement in self defeat. It would be very easy to add one more bitter drop of disappointment to that bitter lot that has been with this nation ever since the upset. There is no shortage of overt enemies, who are waiting for every mistake, or so called friends, with excessively wagging tongues. The feuding parties themselves are not sitting idle and are making their contribution to muddle the atmosphere. Naturally, under these circumstances, Likud cannot be expected not to take any opportunity to divert the public's attention from its total failure to the internal upheaval in the Labor Party.

Mr Rabin is right in his claim that the idea of a struggle was not his and that he was not the one to force it on the party and the Alignment. But there is a basic difference between the situations then and now, and someone like Rabin cannot ignore it. Four years ago no one imagined the possibility of an upset. The Alignment was the central and decisive power in the government and it was still possible to ignore upheavals in public opinion. It seemed that the struggle was on a job that the Labor Party was sure to hold on to, and the problem was only over who was to be entrusted with the responsibility. Is it at all necessary to describe how different things are today? The labor movement today faces a battered nation, bitter and disappointed, a nation that is gradually losing faith that any leadership can bring about the revitalization of the country and Zionism. The party itself has yet to reconcile itself to its defeat.

This author does not think that these circumstances automatically preclude a struggle for opinions, positions and influence. Sometimes, an ideological struggle, incisive and to the point, within the camp, is needed in order to rejuvenate the mission of the whole movement. However, at this point we have not been convinced that this is what the struggle is all about, and that the feuding parties really have substantial, credible differences of opinion or that there is a real difference between them. Undoubtedly the biographies, personal and political, of the two comrades contain a wealth of material upon which to draw conclusions and to decide on preferences. Yet, this does not justify the attempt to embattle the whole camp anew and endanger the crucial, central goal--the toppling of the Likud government. One must admit that during the last campaign there was a lot of exaggeration--at that time it, and its shenanigans were forced on Mr Rabin. But the camp which surrounded him was just as much to blame. This author sees no cause to be sorry for MAPAM's preference of a PALMAKH man, a former chief-of-staff. To be honest, one ought to remember the ultimatum of those days which really went overboard. That ultimatum was not only to the point, but was also a doubtful way out of the dilemma of the internal struggle within MAPAM on the future of the Alignment.

Now, as was mentioned, the objective reasons for the struggle are totally different. It is obvious that both candidates can derive power and inspiration only from the movement, and that their chance--if they are really serious about putting together a government--depends not on the moving dunes of public opinion, but on true support and real backing of the whole camp. Nevertheless, the struggle should not be prevented by administrative means; although it is not fair to prevent it altogether, because that would be prejudicial. The interest of the party requires that it set its scope, form and meaning. The Alignment parties--and MAPAM is a weighty factor in the inner struggle even without a formal vote on the candidate--should lead the contestants and show them the limits, rather than be led by them and their initiatives. If the Alignment has a sober, serious but balanced approach, free of exaggeration, it will add respect to the movement and liberate the public from the heavy feeling that this struggle is but another natural catastrophe which burdens the nation at a time when it is not lacking problems.

It also seems that it may be the best way to help both comrades to better know their expectations, the party's limitations and those of themselves, for their own good.

There is one aspect to this struggle which cannot be separated from the general background of the Labor Party and the labor movement. Ever since death has taken its toll of its exalted founding leaders, it has had a vacuum which has yet to be filled. The vital process of the emergence of a new leadership and its establishment will not happen after a one time struggle or organizational decision. That leadership has to have the stature befitting the movement's goals. The ineptness of the Yom Kippur

War, the last years of the previous government, the defeat at the polls and whatever followed it, killed the myth of the "young leadership" as a solution to all the problems and pains of the country and the labor movement. It turned out that age is not the most important component in the very complex composition that the leadership of a party needs.

The Labor Party is headed by first class people, famous nationally and internationally, people who have many accomplishments in the service of the nation and the country, and who have invaluable experience. The military leaders, diplomats and economists among the party ranks can contribute to the makeup of government and public institutions more so than the Likud who could barely muster from within its own ranks or borrow from others. In all honesty and responsibility we ought to admit candidly that the Labor Party as yet has no leadership to stand up to the challenges of the period. This period demands theoreticians, fighters, those who built the Zionist labor movement, thinkers--and thought is, after all, the source of everything--those who founded the kibbutz movement and who were the original activists and fighters of the Histadrut. Conditions now demand a new ideological attack, in order to point the way out of the crisis that is gnawing away at the affluent Israeli society; to lead it in a direction of productivity and work, responsibility and social and economic rehabilitation of that part of our society that has remained on the wayside. A tremendous ideological and educational effort is needed in order to stop the disintegration of the working class into interest groups and start its reestablishment as the backbone of Zionist-Socialist implementation. What we need is brave thinking in order to reestablish the centrality of Israel--not only as an object of support and identification, but as a crucial arena for the struggle for the future and national survival of the Jewish people.

We do not need "think tanks" to figure out order, details of plans, good or bad, on any subject. What we need is Zionist-Socialist thinking, nurtured on principles which are not to be neglected or forsaken. We need to be shown the goals and the ways to carry them out. All this has to be done under today's circumstances with an effort that makes demands on each and every one of us.

The younger generation of working Zionism has turned its back to thinking, and has devoted itself solely to implementation. Immediate needs cropped up and the establishment of the state opened wide avenues to deeds which supposedly contained all the solutions. It then turned out that solutions also create problems and that without ideology one soon reaches a dead end, without any way out. This author believes that any generation can grasp the meaning of its mistakes and transgressions. It is incomprehensible that people who have exhibited so much intellectual skill never paid attention to changes of direction and regression of the ideology of their movement. This author does not doubt their ability to channel their skills to think in ideological directions as well. There is no doubt that the feeling of spiritual strangulation will probably return

young and old alike to reassessment of the ideological challenges. However, in the meantime we are talking of an interim stage and we are dealing with a struggle in which the issues, so vital to the survival of the labor movement, have not yet been decided upon. The Labor Party is not choosing a one-in-a-generation leader. It is just as well that it knows that there is no choice or substitute to collective responsibility of the leadership of the whole movement.

This is what should be stressed on the eve of the expected struggle. The disproportionate reporting in the press and on television, the hectic groupings, the spotlights aimed at just one position--all these are confusing the issue more than they uncover the substance and real goal of the struggle. There has been an attempt to bring in ingredients of a presidential form of government, which does not exist in Israel. A candidate for prime minister is being selected, a person who has to work with colleagues, as a team, on the basis of collective responsibility with an organized program. It is no easy job, but it is no more than expected in Israeli politics.

Moreover, in the previous struggle there was room to attribute to both candidates different political conceptions. Now, the claim is that there is no difference of opinion between the two contestants--not on political issues and not on economic issues either. This author is one of those who has some reservations and pragmatic wishes. Yet he is not upset with the fact that the contestants have bridged their differences and are now closer to an approach which is basically common. The public, closely watching what is happening in the Labor Party, can be consoled by the fact that even if there is the noise [thunder and lightening] of a struggle, its outcome will really change nothing. They probably cannot change the attitude toward what is common to the Alignment. There is no escape from the conclusion that if a struggle cannot be avoided, at least it should be brought down to its proper proportions so we can live with it. It should be regarded seriously, while proper perspectives are being maintained and over dramatization is shunned. If the struggle exists, the Labor Party and the Alignment will conduct and oversee it. This author would recommend to leaders of the Labor Party and MAPAM to avoid loud declarations of sympathy and forming well defined camps, ready to fight. Let everyone maintain his loyalties and preferences but be content with quiet public relations and secret ballots when the time comes. "Spontaneous" organizations, overt and covert, outside of the party and the Alignment, in frameworks such as Uri and Alef, should be forbidden. These frameworks are not bound by party discipline and their members play politics without making a commitment to participate in carrying the heavy load of party responsibility on the gray day following elections. Rabin's veto ought to be withdrawn. It is only an ultimatum in disguise. At the same time it should be made clear and in no uncertain terms, that if Peres wins the movement will--under no circumstances--forego the participation, with a proper appointment, of Rabin in a future Alignment government. Both of them should reflect on what happened even to a leader like Ben-Gurion when he insisted on ouster all the way.

More than anything, all involved ought to be reminded that most of the effort should be directed toward the workers--the source of power and hope for our organization. Only thus will the Alignment's credibility be strengthened as well as its willingness to answer the call when it comes.

8646

CSO: 6805

'HA'ARETZ' COMMENTATOR ON AIMS OF LIKUD SETTLEMENT PLAN

TA031150 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 3 Oct 80 p 11

[Commentary by Yehuda Litani: "The Settlement Mines"]

[Excerpts] The Nahal foothold Bet Ha'arava, whose establishment has aroused memories and sentiments connected with the good old eretz Yisra'el, is one of six settlements being established in the Jericho area by the Likud government with the aim of "closing" the Jericho corridor and preventing the Alignment government--if the Alignment defeats the Likud in the next elections in a little over a year--from implementing the "Jordanian option" or, as the Herut members phrase it: "Preventing the establishment of a PLO state."

Every government settlement program is primarily intended to undermine the next government's political programs and, to a lesser extent, to establish a serious infrastructure of settlements in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. In a booklet recently published by the number one expert on settlement affairs in Israel and the head of the Jewish Agency settlement department, Prof Ra'anan Weitz, he writes, among other things: "The current method of dealing with settlement can be described as 'running amok,' being satisfied with simply driving pegs in the ground. In the West Bank, which is the area densely settled by Arabs, only 21 settlements have been established, all of them of a purely temporary nature. Nevertheless, because of their difficult situation and the enormous expenditure on groundwork, nearly 10 billion Israeli pounds (1 billion shekels) have been invested in these settlements. This improper method of dealing with settlement and the inept strategy have led to a very serious economic situation in the existing settlements."

Anyone who has a mining operation, rather than a serious settlement plan in his sights, will not be satisfied with what already exists and will want to add more and more settlements--mines for the next government--in order to prevent the establishment of a PLO state or a return of some of the territory to the Kingdom of Jordan. Therefore, the declaration cited by Prime Minister Menahem Begin, that "only four settlements" are going to be established, should not be taken seriously.

One way of circumventing the declaration about the four settlements is to establish new settlements on the green line, which are established mostly on land within "smaller Israel," but which also occupy West Bank territory. Anyone who looks at the "master plan for the development of settlement in Judaea and Samaria" of Matityahu Drobles, the second head of the Jewish Agency settlement department, will notice several proposed settlement blocs of this type proposed for the slopes of the Hebron hills, another four settlements proposed for the Yatir bloc to the south of the Hebron hills, four more settlements proposed for "Gush Ma'arav" northwest of the West Bank. The same applies to "Gush Halamish," "Gush Mod'in," both of them in the center of the West Bank, and another bloc called the "Northern Samaria Region." In the above-mentioned blocs at least another 15 settlements can be established (and all of this in accordance with well-known, overt plans). There is almost no doubt that this is an option that will be used by the Likud government's settlement captains--Ari'el Sharon, Matityahu Drobles and members of Gush Emunim.

Another way of establishing new settlements while bypassing Begin's declaration is the "amoeba system," of splitting an existing settlement into two or even three settlements. The military government and the Israel land administration are locating plots of land near existing settlements (government-owned, rocky land and, when justifiable on the grounds of necessity, sometimes private land, too) where some of the settlers are located to form a new "quarter" of the settlement. As time goes by the quarters become a settlement with all that involves. This is what happened in the case of Nitzpe Yeriho settlement, which, when it was first established, was considered to be a "quarter" of Ma'ale Ha'edumim, in spite of the 8 km between the two points.

By using this system at least 10 more new settlements can be established without this being considered (at least by the Government of Israel) as the establishment of new settlements; not to mention the fact that dozens of new settlements in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are now in some stage of building, planning or approval. Only a qualified accountant can now, at the beginning of October 1980, decide exactly which four new settlements the prime minister meant. Who knows exactly which settlements have already been approved? When? By whom?

Until recently Likud spokesmen could say that settlement X being established in such and such a place had been approved back in the time of the Alignment government. Now this is more difficult. But it must be admitted that this government is more frank on the matter of the settlements than were the Alignment governments. The plans for future settlements are available to anyone be he an Israeli or a foreigner, an inhabitant of the West Bank or on the staff of the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv.

The settlement "mine" is, as stated, intended for the Alignment government, which is expected to take over after the next elections (if the current dispute between Peres and Rabin does not set the Alignment back to the

situation of the eve of the June, 1977 elections). An enormous amount of money is now going to the settlements, particularly to those in the West Bank which are the Likud government's "step children." A small--and not the most outstanding--example of this is the Ministry of Religious Affairs. Since 1967, 143 settlements have been established in the territories, most of them--for the moment--described as non-religious. In spite of this, the Ministry of Religious Affairs maintains in the territories 197 full-time rabbis, 140 part-time ritual slaughterers and 177 part-time employees in the ritual baths. [miqvat].

The same is true of many other settlers who also fill government posts. Thus, for example, Beni Katzover, one of the heads of Gush Emunim and a member of Elon More settlement, also acts as the head of the religious council in the region. The settlers fear that if the Alignment comes to power it will try to cut back this trend. As they see it, the Alignment will be afraid of open, physical confrontation, resulting from evacuation attempts, which were unsuccessful even during the previous [Likud] term in office. So (and this is being discussed more or less openly by Alignment heads) they will use the method of "drying up the budgets."

The current government treats the settlements in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip generously, perhaps too generously, since it regards them as an obstacle to a Palestinian-PLO state. A subtle hint of this was given last week by Jewish Agency chairman Arye Dulzin, a member of the Liberal Party, during a tour of the West Bank. He said that when he was treasurer he had erased various debts owed by "these wonderful people" (the members of Gush Emunim). How much did he erase? Tens of thousands? Hundreds of thousands? Millions? Mr Dulzin did not go into detail. If the Liberals, who are not among the Likud's leading proponents of settlement, think this way, how do members of Herut and Rafi, for whom settlement is a chief concern, behave?

If the Alignment really does return to power and is brave enough to try to disarm these mines, it will have to do so with a great deal of common sense and patience. Haste comes from the devil, according to the well-known Arab proverb. Indeed, anyone who tries to change the new reality too rapidly over such a short period of time will explode the mine instead of disarming it and, of course, will emerge the injured party.

CSO: 4805

JORDAN ANTICIPATING NEXT CONFRONTATION

Tel Aviv BAMAHAHEH in Hebrew 6 Aug 80 pp 10-11

[Article by Hayim Raviv: "The Army of Jordan: Preparation for War"]

[Excerpt] "I cannot promise that the tanks which are now to be supplied to the Hashemite Kingdom will not cross the Jordan River. Such a promise would be deception. Jordan is taking into account the possibility of war with Israel, and thus needs these tanks. Jordan also needs them because of the danger of an attack upon it by Syria or Iraq." This testimony was delivered at the end of last week by Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary of State of the U.S., to members of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the American House of Representatives in an attempt to justify the decision of the administration to supply Jordan with 100 modern tanks. Harold Saunders spoke the truth but judging by the quotation attributed to him in the media--this truth is only partial. Therefore, the danger of deception regarding which Saunders sounded the tocsin [alarm] remains in effect.

Jordan sees in Israel an exclusive military threat. This basic assumption feeds its military effort, and leads its army into the various areas of activity, such as preparation, arms procurement and training. As are the other confrontation armies, so too is the Jordanian army arrayed in a defense pattern, but is capable with no special complication, of passing over to an attack pattern. Its two mechanized divisions are arrayed at a forward line in the zone between the Jordan River and the peak of the mountain. Its two armored divisions are deployed on the peak of the mountain. South of the Dead Sea, a brigade of tanks is stationed with a mission of securing the southern flank. A force is stationed at 'Aqaba which is there to protect the region, while in the area north of 'Aqaba there are relatively sparse forces. In contrast to this, on the Syrian front Jordan maintains small forces which deal with ongoing defense activity, mainly the prevention of penetration into the area by undesirable elements. The Jordanians do not see in Syria--at least at this stage--an actual threat, and there are several reasons for that. The most important reason is that Jordan is not perceived by its neighbors as an enemy against whom war preparations must be made. More than that, Jordan has excellent relations with Iraq, which was defined by Harold Saunders as a possible enemy.

As to arms procurement, the type of weaponry and military equipment that the Jordanians choose indicates that the goal is to find an appropriate response to the challenge of an armed confrontation with Israel. The Jordanian arms procurement policy is conducted according to a single yardstick, and that is: the needs of the Jordanian Army to face the challenge, and on this matter they have no financial difficulties at all. The single difficulty is to reach the correct decision in the choice of the best and most appropriate weaponry, both from the standpoint of maintenance as well as from the standpoint of operational capability.

Reduction for Improvement

Financing of the Jordanian arms procurement is done by the countries which participated in the Bagdad Conference who oppose the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement. Thus, for example, the Chieftain transaction with Britain was made possible by Saudi-Iraqi-Algerian financing. These countries ply Jordan with monies for military and other purposes, with the aim of holding it "short"--that is, to prevent its defection to the peace camp--with the aim of incorporating it when the time arrives in a general war on Israel. The third element which points to the direct tie between the Jordanian Army's preparations and the future war against Israel, is the system of combined operations of this army. What has become readily apparent recently is the goal of coordinating not only with the Syrian neighbors to the north but also with the very powerful Iraq to the rear, in anticipation of the possibility of its participating in that war on the side of the Jordanian forces.

Indeed, the Jordanian Army is preparing for that war with perseverance and with confidence. The face of this army is changing, and it is not a cosmetic but rather a qualitative change, which when completed--in another 2 or 3 years will appear as a modern army, equipped with the best of Western armaments, and enjoying a high degree of mobility. The beginning of this process took place 3 years ago, when King Hussein began to reorganize his army. Within this framework, the order of battle of the army was reduced and it now stands at four divisions as opposed to five in the past. This reduction stemmed from the desire to found the army on an improved qualitative base. An inner balance has now been created in the land forces. Two of four divisions are mechanized and two are armored. One of the armored divisions will be based on tanks of the Chieftain class, which will begin to arrive in Jordan next year, as a result of the transaction signed with Britain to supply 275 tanks of this class. The second armored will apparently be based on 300 improved Centurions. The mechanized divisions will be reinforced by 200 M-60A3 American tanks which are to be supplied to Jordan in the near future. As of now, the Jordanians have in their possession 100 M-60A1 tanks. The modern tanks, which are in operational service in the U.S. army, will bring about a significant improvement in the fighting capability of the mechanized divisions under all conditions of visibility. The surplus tanks (M-60) will be used to set up new formations--for the second half of the decade of the eighties and thus the Jordanian Army will stand on an order of battle of some 900 tanks. This concentrated effort to absorb the modern British and American tanks will

not affect the level of battle preparedness of the Jordanian Army, inasmuch as it is equipped with reserve tanks capable of bridging the gaps in the timetable up to the period of absorption of the new armor.

A qualitative "overturn" is anticipated during the coming year in the Jordanian Airforce, too--when it is equipped with French Mirage F-1 aircraft. Jordan has ordered 36 of this type plane, which is considered more advanced than the American F-5 model which is also in the possession of the Jordanian Airforce (22 planes of the 34 which the U.S. has committed itself to supply). There will be a readily apparent improvement in the haulage and parachuting capability of the forces of the air as they are soon to be equipped with L-130 planes from the U.S. and L-212 planes from Spain as well as with S-76 storm helicopters, "which will serve to transport forces across the Jordan River, at a time of need," in the words of the Jordanian King. As to the future aircraft of the Jordanian Air Force, there are several possibilities and it would appear that the Jordanians have not yet decided what to choose. One of the possibilities is the F-16 plane regarding which there have been recent contacts, but it is not clear whether any conclusion has been reached.

Currently, there are about 100 fighter bombers in the Jordanian Air Force; 15 helicopters and 15 transport planes. Its principal bases are spread throughout the kingdom--at Amman, at Mafrak, at 5-H, at Al-Azrak and at Djefer, and are manned by 6,650 persons beside the 30,000 persons of the reserves. The Jordanian pilots are considered to be good, although they are short on battle experience as is the case with pilots of the other air forces in the theater.

Mobilization--Compulsory, But Controlled

Significant improvement has also taken place in the Jordanian military within the area of anti-aircraft defense. During the Six-Day War the Jordanians learned the meaning of lack of an efficient anti-aircraft system the hard way, and subsequent to that war they devoted great effort to the development of air defense capability; so much so, that presently the main sections of Jordan are "covered" by efficient anti-aircraft forces--improved models of the Hawk ground-to-air missiles, the great majority of which have already been integrated. Likewise, Jordan is about to acquire from the U.S.: about 300 Redeye type personal ground-to-air missiles and 100 Vulcan self-propelled anti-aircraft guns. According to reports from Arab sources, it is possible that the Jordanians will turn to the Soviet Union through a desire to purchase from it self-propelled anti-aircraft armament.

As to the Jordanian infantry--it is for the most part mechanized: of the six brigades in today's Jordanian Army--four brigades are equipped with armored troop vehicles and tanks are organic to every single one of them. One brigade in each division continues to retain its form as an infantry brigade--with three infantry battalions. The Jordanian infantryman is well armed. Beyond the personal M-16 rifle, he is equipped with anti-tank missiles--a Dragon at the battalion level, and a Tau at the brigade

level. He enjoys good artillery support, including 155 and 203 mm. cannon. (The artillery in the Jordanian Army is almost exclusively self-propelled with long-barrel M-109 and M-110.) Included in the infantry are the parachute battalions and the Special Forces, numbering three, which in the future, as has been stated will serve as missions are required--for parachuting from the air, after integration of the S-76 helicopters within a year.

Within the framework of the newly reorganized Jordan Army, King Hussein instituted compulsory mobilization in 1976. Up to that year this army was based upon permanent volunteers. The compulsory mobilization law for 19 to 40 year-olds contains a number of risks: on the one hand, the professional level of soldiers in the army is impaired, in that while it is possible to elicit the maximum from a permanent man who serves for long years, within the framework of his professional or his battle service--it is difficult to say the same for the obligatory soldier, whose period of service is a mere 2 years.

On the other hand, unlike the past, the army today is no longer subject to the pressures of manpower shortage. The increase in the mobilization cycles makes possible an increase in the army, and as a result--entry into new weapons systems.

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CSO: 4805

ISRAELI POLL INDICATES ALIGNMENT CONTINUES TO LEAD

TA030919 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 3 Oct 80 pp 1, 2

[Pori public opinion poll: "Alignment Supported by 50.4 Percent and the Likud by 19.1 percent; a Drop of 1.5 percent for the NRP"]

[Text] The alignment continues to lead with more than 50 percent of all votes (50.4 percent). The Likud is assured of only less than 20 percent (19.1 percent of all votes). The NRP dropped by 1.5 percent, from 7.9 percent in July to 6.4 percent now. These are the major findings of a Pori public opinion poll conducted in September and commissioned by HA'ARETZ.

If the elections had been held in September the alignment would have gained 50.4 percent of all votes (50.6 percent in the July poll) and the Likud 19.1 percent (19.7 percent in July).

The NRP has lost 1.5 percent of its power; 6.4 percent in September in contrast with 7.9 percent in July. This may be the effect of the police investigation of irregularities in the Religious Affairs Ministry.

The Tehiya movement continues to lead among the small parties with 2.6 percent.

Following are the results of the poll, also compared with the July poll and the ninth Knesset election results:

	September poll	July poll	Ninth Knesset
Likud	19.1	19.7	35.3
Alignment	50.4	50.6	24.8
NRP	6.4	7.9	9.2
Agudat Yisra'el-Po'aley			
Agudat Yisra'el	3.1	3.6	4.7
Democratic Movement	0.2	0.2	11.6
Shay	0.6	0.6	--

	September poll	July poll	Ninth Knesset
Others	6.8	7.1	8.2
Minorities	not asked	not asked	--
Abstentions	13.4	11.1	--
	<u>100.0</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>100.0</u> [figure as published]
		[figure as published]	

The 6.8 advantage of the small parties are divided among: the Tehiya--2.6 percent, Sheli--2 percent, Citizens Rights Movement--0.9 percent, Independent Liberals--0.3 percent and other parties--1 percent.

There are many former DMC and Likud voters who declare they will now vote for the Alignment. Of the polled 25.6 percent who declare they will vote for the Alignment today voted for the Likud in the previous elections while 11.2 percent who will vote for the Alignment now voted for the DMC in the 1977 elections.

Less than half (43.2 percent) of those who declare they will vote for the Alignment today voted for it in the previous elections as well.

The Alignment voters today are younger than the Likud voters. The average age of the Alignment voters is 30.8 while the average age of the Likud voters is 33.7 percent. There is also a high percentage of Alignment voters of European and American origin (57.7 percent) whereas the high percentage of the Likud voters is of Asian and African origin (59.6 percent).

Today the Likud is leaning mainly on its former voters and very little on the voters of other parties in the previous elections. Of those who declare they will vote for the Likud today 83.8 percent voted for it in the 1977 election.

Only 3.1 percent of those who declare they will vote for the Likud today voted for the Alignment in 1977 and only 1 percent voted for the DMC.

A check of the abstentions indicates they come mainly from former Likud and DMC voters. Of this 27.6 percent voted for the Likud and 11.7 percent for the DMC in the last elections. Of all those abstaining 22.6 percent did not at all participate in the previous elections.

The poll encompassed a representative sample of 1,200 people eligible to vote. All eligible voters were personally interviewed in their houses with full confidentiality.

CSO: 4805

BRIEFS

MEASURES, SPECIAL TAX APPROVED--The economic minicabinet has decided that the one-time tax on people with high incomes will be a maximum of 6 percent and progressive. All people who earned more than 750,000 Israeli pounds last year will be taxed. Our correspondent Moshe Nestlebaum reports that the economic minicabinet has also approved the imposition of VAT on tourism, a regulation that will take effect at the beginning of April. The tax will be imposed on all services [received by tourists] including tours and car rentals but not on hotel bills and food. [Text] [TA031311 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1200 GMT 3 Oct 80]

CSO: 4805

OIL MINISTER GIVES VIEWS ON OPEC'S VIENNA MEETING

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 29 Sep 80 pp 8, 9

[Interview with Sheikh Ali Khalifa al-Sabah, Kuwait oil minister, by Randa Takieddine, date and place not given]

[Text]

Most of the world's press zeroed in on what OPEC ministers failed to do during their meeting at Vienna. It is was not, however, the attitude displayed by one of the leading actors, Kuwaiti Oil Minister Sheikh Ali Khalifa al-Sabah. Soon after the OPEC ministers ended their deliberations, Sheikh Ali sat down with *An-Nahar Arab Report & MEMO's* Randa Takieddine to review the meeting and its meaning for coming months. Sheikh Ali, as the following exclusive interview shows, is far from pessimistic.

Q: The decision of the oil ministers (to freeze oil prices in return for Saudi Arabia's agreement to raise the price of its Arabian Light crude to \$30 per barrel) came as a surprise. Could you explain and comment on the final communique, which sets the price of the marker crude at \$30 although you had agreed in Algiers on a \$32 benchmark price? What does this mean?

A: The decision is a very simple one. Essentially, before the decision, the situation was as follows: we did not have a marker crude price. We had a maximum price for the marker crude but we did not have proper differentials between the various groups. The differentials tended in some cases to be on the side of exaggeration.

What we decided upon was a fixed marker crude at \$30 and to allow countries - or recommend to countries - that they maintain their prices at their current levels. Those who are at \$37 remain at \$37 on the assumption that (at OPEC's summit meeting) in Baghdad, after the adoption of our long-term strategy, the price formula (contained in the strategy plan) will be applicable. This will raise the \$30 price to \$32 and beyond as we go along. This would remove the existing disparities between the various crudes...

Q: But the problem of differentials remains unresolved at present?

A: Then (after adoption of the strategy), you can introduce differentials which are more realistic, more scientific – but without changing current prices too much.

Q: How?

A: Let us take for example the price of North African crude at \$37. This price would assume that the true differential is something in the neighbourhood of \$4 to \$5 per barrel. Now, if they wait long enough, as the formula for long term pricing is applied to the base price of \$30, the price of the marker crude is going to be \$32 to \$33. In the long-term strategy there is a formula to be applied on a quarterly basis to the marker crude. Let us suppose that we have adopted this formula in November. Come December, we would apply it and it will raise the price of the marker crude from \$30 to a higher price, bringing the North African crude at \$37 into line with a marker price of \$32 or \$33.

Q: Do you consider that putting up the price of Saudi oil from \$28 to \$30 was a compromise move aimed towards unification of the pricing system?

A: It is unlike previous compromises. It has within it the seeds of unification, especially if you add to it the long-term strategy committee's recommendation on the formula. There is a way towards price unification.

Q: But in the short term, what is happening to differentials?

A: They are still messed up. Nobody is going to touch the differentials until there is the prospect of adjusting them without too much of an adjustment. Nobody is going to change the price of his crude by \$1 down or \$2 down. But as the price of the marker crude moves up, then an opportunity will arise for us to introduce again more reasonable differentials – but on the basis that it would not involve us in changing prices downwards.

Q: Do you have the feeling that the \$30 price for marker crude will soon move to \$32?

A: Not necessarily. The decision is that the new price is valid until the end of the year.

Q: How can one then say that it is a step towards unification?

A: If we approve the formula in Baghdad, then in December – only three months from now – let us say that the formula produces a change of 8 or 9 per cent in the price. When you apply that to a \$30 base, you get an increase of between \$2.50 and \$3.

Q. Throughout our discussions, you have been assuming that an agreement will be reached on the long-term strategy pricing formula. But it seems that only 10 member countries agreed on its principles. What do you do about the three remaining countries when Algeria has expressed reservations on the pricing formula?

A. Ten countries are already committed to the formula. Algeria and Libya are not too far from accepting it - I think they have already accepted the principle deep down in their hearts. There is no room for amending the long-term strategy formula for pricing.

Q. Production seems to be a difficult problem for OPEC to tackle on a long-term basis. Do you feel there will be a consensus on this very important issue?

A. I think the production question will become almost irrelevant within a short period of time. I think people tend to exaggerate present difficulties and that this is affecting their point of view. As to the market outlook for the medium term, I think that, as people realise that the market is not as bad as they feel it is and as pricing indications come in towards the end of this year and as the pressure on them is reduced on a daily basis, people will be considerably more relaxed, more willing to compromise. Part of the difficulties we had here was due to the fact that the spot market was not going to help. Product prices were dropping, etc. This is a short term phenomenon. I think that by December the outlook would have changed - and when the outlook changes, attitudes change.

Q. Can one in fact say that the OPEC meeting in Vienna of foreign, finance and oil ministers failed to agree on an agenda for the Baghdad summit in November?

A. There are three items on the Baghdad agenda:

a. the pricing strategy - and on this a consensus is emerging, no matter what people are saying.

b. the relationship with developing countries, which has to aspects: our aid to them - and there is a commitment to increase the resources available to developing countries, the ministers of finance are going to meet in Quito to do something, but at any rate, our present figures are high; the basic idea is to have a commitment on a *modus vivendi* to reach agreements in the future for replenishment of the fund; it is not important to put a figure of \$20 billion and then have these \$20 billion spread over 10 years; big deal!; but if you agree on a method of replenishment, then the right thing has been done, the second aspect is the security of oil supplies to developing countries and on this I think some ideas are emerging.

c. the last item is global negotiations with the industrialised world, and again some kind of consensus is emerging.

Q Will the global negotiations take place within the UN?

A Not necessarily within the UN.

Q You have decided to hold another meeting of oil ministers on October 14. What are the prospects for such a conference?

A Essentially, what will be on the agenda is to look at all documents, seeing that they are in the right, proper form and to do what is needed to be done in terms of a final compromise and to prepare them in their final form for the ministerial meeting which is going to be held one day before the heads of state meet in Baghdad.

Q Do you think that political developments in the Middle East will affect and hinder the working of the OPEC Baghdad Summit? What I have in mind are the Iraqi-Iranian conflict, Syria's union with Libya and the tension between Syria and Iraq.

A Why should they?

You are speaking of the conflict between Iran and Iraq. In the past, we have managed to keep politics away from the organisation. When Saadoun Hammadi was Iraqi Oil Minister, he was in Tehran signing the Tehran agreement when there was conflict between the two sides on the borders. In Algeria in 1975, the Shah and (Iraq's then Vice President, now President) Saddam Husein were there when there was an outstanding conflict between them, this happened to provide (Algeria's late President Houari) Boumedienne an opportunity to try to patch it up.

I am not saying that this is what is going to happen this time. But the point is that they were not prevented from attending a conference together even though they had disputes on borders and on the Kurdish problem.

If you think that Syria is going to affect Libya's position over attending the OPEC Summit in Baghdad, you must remember that Syria attends conferences with Iraq despite political differences that exist between them. They work very well together in conferences.

KUWAITI PAPER SAYS VICTORY FOR IRAQ IS VICTORY FOR ALL ARABS

LD301221 Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 26 Sep 80 p 9

[Article by Najib 'abd al-Radi: "Possibility of Iraqi Victory Terrifies Israel"]

[Text] Even Israel does not want Iraq to score a victory against Iran; it is asking the United States to intervene in favor of Iran and to prevent its defeat.

Why does Iraqi victory terrify Israel and why is Israel appealing to the United States and urging it to support Iran?

The answer to this is simple and well-known: Israel realizes that an Iraqi victory definitely means the restoration of Arab cohesiveness and the emergence of a conscious Arab leadership around which all the Arab masses will rally, which, of course, threatens the "security," stability and continued existence of Israel.

Israel realizes that an Iraqi victory strengthens the Arab position in the Arab world. It also regains respect for the Arab soldier, revives in him the spirit of sacrifice and encourages him to engage in other heroic fighting.

For this reason it can be said that the heroic achievements which Iraq has realized under Saddam Husayn's leadership will be an asset for all the Arabs, will lift them from their humiliating position and will put them in their appropriate place among peoples and nations.

The battle Iraq is fighting now is an Arab battle in the full sense of the word. Victory in it means victory for the Arabs and defeat--God forbid--means defeat for all the Arabs. Therefore, all the Arabs without exception are called upon to stand with all their capabilities and resources on the side of Saddam Husayn who is fighting the battle of freedom, dignity and defense of Arab rights, which some imagined could easily be devoured.

Saddam Husayn's battle will determine the entire future of the Arab nation and the future of the whole Arab homeland. We must all realize before it

is too late that just as defeat has a price that the future Arab generation will pay victory also has a price, a very high price which, nevertheless, remains cheap if compared with the gains for the future generations.

In view of all this we can realize why Israel does not want Iraq to triumph.

CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

INDIAN OIL SEARCH--As a direct consequence of the talks held by His Highness the Amir in New Delhi, India and Kuwait are likely to cooperate in the field of oil exploration and prospecting in India. It is learnt here that Kuwait has shown interest in participating in one of the oil concession areas which the Indian government had recently decided to offer for foreign participation. Six foreign cartels are bidding for concessions in India and Kuwait is likely to team up with one of them, to combine Kuwaiti investment and Western know how for exploration preferable off-shore off the Western coast of India, reliable sources said. The Kuwaiti participation would either be through the Kuwait Petroleum Organisation or through the newly created Kuwait Petroleum Investment Company, the sources added. The joint statement issued at the end of the Amir's talks had made it clear that the two countries will cooperate in exploration and exploitation of the oil resources. There is also the possibility that Kuwait will supply India with crude oil, India is believed to have asked for buying up to 2 million tonnes of oil each year from Kuwait either on cash, or on barter, or even credit. (Text) [Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English 20 Sep 80 p 21]

UNDERGROUND TRANSFORMERS--An official source said yesterday that all above-ground small electric transformers will be removed in the near future. The Ministry of Electricity and Water plans to replace these transformers with new ones to be placed underground within a space of no more than 100 square meters. The purpose of moving the transformers underground is to place them out of reach of children and troublemakers, and to improve the surroundings of buildings and homes nearby. The Ministry of Electricity and Water is currently contacting some Kuwaiti engineering firms regarding the design and implementation of the project at a later date. The matter of moving the transformers underground had been subject to a dispute between the municipality and the Ministry of Electricity and Water since 1978. The cabinet arbitrated the issue. To settle the dispute, the two parties agreed that the transformers be housed underground within the city. Outside the city, the ministry will continue to install them above-ground. [Excerpts] [Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 22 Aug 80 p 3] 9455

DETAILS ON INITIAL APPLICATIONS OF ISLAMIC LAW

Paris LE MONDE in French 21-22 Sep 80 p 6

[Text] Nouakchott (AFP [French Press Agency])--The sharia or Islamic law, restored in Mauritania this year, was applied for the first time on Friday, 18 September 1980 [as published] at Nouakchott, where a sentenced prisoner was executed by firing squad and where three others had a hand cut off. Several thousand persons witnessed these first executions of judgments by the special Islamic court established by a decree of 10 May. The government had indicated that it was creating this court because modern law was not sufficient to stop crimes.

The authorities wanted to play the event up big by using the execution to set an example. Early Friday morning, the site among the sand dunes several kilometers northwest of the capital had been crowded by thousands of persons who got out of trucks and private vehicles made available to them. Everybody wanted to be in the front ranks to witness the execution.

Before that, the authorities had erected a white wall in the middle of the place. The eight members of the execution squad were lined up several meters away, their faces hidden by black turbans. Further away, a completely covered tent had been set up for the hand amputation operations.

The four prisoners were taken to the place and made to sit on a bench. A member of the court read the verdict and the letter by which the chief of state had authorized the execution. Verses from the Koran were recited and then the first prisoner was taken before the firing squad, his face covered by a red hood. The first salvo was welcomed by long applause and shouts of "Allah ou Akbar" (God is Great); but it was only after the second volley that a doctor was able to report the prisoner's death--a finding which was received with new applause from the crowd.

Sidi Ould Metalla had just died in accordance with Islamic Sharia [as published] for having killed one of his fellow workers whose wife he had wanted. The other three prisoners, whose hands were to be amputated, were then taken into one tent where surgeons from the Nouakchott hospital

officiated. After several minutes, a doctor came out of the tent, waving the right hand of the first amputee, Boubou Sow, and then the hands of the other two persons who were sentenced for theft, Mohamed Ould Bla Bla and Mourali Sikosso. The three hands thus amputated were suspended from a string to permit the public to get a good look at them.

5058

CSO: 4400

FACTORS OF REGIONAL INSTABILITY ASSESSED

Democracy Feared by Rulers

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 4-10 Aug 80 pp 22-23

[Text] Kuwait--This is a tour to survey the affairs and the anxieties of the Gulf. Gulf rulers manifest fear in their complaints and in their talk about the future. Lebanon is an example for all; they learned many lessons from it.

"Yes, they can do in the Gulf what they did in Lebanon. Nothing is difficult for them. No one is immune or secure. We are all Arabs in this boat."

It was with these words that a senior Kuwaiti official took me by surprise. He has been in the government for 15 years, and is one of the chief members of the ruling family. He is known for his flexibility and openness and for [his ability] to stay on top of events and to analyze them.

The discussion was about the "internal danger" in the Arabian Gulf. I am one of those who espouse the idea of defending the Gulf and its holding out against attempts to upset domestic security, or disrupt and explode the domestic situation.

It is my opinion that the citizen of the Gulf feels more peaceful and secure under the regimes that rule him, than the Lebanese citizen did under the regimes that ruled him. I said that the citizen of the Gulf, for example, would not kill a fellow citizen for 100 pounds, nor would he bomb the ruler's residence for 1,000 pounds. This is because his loyalty to the regime is stronger than that of the Lebanese citizen to his regime. What took place in Lebanon may not be repeated in another Arab country; but if it is repeated, it will not be in the Gulf.

He said, "Listen, what you said may have been the result of the fact that you are convinced and you are confident that the difficulties of the citizen of the Gulf is less than that of other Arabs. The present and the future of the citizen of the Gulf are guaranteed. His future is guaranteed even before he is born, even when he is still an idea for the future, that is,

when his prospective father marries his prospective mother. When they marry, the parents receive a government 'grant' that is not less than 100,000 Lebanese pounds. If the husband has a limited income--that is, if his salary is around 5,000 pounds (since there are no really poor people in the Gulf) he has the right to receive free popular housing which [eventually] becomes his property in return for nominal payments that decline in time. He has the right to a job; whether he gets it or not, he receives his salary. In addition to his job, he runs his own private business. He has health insurance and social security. He is even buried after his death at the government's expense. Furthermore, he is entitled to an expenses paid vacation in London, Paris or anywhere else in the world on the grounds of looking for a remedy for an imaginary illness for which local physicians, in his opinion, could not find a cure.

"Then a child comes along. His father receives aid for him. When the child is four years old, his schooling is guaranteed free of charge along with this food, his clothing and his 'allowance.' After secondary school, he goes to the local university free of charge and receives an incentive allowance until he completes his education. Or he is sent to any university abroad at the government's expense, all expenses paid. When he graduates, his job is ready for him. Then, there is a marriage allowance and a housing allowance. He is ensured until death."

The Shaykh paused, took a sip of tea, and went on: "But none of this precludes the existence of rejectionists among citizens of the Gulf--rejectionists of the regime, the style of government, the government's Arab and foreign policy, or the discrepancy in wealth among the citizens. You know what the frame of mind of young people has been in this Arab state of anxiety and loss of stability. There is a dark view of the future. Coups and revolutions have taken place on the outskirts of the Gulf introducing overt and covert doctrines. There is talk of liberation, reaction, imperialism, national rights, citizenship, naturalization, equality, justice and so on.

"There are lapses and pitfalls in the Gulf. The proverb says, 'People are never content with what they have.' Do you know of anyone who can please the people, all the people, in a world that shifts from one madness to another? This is a world where infection is transmitted quickly since media outlets have become widespread. Citizens of the Gulf continue to travel abroad for recreation and to mix and mingle with the world [and learn about] the accomplishments and aspirations of others."

What We Have Is Like What You Have

I asked: "But don't you believe there is some loyalty to the homeland in the Gulf?"

The Shaykh answered: "Loyalty, yes; but there is a type of people who renounce everything--even the homeland. Don't forget that foreign countries are trying to destroy us by all means. Do you believe that foreign countries

are incapable of using doctrine, money or other enticements to turn people against the homeland? They would do so not to destroy the homeland, but rather to change it, develop it or 'liberate' it. This is exactly what happened in Lebanon, and here lies the problem."

What the Shaykh said is now the reality or cause of hardship of the Gulf. His statement had been secret. It was made before the incidents which took place in Kuwait and Bahrain, and whose fallout one day reached the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and the Sultanate of Oman. However, the most serious factor in the Gulf is that which was revealed by the Crown Prince of Kuwait, Prime Minister Sa'd al-'Abdallah al-Sabah and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Sabah al-Ahmad al-Sabah.

Following the explosion at the printing presses of the Kuwaiti newspaper, AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM, senior officials clearly and openly accused foreign agencies, without naming them. They also hinted at elements inside the country, inspired by foreign sources.

The point in this case is that the Gulf is not immune to sedition, nor will it be immune to revolution. What happened means that someone lit the fuse, but will the barrel of gunpowder explode?

Actions and Cells

Before answering this question, one must know what is in the Gulf--what is inside the gulf other than oil, gas and precious and non-precious metals.

Security officials acknowledge that the region is not free of what they call "red [communist] spots."

Not all these spots are red. In fact, they fall into two categories:

- Some seek to change and democratize the regimes, so that they would adopt a parliamentary system. The people's voice should be heard by the ruling families who would relinquish their rule by "divine right" and their exclusive way of making decisions.

- Others seek to blow up these regimes altogether and establish popular democratic republics that would adopt the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (Aden) as their model.

Organizations of either category are numerous. It is not one of the functions of the [foreign] press to reveal their identities, because it is not in charge of the destiny of the peoples of the area.

But it is known in Kuwait that party organizations, which are officially outlawed, are widespread. They are called groupings or blocs, and their activities are known to government offices and to the newspapers, just as they were known previously to the National Assembly (the Chamber of Deputies) before it was dissolved.

In addition to these organizations there are undoubtedly cells which have been mentioned by more than one Kuwaiti official in statements made to the press. The structure of these cells may be Kuwaiti, although Kuwaitis may constitute a minority of its members. However, in the aftermath of events in the area, they have become a burden felt by Kuwaiti society, because they have planted in Kuwaiti soil the seeds of the disputes among the Arab regimes, as well as the seeds of the dispute between some Arab regimes and the Islamic regime in Iran.

In Kuwait, foreigners make up 60 percent or almost two-thirds of the population. Not all of these support the regime, the people, the soil or the society of Kuwait. They do not consider Kuwait their homeland, but rather a temporary refuge. Some of them do not want to live in Kuwait in peace, realizing their ambitions to amass fortunes. Their ambition is rather to use Kuwait as a stage for expressing their beliefs or what they think would ensure the interests of their mother country. Some countries exploit their citizens living in Kuwait as part of their intelligence network or sabotage groups.

This is the situation in Kuwait. What about it in other countries on the Arabian Gulf?

In other countries on the Gulf, such activities are no longer secret. Liberation fronts have been implanted here and there, and their activities, especially in Bahrain, are sometimes so open as to be open demonstrations. The cells that have been secretly implanted have leaders that are working in more than one place in the Arab world and abroad. These cells consist mainly of students, disadvantaged workers and the poor classes whose poverty is exploited to create unrest.

There are extensive activities outside Bahrain, especially inside the United Arab Emirates. These activities are carried out by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman. There were arrests more than once of members of this front in Ra's al-Khayman and Dubai.

The sultanate of Oman knows about this. It is for this reason that one reads day after day of the arrival of an official [from Oman] to one of the emirates. This official travels not to look into the border question, as the official media state, but to look into what are called illegal activities.

The Danger Exists...But?

The internal danger in the gulf does exist, but it has not yet reached the explosive level. Most of the danger does not in fact lurk among the citizens of the Gulf as much as it does the hundreds of thousands of foreigners who are referred to as "visitors" or transient workers. Police agencies in the region have not yet reached the stage where they can tell who is coming and who is going. These agencies themselves had to hire some of these "visitors" when they were being established. And there may

or may not be among these agencies elements of the organizations the country is now suffering from.

The question is one of a race against time. The percentage of foreigners in some countries of the region exceeds 80 percent. They are not Arabs, but rather the oddest mosaic of people the world has seen: Baluchis, Pathans, Indians, Pakistanis, Bengalese and Philippine citizens. So far, and despite all the rules and regulations that have been enacted and all the security measures that have been taken inside the country, on the coast, at airports and at the borders, thousands find their way into these countries every day. There are tens of thousands of illegal residents in these countries.

The Mentality of the Middle Ages

The activity of the "visitors" may be understood, but why are the people of the country restless?

There are 1,001 reasons for this restlessness. We would need scores of pages to enumerate them, but we may be able to summarize them at least in passing so as not to give rise to hurt feelings.

The primary reason for this restlessness is the fact that there is a lack of agreement and mutual understanding within a majority of the ruling families in the region. Some of these families suffer from ambitions, the simplest of which is owning paradise.

There are disputes among brothers, fathers, sons and grandsons. There are disputes between the son of the first wife and the son of the second wife or the third or fourth. Everyone desires Layla, but which one of the suitors does Layla want? [Sentence implies that everyone wants to be boss].

The settlement of disputes is carried out entirely through patch up operations. If one agrees to something, his agreement is temporary. He would wait for the opportunity to change his mind, in the hope that time would work to his advantage.

There are no radical solutions and no permanent accords. Nothing said on official levels represents the whole.

The second reason for this restlessness lies in the method of government. The method itself is acceptable to the people, because it is the original tribal democracy. Every citizen can have access to the prince or to any official whenever he wants to. He can express his opinion openly regardless of how painful it is. The prince or the official would listen to him, and if his request is legitimate, it would be granted. If what he wants is reasonable, it would be carried out.

But this democracy which worked in the 18th and 19th centuries is no longer suitable now. This is because the affairs of state are basically known only to the prince and to some of his advisers, most of whom are "visitors" whose only concern is to satisfy the prince.

Scores of thousands of the area's young people have graduated from major universities in the world or from Arab and national universities. These young people have not yet found for themselves the right niche under the regime; no one asks for their opinion or listens to them.

The third reason for the restlessness lies in the fact that some of the regimes do not budget their revenues. If they do prepare budgets, these budgets are hypothetical. In some countries, one-third of the national revenue goes back to the prince; the second third goes to the ruling family; and the last third remains for the state's expenditures and reserves.

In fact, there are many more reasons than these three.

The question that is being raised is whether or not adopting parliamentary democracy would make matters easier.

Democracy was at one time adopted in Kuwait. It was then frozen for a period of time to avoid its errors, and the constitution was amended so that the experiment would be repeated without errors.

It was adopted in Bahrain once, and then it was repealed without holding discussions about the possibility of reinstating it.

In Qatar and in the Emirates there is the experiment of an advisory council in the former, and a United National Council in the latter. In Qatar, the prince himself selects the members. In the Emirates, the Supreme Union Council, which includes the rulers of the seven emirates, selects the members of the United National Council. The two councils have an advisory capacity only. They discuss, for example, the price of sweet potatoes and importing fresh meat for citizens. They have nothing to do, however, with the higher policy of the state. The decisions they make are compatible decisions that may or may not be followed.

When the issue of democracy is raised, it is said that tribal society is living its own democracy and is comfortable with it, and that anything alien to this society should not be adopted, because one may not force a hat on a head that had grown accustomed to the local headgear.

Furthermore, officials in the Gulf are fearful of the parliamentary experiment, and even of freedom of the press, in view of what has happened in Lebanon where democracy, freedom and people have been destroyed.

But there is something that cannot be denied: the Arabian Gulf is going through a period of danger--danger at home and from abroad.

Oil started out as a blessing, but in time it almost became a boon. It has spoiled societies; broken up families; and made the bears and the wolves abroad bare their teeth, as they eye the Straits of Hormuz, the oil passageway and bottleneck of the Gulf.

Lebanese Style Disruptions Feared

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 8 Aug 80 pp 18-19

[Text] When the Americans carried out their unsuccessful landing in Iran to free the hostages, tension in the area was at its highest. Some Gulf newspapers stated that more officials in the gulf were pursuing their usual hobbies. Some of them were hunting, and some were involved in camel races. Observers were surprised by this lack of concern on the part of Gulf officials while the world around them was in turmoil. In fact this behavior was openly criticized by some Gulf circles themselves. But the rulers of the Gulf were looking at matters differently. They considered their preoccupation with sports on that day to be an indication of confidence. They were confident, and they wanted to assure people.

Although news of the stock exchange, of camels, of fishing and of social activity dominated offices and councils of the Gulf, there was a sense of anxiety in the air. Some [people] blamed the Iranians; some blamed the Iraqis; some blamed the Palestinians; and some blamed all foreigners without exception. It is said that when the offices of the Kuwaiti newspaper AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM in the district of al-Shuwaykh in the city of Kuwait were blown up last month, 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Masa'id, the publisher said, "These are the harbingers of the deterrent forces in Kuwait!" He was borrowing an expression relative to the situation in Lebanon to refer to the fact that the powder keg in the Gulf had gotten close to the fire.

The general calm in the area of the Gulf which until recently was characterized by peace, began now to be tarnished by signs of tension. Like the Lebanese, the citizens of the Gulf do not want their countries to become a battlefield between foreign forces. They are blaming some Lebanese groups for making this matter easier. They are, therefore, not lenient with citizens of the Gulf who provide an opportunity for this kind of divisiveness. It is for this reason that the government of Kuwait took firm measures against members of the al-Mahri family: it sent them to Iran despite the fact that they are related to Imam Khomeyni. The fact is that strong feelings have been aroused against any cause of unrest in the Gulf, no matter how simple or trivial. The government of Sharjah was severely criticized last spring for allowing a popular demonstration against high gasoline prices. This was considered to be an introduction to security disruptions on similar occasions in the future. The case was the same when there was a personal dispute at a circus in the course of which one of the parties, a police official, was insulted. The police led an armored division to regain his prestige. Gulf citizens commented that if armored divisions can leave their barracks for such a reason, it will be possible for them to leave their barracks for more minor reasons in the future.

In the Emirates, which is considered one of the most tolerant and open Arab countries, a feeling of irritation with the rivalries among the rulers began to emerge even with regard to the costly rivalries in development projects. This is because such rivalries would ultimately lead to divisiveness. A

well-known journalist in the Emirates said at a private meeting. "Shaykh Sultan has gained fame for building bridges; Shaykh Rashid has gained fame for digging tunnels; but ultimately we don't know who will cross over these bridges or who will travel through these tunnels." He added, directing the conversation to his Lebanese guest, "We used to make fun of the Lebanese people when they coined the expression, 'Cyprusize Lebanon,' more than a year before the war broke out in their country. Do you think they will make fun of us when the term 'Lebanonize the Gulf' is used in reference to us?"

This happened only 3 months before an explosive package blew up in the National Bank of Iran in the city of Dubai. [This was followed] by the explosion of a bomb in Abu Dabi, resulting in the death of one Iraqi diplomat and the injury of two others. The concerned authorities were bewildered by these explosions, and tried to impose a news blackout on them. Announcement of the incidents was delayed until news about them spread abroad by coincidence. One person who was on his way to a European capital related what happened to a friend who questioned a colleague employed at a news agency about the incidents. The agency contacted its representative in Bahrain, presented the news to him and merely asked him to confirm or deny it. He confirmed it. As a result, two information policy opinions developed in the official circles of the government of the Emirates. One opinion favored announcing such incidents as a kind of guidance whose objective is to rally people. Another opinion favored ignoring them so as not to arouse fears and uneasiness among citizens, businessmen and financiers, especially as the economic cycle of the country is picking up following a period of sluggishness in the past 3 years.

What Gulf citizens now fear following the incidents in the Emirates is that their area may be turned into a battlefield between Iranians and Iraqis. Citizens of the gulf are torn between their interests on one hand and their emotions on the other. It is in their interests that the area remain calm and stable as it has been in the last 10 years. Emotionally, they want the area to remain Arab in appearance and in language. Those who have this feeling constitute two groups: one group looks at what is happening in a neutral way and states that the Gulf states should stay away from the Iranian-Iraqi conflict and strive to reconcile Tehran and Baghdad. The other group states that the conflict is not an Iranian-Iraqi contest as much as it is a Persian-Arab battle, and that the citizens of the Gulf should take Iraq's side rightly or wrongly. However, the two groups are in agreement about the fact that their area should not be a battlefield.

It is the opinion of some circles in the Gulf that the situation in the area has been radically different after the fall of the Shah and the advent of Khomeyni to power in Tehran. During the Shah's administration, the Iranian-Iraqi conflict was taking place over Iraqi territory. In this sense it was remote from the Gulf despite the expansionist ambitions of the late Shah. Internal stability at that stage was different, because Iraq was not a direct factor in this stability as it is now. Stability then was

based on the unity of Palestinian-Gulf ranks against Iranian ambitions. There was popular power that was capable of maintaining stability. These circles are saying that the early effects of the Khomeyni wave, which were accompanied by fears on the part of the governments of the area over the break-up of Palestinian-Gulf ranks, have resulted in a tentative look towards Iraq to maintain Gulf stability.

Regardless of opinions on past or future stability, the Iranian-Iraqi or the Persian-Arab conflict is now taking place all over the Middle East. Because of its geographic proximity to the feuding parties, and because of its unique population makeup, the area of the gulf appears to be more likely to be ravaged by the fires of war. There are governments in the Gulf that believe that danger to the Gulf does not emanate from the Iranian-Iraqi conflict (in their opinion the Iranian-Iraqi conflict is a permanent struggle that assumes different forms) but from Soviet expansionism towards the warm waters. However, other circles in the Gulf believe that the foreign danger is more remote than the local danger.

In this regard a Gulf official says, "What we say is one thing, and what we really feel is something else. It is this lack of honesty which is dangerous to us. We do not tell the truth when we say that we are not afraid. Bullet-proof Mercedes vehicles have become necessities for us. I personally do not travel in my car unless I have a machine gun beside me. However, when one asks a Gulf citizen what he is afraid of, he gives a vague answer."

The old people of the Gulf still believe that the British would have the right answer [for this problem], because they ruled the area for a long period of time, and know its ins and outs more than anyone else. But nationalists among the people of the Gulf consider the Iranian-Gulf problem to be a problem created by the British. They regard the internal divisions as well as the border problems between Iraq and Iran to be creations of the British also. The matter came close to the brink of war more than once between Iraq and Kuwait; more than once between the Sultanate of Oman and the Emirates; and more than once between the Emirates and Saudi Arabi over the al-Barimi Oasis before agreement about it was reached. The matter is the same between the Emirates and Iran regarding the islands which the Shah occupied right after the British left [the area] in accordance with an agreement he had with them. And there are problems even between Bahrain and Qatar over an island that does not [even] appear on the map!

The bitterness Gulf residents feel towards the British is unequalled these days by anything but their lack of trust of the American umbrella, which exists only because of the Soviet threat, as acknowledged by U.S. officials themselves. In case of a Soviet threat to the Gulf, the Americans will not interfere unless they are "asked to do so by the friendly governments in the area." A western newspaper responded to this U.S. condition by asking a question to which Washington does not respond: "What if unfriendly governments were to be set up in the area?" This question assumes that U.S. policy regarding the Gulf has not changed, and that the Americans would interfere against a direct Soviet threat. However, in case of internal

disturbances, they would find no fault with having one of the regional powers interfere to establish its control over the area. This role that had been designed for the Shah before he fell.

The West in this context views the Soviet incursion into Afghanistan in the same way it viewed the incursions of the Cossacks during the reigns of the Czars of the 19th century. This view may be summarized in the writings of the British diplomat George Kurzon about the Russian invasion in Asia under the title, **RUSSIA IN CENTRAL ASIA IN 1889 AND THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN PROBLEM**. This was the time when Britain was playing the current U.S. role on the Asian continent. Kurzon says in his book, "Belief in the permanence of Russia and in the Russian invasion is an important factor in explaining the basis of Russia's strength. Forward progress, whether it be achieved voluntarily or under the pressure of circumstances is a matter that one cannot regret or retract. No return tickets were issued to the advancing Cossack troops, and [their] advancement was followed by annexation [that was carried out] under the slogan of "I will stay where I am." This is a French slogan, "J'y suis J'y reste." Enflaming the situation with Russia so as to force it to withdraw for peace, for economic considerations or to protect the lives of men is of no avail. The hornet's nest that is being built over [the country that is being invaded] is not followed by the withdrawal of the interfering party, but rather by the wholesale extermination of the rebelling wretches."

The Americans, like the British, know that there can be no going back on the Soviet control of Afghanistan. They know that the next step that will be taken in Asia is towards the Gulf. They are convinced, despite the propaganda campaign and the din in the media that the Soviet campaign in Afghanistan has achieved its objectives. This is what U.S. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown said openly when he was interviewed last week by U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT.

In responding to a question in that regard about whether or not the Soviet adventure in Afghanistan had failed, Brown said, "No, it did not fail. I believe that the Soviets did achieve what they felt they needed to achieve, and that is removing the possibility that a non-Marxist Islamic government assume power in Kabul. The Soviets wanted control over the population centers and the basic roads, and they wanted to impose indirect political and military pressure on the neighboring countries and on the Gulf region."

The U.S. secretary of defense devoted most of his discussion to the Gulf region. He said, "European interests in the Gulf are far greater than those of the United States. When the United States defends the Gulf, it does so in behalf of the Europeans and the Japanese who cannot do so." Brown does, however, agree with the Europeans that defending the Gulf is not merely a matter of military capability, but that it rather requires the establishment of stability in the countries of the Gulf. This, in his judgment, requires that military aid be offered to some of these countries;

that economic aid be offered to others; and that political support be offered to all.

With regard to the security of the Gulf in general, it is Harold Brown's opinion that "The countries of the area must constitute the first line of defense with regard to resisting political unrest, sabotage activities and attacks that are carried out in behalf of others." It is, however, unrealistic "to expect the countries of the Gulf to withstand a direct Soviet attack." This can only be done by the United States. It is the opinion of the U.S. secretary of defense that this is contingent upon the United States' readiness and its ability to continue to be prepared for such a contingency. This readiness is to be countered by political support to the area.

Brown disagrees with those who say that the Soviets' objective of advancing towards the Gulf or of overwhelming this area with unrest stems from their need for oil. It is Brown's judgment that the Soviets will not import oil before 1990, and that they will not import then more than five percent of the oil they need. They would be able to obtain that oil from the Gulf in a normal fashion. The Soviets' real objective in Brown's opinion is to control the arteries that provide western Europe with life rather than monopolize these arteries for themselves.

Although the Europeans are in agreement with Brown's theory for strengthening European defenses within NATO so that the United States would have the opportunity to place more of its capabilities in position to defend the Gulf, they have doubts about the United States' ability to play that role, especially after the alarming defeat of the U.S. military operation in Iran to free the hostages. This doubt which Europe has about the United States' capability has created a climate in European capitals, especially in Paris and in Bonn, that advocates coming to an understanding with the Soviets and sharing interests with them even in the Gulf area, provided that the Soviets help in the establishment of political stability in the area.

The Soviets in turn are using Europe's position as an excuse to further the doubts about the United States both in the Gulf and in Europe. They consider U.S. efforts to alarm Europe and the countries of the Gulf and Washington's rush to search for military bases in the area to be the principal reasons for tension and unrest in the area.

But unrest and stability, as one may deduce from the conversation of the U.S. secretary of defense, constitute a problem that cannot be determined abroad. It is the nature of outside factors, within possible limits, either to stimulate unrest or establish the stability. This is because stimulating unrest is easier than establishing stability, and this is exactly what happened in Lebanon and is still going on until this moment; it may even go on for a long period of time into the future. The European interpretation of Brown's statement, viewed in the light of the U.S. military failure, is that the Soviets and the Americans are in agreement at a certain point with regard to the security of the Gulf.

The Soviets do not stand to win anything from the stability of the Gulf, but they may benefit from its unrest. The Americans would win with stability, but they do not stand to lose much with unrest, and this is acknowledged by their secretary of defense. According to Secretary Brown, "The loss from unrest would be far less than the total cost of establishing stability."

It is in this assessment in particular that the fear of the citizens of the Gulf lurks: they do not fear a direct Soviet threat, but rather the absence of a reliable guarantee of stability. The Lebanese experience has been a valuable one for the superpowers. The lesson it taught is that limiting losses is better than an unguaranteed gain. Harold Brown's aforementioned statement signifies in sum that if matters got worse [in the Gulf], wisdom would dictate that losses be limited. However, the Americans' losses in the Gulf are losses from profits; therefore, their willingness to endure them is clear and well-considered.

Now that the winds of unrest are blowing on the Gulf from here and there, the expression, "Lebanonize the Gulf," is no longer ridiculed by Gulf residents who have begun to realize that the key to stability lies in their hands even though the key to unrest is in the hands of others.

8592

CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

GAS EXPLOITATION -- A West German consortium has submitted a comprehensive plan costing 15 billion dollars to exploit the al-Dawn gas field, which is one of the largest gas fields in the world. The plan undertakes to build a gas liquefaction plant with a capacity of one billion cubic feet per day, to begin production in 1986. The factory will cost 3 billion dollars, in addition to the construction of a maritime station for loading ships, having a capacity of 500 million cubic feet per day and costing 275 million dollars, and other requirements costing 350 million dollars, as well as two ships for carrying liquid gas. The plan will necessitate subsequent construction of two similar plants to bring the rate of production up to 3 billion cubic feet per day in 1990. At the same time, the Netherlands Royal Dutch Company is undertaking to perform another study to exploit all of the [other] products of the field, such as crude petroleum and methanol, to use them to operate the aluminum mill, and to produce fertilizer and household fuels. The reserves of the al-Dawn field have been estimated at 120 million cubic feet of natural gas and 2 billion barrels of condensed gas. [Text] [Manama AL-ADWA' in Arabic 13 Sep 80 p 4]

CSO: 4802

ECONOMIC COOPERATION WITH KUWAIT DISCUSSED

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 22 Aug 80 p 11

[Article: "Kuwait-Sudan Economic Cooperation Below Expectations"]

[Text] The latest issue of KUWAIT ECONOMY, the magazine of the Kuwait Chamber of Commerce, carries an article by Sulayman al-Qudsi dealing with certain aspects of economic cooperation between Kuwait and the Sudan.

After a quick review of the economic structures of Kuwait and the Sudan, Dr al-Qudsi examines the three main areas of economic cooperation between the two countries, namely, commercial exchange, and the movement of manpower and capital. Details of these three areas follow.

Commercial Exchange

International trade between the Sudan and Kuwait serves each country with regard to some of its daily economic needs. During the years 1975 to 1978, Kuwait's exports to the Sudan amounted to around 9 million dinars, while its imports [from the Sudan] were less than 2 million dinars. This volume of commercial exchange is undoubtedly far below our economic expectations. Kuwait imports over 91 percent of its total food requirements from various Arab and non-Arab countries. Its current food import list is estimated at around \$700 million.

On the other hand, 70 percent of the Sudan's workforce are employed in agriculture. The Sudan also has a potentially large supply of meat which would satisfy the country's needs and provide a surplus that could be exported.

But the truth is that productivity of the agricultural worker in the Sudan is noticeably low.

Thus, commercial exchange between the two countries remains far below what is possible or hoped for.

Manpower Mobility

Relative to workers leaving their country, it is often said that the existence of workers outside their country brings the labor-exporting country 3 economic benefits:

First, the volume of national savings increase through the citizens who work abroad and transfer part of their income to their country.

Second, the workers acquire experience and training in the host country which increases their potential.

Third, the rate of unemployment in the exporting country decreases. This may be accompanied by an improvement in average individual income, especially if the exported labor earned very little in its own country.

The record of movement of workers between Kuwait and the Sudan shows that only 5,000 out of the 17 million people in the Sudan work in Kuwait. This represents less than 0.2 percent of the Kuwaiti population and around 0.4 percent of imported labor in Kuwait.

Movement of Capital

Dr al-Qudsi then discusses the movement of capital, which is another form of economic cooperation between the two countries. He finds that actual accomplishments in this area are close to expectations.

Kuwait, of course, has a relative advantage over the Sudan in relation to capital funds. Thus, capital flows from Kuwait to the Sudan.

As of the mid-1970's, the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED) became the organization through which Kuwait's capital flows into the Sudan, other Arab countries, and other developing countries.

According to the latest KFAED report available to us, the Sudan had received by mid-1978 two loans. One loan financed the Sudan railroad administration's need for technical assistance, equipment, cars and engines necessary to build the railroad. The other loan helped finance the construction of a sugar plant in al-Kinanah which has an annual production capacity of 330,000 tons. The latter loan amounted to around 5 million dinars.

Such capital flow from Kuwait to the Sudan has favorable economic effects represented in the following:

1. It has a favorable effect on local interest rates and the balance of payments. At least theoretically, the flow of capital into the Sudan, especially in the form of hard currency, increases the supply of funds, and induces a decrease in local interest rates. Thus, it encourages investments and stimulates the volume of production.

2. It eases the dearth of foreign currency. Economic growth is frequently limited by the small amount of foreign currency a developing country has to import capital goods and basic materials for the production process. Accordingly, [developing] nations usually resort to borrowing, thus increasing their burden of debt to the outside world.

This is exactly what happened in the Sudan. Statistics of the Ministry of National Planning show that between 1970 and 1975, foreign debts increased at an annual rate of 25.5 percent, while exports grew by only 9.4 percent.

3. It promotes integration of labor and economic resources.

4. It serves to improve the distribution of national income.

Despite the above, it is important to note that rising petroleum prices may create undesirable pressures on economic cooperation between the 2 countries.

9455

CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

PETROLEUM AFFAIRS COUNCIL FORMED--President Gaafar Muhamed Nimeiri issued a presidential order on 26 August forming a Petroleum Affairs Council in accordance with Article 5 of the Petroleum Resources Law of 1972. The Council will be chaired by the Minister of Energy and Mining, with the following as members: the Undersecretary of Energy and Mining; the Undersecretary of Finance and National Economy; the Undersecretary of National Planning; the Undersecretary of Industry; and the Undersecretary of Cooperation, Trade and Supply; the Director of Industry, Trade and Supply in the Southern Region; the Chief of the Geology Department at the University of Khartoum; Mahmud Ahmad 'Abdallah of the International Gulf Organization; the Director General of the Department of Geology and Mineral Resources; and the Director General of the Survey Department. [Text] [Khartoum AL-AYYAM in Arabic 27 Aug 80 p 1] 9455

CSO: 4802

SULTANATE OF OMAN

BRIEFS

NEW SCHOOL -- Recently, Director General of Technical Affairs in the Ministry of Public Works 'Abbas Ja'far announced that the ministry of education is going to build a school in the district of Abu Baqarah. It is expected that work on the construction will begin on 7 October 1980 and will be completed on 2 August 1981. The cost of the project will be about 175,000 riyals. The school will have 12 classrooms, a study hall, and administrative offices. [Text] [Muscat 'OMAN in Arabic 16 Sep 80 p 8]

CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

INCREASED TRADE WITH FRANCE--Syria is expected to import goods from France worth FF1.5 billion (\$365 million) in 1980, according to French diplomatic sources in Damascus last week. This is an increase of about FF250 million (\$60 million) on Syria's imports from France in 1979. Crude oil was the main commodity imported by France from Syria in 1979, when the French purchased 2.15 million tonnes of crude worth FF1.195 billion (\$290 million). France, according to the sources, has reduced its liftings of Syrian crude in 1980 but has stepped up its purchases of refined oil products from the Homes refinery. The sources said talks on increasing Franco-Syrian trade would be held in the Syrian capital during a visit by Guy Carron de la Carriere, the Director General of the Centre Francais du Commerce Exterieur, for the 27th Damascus International Fair, which opened on August 20. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 25 Aug 80 p 5]

CSO: 4820

BOURGUIBA RENDERS ASSORTED DECISIONS

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 13 Sep 80 p 1

[Text] Yesterday morning, President Bourguiba met with Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali at Essaada Palace at Marsa, following which Mzali issued the following statement:

The meeting with the chief of state concerned political, economic and education questions.

The president of the republic has decided to raise the price of wheat to producers by 1 dinar per quintal for the 1981 agricultural season as an incentive to farmers.

President Bourguiba was anxious to announce the decision immediately in order to encourage farmers and incite them to work even harder, use select seed and the necessary fertilizer and to wage a fight against weeds.

The decision fits into a framework of different incentives recommended by the special commission emanating from the Council of Ministers.

In addition, President Bourguiba considered ways of increasing the prestige of secondary school teachers.

The chief of state approved the establishment of a rank of principal teacher. The decision joins measures already taken in recent weeks to improve the situation of directors of primary schools, particularly in rural areas, and that of directors of secondary schools and the various classifications of education inspectors.

The chief of state also signed decrees relating to the appointment of certain ambassadors and high officials for Tunisia, including:

A decree appointing Mahmoud Besbes first president of the Auditing Office; a decree naming Nouredine El Joudi general comptroller of spending; a

decree naming Abdelmajid Saheb Ettabaa chairman of the board of the Tunisian Trade Office; and a decree appointing Raouf Henaein chairman of the board of the National Oil Distribution Company.

The president also signed a law concerning judicial cooperation in civil, commercial and penal matters and a personal code between Tunisia and Kuwait.

11,464

CSO: 4400

MZALI ADDRESSES GROUP FROM BRITAIN'S DEFENSE COLLEGE

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 13 Sep 80 p 4

[Text] Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali met this morning with a delegation from Great Britain's Royal Defense College, headed by Rear Admiral Whetstone. The meeting, held at the Government Palace at Keshah, was attended by Salaheddine Baly, minister of national defense, Mezri Chekir, chief of staff of the prime minister, and the British ambassador to Tunis.

Prime Minister Mzali outlined the major points and guidelines of Tunisian policies. "In the course of our struggle for national liberation," he said, "we waged a political fight without hatred and without rancor to achieve the independence and emancipation of our country. In the same spirit and based on the same values, we have, once our independence was won, stretched out our hand to all countries for mutual cooperation."

The prime minister also sketched the history of Tunisia, a land of moderation, good sense and dialog, a meeting place of characteristics typical of its genius and vocation.

Tunisia is a Muslim country. Islam is a source of tolerance, effort and brotherhood. It is located on the banks of the Mediterranean Sea, which is not an obstacle but a link.

Mzali then told of the historical role played by Commander in Chief Bourguiba, who is a "leader from the people. He embodies their personality and has been able to institute a direct dialog with Tunisians, who have identified with him. The Tunisian shaped by the Bourguibian ethic is a man who is willing to die for dignity and freedom but who retains a human vision of things, who remains open in the friendly relations he maintains with all countries. The Tunisian is cooperative, but jealous of his independence."

The prime minister then described the government's action which joins two objectives: on the one hand, demands for justice and socialism and on the other hand, aspirations to freedom and democracy.

This balance is achieved within the framework of a policy and plan of economic development aimed at the creation of wealth and fair distribution among all citizens. In this connection, Mzali said: "The goal is to raise the Tunisian's standard of living so that he may be free and responsible."

This policy is articulated around major choices, including universal education. Some 80 percent of all school-age children are now in school. This education is modern in content, because of the important place assigned to living languages, and progressive because of the place given to sciences. It is aimed at eliminating the Tunisian's fatalistic attitude and making him responsible.

Mzali then told of the task of liberating Tunisian women and of the positive effects of the Personal Code, which is in the vanguard of everything done in the world. "There we have true democracy and true freedom," he said.

The prime minister also outlined Tunisian policies on population and family planning, a humanistic policy based on progressive legislation whose purpose is to make the citizen responsible. All these social actions have, because of their high cost, created certain economic difficulties, Mzali said, but we are determined to overcome them through our efforts and means, despite the inadequacy of our resources.

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CSO: 4400

INTERIOR MINISTER DISCUSSES PARTY OBJECTIVES, PLANS

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 13 Sep 80 p 5

[Text] In the Regueb delegation, Dries Guiga, member of the Political Bureau and minister of interior, opened the partial legislative election campaign in the governorate of Sidi-Bouzyd, as head of the party's list of candidates for the elections.

Guiga went to the People's Hall to preside over a meeting attended by regional cadres headed by Mohamed Ben Rejeb, governor of the region, Mohamed Sdiah El Ouni, secretary general of the party coordinating committee, and Abdelkader Cherif, on the list with Guiga.

In his speech, Guiga first of all indicated that his colleague and he were running in the elections representing the PSD [Destourian Socialist Party] and that they intended to apply the party program. He emphasized that they therefore had no election promises or commitments to make. "Our slogan at all the people's meetings is that the party and all Destourians are determined to remain faithful to the commander in chief, President Bourguiba, and to work to achieve the objectives defined by the party, objectives aimed at ensuring the community's common good.

Guiga reaffirmed the importance of direct contact with citizens as an exemplary method of work that should enable leaders to take up the people's concerns and better approach their problems. He recalled the frequent visits which President Bourguiba made to the different regions of the country during the liberation struggle, visits that enabled him to raise the morale of the people and arouse their enthusiasm.

Nothing could therefore keep the commander in chief from completing his noble mission, he said, neither passing difficulties nor the very hostile political situation that existed at the time because he was aware that the revolution would be successful only if started by the people themselves.

The minister of interior emphasized the need to preserve the same enthusiasm that enabled the people to triumph over the colonizer and struggle against all aspects of underdevelopment, obscurantism, sickness, deprivation and anything else that might hinder the country's march toward development.

"Our struggle today demands as much cohesiveness, solidarity, coordination and cooperation between all the live forces of the nation," he said.

Action of Government and Individual Effort

Guiga continued: "We are determined to guarantee the success of our struggle for development in every corner of the territory.

"However, our action must first of all reach areas requiring more than others the deployment of additional efforts."

He added that the political awareness now characterizing citizens must be accompanied by an economic and social awareness making it possible to eliminate all aspects of underdevelopment and strengthen national unity.

The minister recommended that a fight be waged against anything that might cause dissension and against the remnants of tribalism that could damage the people's unity.

He also emphasized the need to encourage a complementariness of action between what the government does and individual efforts to develop the country and guarantee all citizens of a life with dignity. He stressed that true development is subordinated to the effective contributions and enthusiasm of citizens.

Guiga explained that the authentic militancy of the people requires that they work for the welfare of all citizens, particularly those of modest means. "That is why the drilling of wells to reach water is one aspect of the militancy that we preach and an act of solidarity with the people, like the construction of schools and lycees and the development of land."

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CS0: 4400

STATEMENTS BY INTERIOR MINISTER ON PARTY PLAN

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 15-16 Sep 80 p 4

[Text] Within the framework of the partial legislative elections, Driss Guiga, member of the Political Bureau and minister of interior, presided over a meeting in Ben Aoun (Sidi Bouzid) on Saturday in the course of which he announced that the special party congress decided upon by the commander in chief will begin on 12 May 1981, a date coinciding with the 100th anniversary of the occupation of Tunisia by colonial forces.

The choice of this date symbolizes the party's determination to put an end to the aftereffects of colonialism and show its ability to launch the country into a new era guaranteeing all Tunisians of political, economic and social security, reviving their pride in belonging to this nation and freeing them from deprivation and underdevelopment.

The minister of interior added that in making the decision to hold a special party congress, the chief of state intends to provide the rank and file with an opportunity to speak out on the next development plan, which the commander in chief sought to make a mirror reflecting the suggestions of citizens and whose drafting cannot be solely the work of high officials or ministers.

The next plan will be a turning point in the evolution of Tunisian society in different domains, Guiga said. He emphasized the government's interest in regions with limited resources. Such regions will have priority when it is a question of distributing the fruits of development with the greatest fairness.

Guiga also seized the opportunity to stress the place which jobs will have in the next plan. The government is determined to offer employment to all those seeking it, he said.

Tunisians have the right to be proud of their achievements and of the great moral force motivating them, the minister said. They are firmly determined to bring about the failure of all attempts at demobilization and never to succumb to the siren songs aimed at sowing doubt. The people are perfectly

aware of the stakes of the development battle and intend to pay whatever price is necessary to win this historic battle on which the nation's future depends so much.

Guiga also stressed the preponderant place occupied by agriculture in the Tunisian economy, emphasizing that farmers are now capable of assimilating all technical innovations in working the land based on scientific criteria.

Far from lapsing into smug self-satisfaction, the minister added, the party has constantly reminded citizens of the needs of economic and social renewal and is constantly in the vanguard of the fight, always desirous of fulfilling the profound aspirations of the masses through perfect communion of the hearts and minds of the people and their leaders.

The minister of interior had previously distributed aid from the Rural Development Program to beneficiaries and laid the cornerstone of a socio-cultural complex in Jelma.

In Bir El Haffay, Guiga learned about the activities of the municipality during a meeting with local officials. On that occasion, he encouraged commune cadres to serve citizens with speed and devotion and to spare no effort in hastening the development of that rural area.

Finally, the minister of interior announced the decision of the commander in chief to create a delegation at Bir El Haffay.

Party's Strength

Guiga also presided over a meeting of the Jelma delegation in the governorate of Sidi Bouzid on Saturday. He emphasized the need to fight all attempts to damage national unity, noting that Tunisians everywhere must be considered as full citizens, irregardless of the region they come from.

The minister then emphasized that Destourians must work to provide conditions ensuring the success of the country's economic and social development effort through their fight against outdated traditions and complacency.

After praising the militancy found in the region of Sidi Bouzid, Guiga said that the party's strength resides in the worth of its members, particularly in their moral probity and ability to overcome difficulties, to resist and to withstand tests.

The party's strength also resides in its ability to regenerate itself by introducing new blood into its ranks and young leaders, which has enabled the party to be in the vanguard of the struggle and to constantly renew its mission, now consisting of eliminating all aspects of underdevelopment.

11,464
ESO: 4400

MINISTER OUTLINES MAIN ELEMENTS OF NEW FIVE-YEAR PLAN

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 15-16 Sep 80 p 4

[Text] On Saturday evening, Moncef Bel Hadj Amor, minister attached to the prime minister for Civil Service and Administrative Reform, presided over the closing session of the Economic Days in the governorate of Bizerte. The meeting was held at the Palace of Congress in Bizerte and was attended by regional cadres, headed by the governor, the coordinator of the provisional coordinating committee, and several heads of economic enterprises.

Amor delivered a speech at the meeting in which he noted that the Economic Development Days are of great interest in preparing the next development plan, whose projects must spring from the economic and social situation in the different regions and not from offices in the Central Administration.

Amor then turned to the coming decade and emphasized that the development effort during that period will require increased diligence and greater effectiveness. Drawing up the balance sheet for the 1970's, the minister noted that the results recorded have been good on the whole, with a growth rate of 7.3 percent compared with 4.6 percent for the 1960's. This rate is also very good compared with that of other countries. Moreover, investments amounted to 6 billion dinars, compared with 1.3 billion during the 1960's. As for financing from national savings, it totaled 75.5 percent of all investments, thanks to the increase in the price of oil, phosphates and olive oil.

Amor also said that the next decade will be more difficult than the previous one although the 1970's can be called "satisfactory on the whole," inasmuch as an annual growth rate of 7.3 percent was registered during that period. This in itself is a good performance, especially when compared with the rate of 4.6 percent barely recorded in the 1960's and with the averages achieved by other developing countries.

Furthermore, the overall volume of investments amounted to 600 million dinars per year between 1970 and 1980, compared with 130 million dinars during the previous 10 years.

In his analysis of the socioeconomic situation, the minister took up the matter of employment, noting that despite the creation of 40,000 new jobs annually, additional demands for employment have not been totally met because of the growth in population, which has been greater than predicted. At the same time, there has been a decline in the migratory movement, along with increased demands for jobs from women, which have also surpassed predictions.

Amor then outlined prospects for the 1980's, emphasizing that the current situation is good and can therefore serve as a point of departure for the phase to come.

He indicated that the new 5-year plan is based on the following points:

- 1) employment: the creation of 65,000 jobs a year and the absorption of unemployment;
- 2) agriculture: making up for the lag in the agricultural sector so as to achieve self-sufficiency in food; and
- 3) regional decentralization and development: correcting interregional imbalances and paying particular interest to the poorest regions, whence the principle of a geographical redrawing of economic regions and industrial distribution, not at the level of the governorates, but rather, at the level of delegations.

The minister pointed out in this connection that three studies are underway for the northwest, central Tunisia and the south. These studies have been undertaken by the government with the aid of the World Bank and several American and French institutions.

Speaking of decentralization, Amor said that the government intends to endow regions with the necessary prerogatives enabling them to take over their own administration and directly take charge of their own development.

He added that the achievement of industrial decentralization will necessarily be based on administrative decentralization so that there may be complementarity and balance between regions and economic sectors and in order to create incentives stimulating private initiative and encouraging private parties to launch development projects generating jobs.

11,464

CSO: 4400

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY CONDEMNS JERUSALEM ANNEXATION

Tunis LAS PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 21 Aug 80 p 4

[Text] The presidency of the National Assembly has made the following official statement public:

"The National Assembly, after having examined the latest events which have taken place in the Middle East area, events which threaten the Palestinian entity, peace in the region and security in the world,

- Given the stubbornness of the Zionist authorities and their persevering in a policy of robbing the Palestinian people of their rights by resorting to repressive and expansionist methods,

- Faced with the sad news which has appalled the Arab and Islamic world and the international community, by announcing the annexation, unification and adoption of Jerusalem as Israel's capital,

- The National Assembly considers this measure a challenge to international opinion and an obstacle to all peace efforts,

- It firmly condemns this decision which once more reveals the expansionist and warlike intentions of Israel which is defying international opinion and the feelings of all Moslems and Christians of the world.

It considers this reprehensible initiative a flagrant violation of all UN principles and decisions.

The National Assembly calls on international opinion and all peace-loving forces to stand up to these base maneuverings to prevent Israel from achieving its expansionist aims."

9631

CSO: 4400

DESTOURIAN PARTY DIRECTOR COMMENTS ON UPCOMING CONGRESS

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 13 Sep 80 p 4

[Text] Mongi Kooli, minister-delegate to the prime minister and director of the party, presided over a general meeting at the headquarters of the phosphate group in Tunis yesterday. The meeting was organized by the Destourian cell of the Maghrebian chemical industries and the Investment Promotion Agency.

In a speech delivered on that occasion, Kooli responded to addresses by participants in the meeting and noted with satisfaction the frankness and sound thinking demonstrated by the speakers.

"It is a pleasure for me to meet with militant brothers belonging to one of the key sectors of the national economy," he said.

Dream

"As you know, the chemical industries constitute a young industrial sector that owes its creation to the prosperous Bourguibian era. Actually, after the country gained independence and following the consolidation of the government, the Bourguibian regime directed all its energies toward the path of socioeconomic development in order to assure all the Tunisian people of prosperity, thereby making an old collective dream come true.

"The establishment of such modern industries requiring high-level technological competency was considered to be in the realm of the impossible before independence. But Bourguiba's genius overcame all obstacles and accomplished the miracle of the establishment of chemical industries in Tunisia, just as he had previously achieved the miracle of independence and national sovereignty."

Bourguiba's Regime Created Men and Riches

"I remember that one of our French teachers at the Sadiki School during colonial times a fierce defender of colonialism, used to tell us that 'your country is one of the most important phosphate producers in the world,

but they are phosphates with derivatives which you cannot extract because you have neither the means nor the men.' Those remarks and others along the same line wounded our pride. That is why I am proud and happy to be with you today in order to work together on anything dealing with this pilot industry which is based on the processing of one of the most important raw materials we produce and which the Bourguibian regime set up on the soil of our beloved land after creating the men and riches necessary for such an undertaking."

The director of the party recalled how in colonial times the Tunisian phosphate was sold in the raw state at modest prices. "Before independence, we suffered one of the most odious forms of exploitation of our natural resources. But today that the dream has become a reality, we have the right to be proud of the establishment of chemical industries in our country and to consider this as an achievement and a feature of development of Bourguiba's Tunisia."

Chemical Industries Help Form Mining Riches

Drawing the conclusions from the foregoing, Kooli emphasized that the processing of Tunisian phosphates by our own means in order to extract all kinds of derivatives prevents the abusive exploitation of that national resource by others for their own interests and confers added value beneficial to our national economy. This processing by Tunisia of its phosphates also makes it possible to create many jobs for Tunisians and proves the concern of the Tunisian Government for working our mining resources wisely by Tunisians and for all Tunisians.

It also shows that the Tunisians are capable of acquiring and mastering modern technology.

Professional Cell

After warmly congratulating the Tunisian cadres who head these industries (engineers, technicians and workers), Kooli indicated that the meeting fits within the framework of a series of direct contacts he proposes to initiate in the different enterprises because of the importance of the role of party cadres in these enterprises.

These cadres are actually being called upon to demonstrate, more than anyone else, a spirit of self-sacrifice and devotion to serving others. They must be particularly careful not to use their status as party cadres to obtain advantages or privileges in any form.

Kooli recommended that party leaders within the enterprises make every necessary effort to be examples, model workers, in their behavior and in their output so as to honor the party and increase its prestige. In this way, the influence of the party gains in intensity and its following among the people grows.

Vigorous, Balanced Economy

In response to a question from a participant, the director of the party spoke of the mission of the professional cell. He emphasized that the professional cell is neither a union nor an administrative structure. Its mission is essentially political. Above all, it consists of informing workers of party policy and its choices in the political, economic and social domains and of persuading them of the accuracy of that policy and those choices. Just as the territorial cell has the task of having direct contact with citizens in order to educate them, train them and teach them the party's principles, the professional cell must initiate a dialog with agents in the enterprise so as to enlighten them about the evil designs concealed behind certain positions and about dangers to which the smooth operation of the enterprise and its prosperity could be exposed due to the adoption of such positions. Seen from this angle, the professional cell needs more moral support than material support in order to facilitate contact with workers in the enterprise.

Speaking in response to a question about the place of industry in the Tunisian economy, Kooli emphasized that the challenge of development facing the Tunisian Government can only be won if we manage to build a balanced national economy in which industry, agriculture and commerce complement one another. "We are trying to see that each sector plays its role. Tunisia needs developed agriculture as much as it does modern industry and healthy, balanced trade.

"For the administration of all sectors, we are applying a well studied plan based on enlightened planning having the participation of the citizens themselves. The next party congress, which will be held while we are preparing to draft the Sixth Development Plan, will take up our fundamental orientations and set the order of priorities."

In conclusion, Kooli called on cadres to develop the militant spirit of which the commander in chief, President Habib Bourguiba, is the supreme example.

11,464

CSO: 4400

GOVERNMENT SEEKS TO SOLVE PROBLEMS IN UNIVERSITY

Increased Student Representation Sought

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 17 Sep 80 p 4

[Text] Hechemi Amri, chief of staff of the minister of state in the Office of Prime Minister and director of the party, presided over the closing session of the Regional Conference of Students in the governorate of Sidi Bouzid on Monday morning. The ceremony was also attended by M'hammed Ben Rejeb, governor of Sidi Bouzid, and Salah El Ouni, secretary general of the party coordinating committee in Sidi Bouzid.

In an address delivered on the occasion, Hachemi Amri emphasized the concern of the party and the government for improving the climate in the university and creating the political, social and psychological conditions that might help solve the UGET [General Union of Tunisian Students] crisis and promote the emergence of a student organization that will enable students to participate in decisions concerning them.

Recalling the speech delivered by Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali at the opening session of work of the committee to reflect on the question of student representation, Amri noted that the speech should serve as a point of reference for everything having to do with the future of the university, especially since the prime minister clearly emphasized the concern of President Bourguiba, the party and the government for the student organization and the determination of all officials to endow the organization with everything needed to make it a powerful, responsible, competent and outstanding body.

Amri emphasized that students must have the necessary courage to choose their representatives freely and democratically so as to contribute to the formation of an organization able to embody the aspirations of students and possessing the following and influence necessary among all students.

Amri warned students against those who set preliminary conditions for solving the problem and who do not want the problem solved.

He emphasized that now that the political climate has been rectified, there is nothing to justify the continuation of the crisis.

Amri noted in this connection that the reputation of Tunisia, its position and the future of its children must be placed above any other consideration and emphasized the party's concern for bringing young leaders into its action.

Solution Before Year's End

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 17 Sep 80 p 5

[Text] Driss Guiga, member of the Political Bureau and minister of the interior, presided over the closing session of the Region Conference of Students in the governorate of Bizerte Monday evening. The session was also attended by Tahar Ben Rejeb, governor of Bizerte, and other regional leaders.

After hearing the text of the closing motion of the conference and the remarks of several students who dealt with problems relating to university life in general, Guiga delivered a speech in which he emphasized that it is possible to solve all problems if two conditions exist: the establishment of a franc and sincere dialog and the emergence of a student organization that is a valid interlocutor in the dialog.

Guiga added within this context that the question of UGET can be rapidly solved because the government has clearly expressed its intention of solving it and of enabling students to freely elect their representatives in order to have a representative student organization. The minister of interior stated that the government refuses to impose solutions that could be interpreted as control by it or the party.

Concerning the method to be followed for the election of representatives, Guiga noted that while the opinions of the students on this subject are many and diverse, it is important to choose a method that will be effective and definitive.

"For my part," Guiga said, "I believe that the scientific councils of the schools and other establishments of higher education, led by the deans, can supervise these elections since these councils are entrusted with the task of defending the rights and interests of students. This formula would make it possible to go beyond disagreements on the structure that is to supervise the elections."

The minister of interior pointed out that the Union of University Professors can intervene to reconcile the views of students on this problem, but it must express the desire to do so itself because the government does not want to propose anyone, just as it refuses to intervene and remain the arbiter in the situation. The government's sole concern, Guiga said, is that a solution be found for the problem before the end of the year in

order that a special Congress of UGET may be held during the February vacation. The government wants to find a representative and competent interlocutor as rapidly as possible so that it can discuss the students' problems and find appropriate solutions.

The minister said that in order to solve the problem in UGET, students must come to an understanding among themselves and forget -- even if only for the time being -- their secondary problems.

Speaking of the university's orientation, the minister said that this problem has emerged gradually in the course of the search for fair solutions that would reconcile the aspirations of candidates for higher education, on the one hand, with the material limitations and development needs on the other. But whatever the difficulties might be, the problem can be overcome. As is done in other countries, one could contemplate doing away with the baccalaureat and replacing it with a diploma for completion of secondary school not automatically conferring the right to go on to higher education. Access to higher education would then be on a competitive basis. Every school or establishment of higher education would organize competitive examinations to recruit the number of capable students, based on its capacity. The competition would not be organized all at the same time but would be spread out over official vacation so as to provide candidates with the best possible chances. Candidates could then participate in several competitions. Students would no longer have to go through orientation.

But does the government have a rigid position on this matter and wishes to find a fair method able to satisfy everyone. This would not be possible without consultation with a structure representing the students.

Speaking of progress and the content of higher education and the recruitment of professors, Guiga said that the government has endowed the education committees in the establishments of higher education with broad powers, including the recruiting of professors.

The minister of interior emphasized that the government hopes that students will participate in and make their contribution to the discussion of the country's current problems, particularly those affecting young people.

He recalled that the commander in chief, President Habib Bourguiba has demonstrated marked interest in this question, prompting him to call a special party congress to discuss Tunisia's current problems and the main guidelines of the policy of the party and government.

In conclusion, Guiga emphasized the need to safeguard national cohesion and coordinate efforts so as to fulfill the aspirations of the Tunisian people to progress and prosperity.

11,664
(SUI 4480)

AMBASSADORS', CONSULS' CONFERENCE MEETS IN TUNIS

Problems of Diplomacy

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 18-19 Aug 80 p 1

[Text] Yesterday morning the conference of Tunisian ambassadors and consuls stationed abroad was held at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, presided over by Mr Mohamed Mzali, prime minister, and attended by Messrs Hassan Belkhodja, minister of foreign affairs, Mongi Kooli, minister attached to the prime minister and party chairman, Mansour Moalla, minister of planning and finance, Abdelaziz Laarab, minister of national economy, Fouad Mebazaa, minister of information and cultural affairs, Mohamed Fredj Chedli, minister of national education, Moncef Belhadj Amor, minister attached to the prime minister for civil service and administrative reform, and Taieb Sahbani, secretary general of the Foreign Affairs Ministry.

During the conference Mr Hassan Belkhodja delivered an address at the beginning of which he welcomed the prime minister, emphasizing that this conference will be followed by other meetings which will enable the Tunisian consuls to examine the problems they run up against in carrying out their mission and to receive the prime minister's directives regarding the country's foreign policy, a policy which rests on fixed foundations and is defined by the chief of state.

He also observed that the changes which will take place within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will be of an administrative and structural nature such that they may respond to how our foreign policy is evolving with regard to both officials employed in our chancelleries and the increase in the number of Tunisian diplomatic establishments abroad.

Then conference participants spoke up to raise several questions, particularly concerning diplomatic operations and ambassadorial relations with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the other ministerial departments as well as with international bodies and others.

For their part Messrs Mansour Moalla, Abdelaziz Laarab, Fouad Mebazaa, Mohamed Fredj Chedli and Moncef Belhadj Amor gave exhaustive explanations

regarding development policy in Tunisia and the projections of the sixth plan.

We are presenting below a reconstructed version of Mr Mohamed Mzali's address:

Mzali Addresses Conference

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 18-19 Aug 80 pp 1,4

[Text] Mr Mohamed Mzali, the prime minister who presided over the opening of the conference of Tunisian ambassadors and consuls stationed abroad, delivered an address which was focused on the need to struggle against administrative routine and to show a greater interest in the psychological and patriotic sides of bureaucrats, on the need for and importance of integrated diplomatic representation, and on the Tunisian concept of cooperation with foreign countries taking into account the Tunisian character and along the lines of the Supreme Soldier's directives.

In this connection, Mr Mohamed Mzali expressed the hope that this conference will give the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the chance to give further expression to Tunisian policy, to strengthen the Tunisian presence and influence in both friendly countries and brother countries as well as within international bodies. The prime minister expressed his thanks to Tunisian diplomats for the way in which they carry out their duties, observing that he was aware, because of the official visits he had made in different capital cities, of the problems and difficulties met with by ambassadors.

The prime minister then observed that, after only 25 years of independence, Tunisia has managed to acquire great prestige on the international scene, thanks to the Supreme Soldier who was the first minister of foreign affairs of independent Tunisia, and thanks to his policies which gained for Tunisia the esteem and respect of foreign countries and allowed him to play an important role on the international scene.

And the prime minister added:

"All this has been made possible as well thanks to the good qualities that Tunisians have, and more particularly their strong character, their very extensive culture, their influence, their powers of imagination, and their capacity for coming up with solutions."

Mr Mzali referred as well to aspects of the Bourguibian policy, which is noted for its moderate stands, its firmness in defending just causes, its sincerity, and its loyalty.

The prime minister urged Tunisian diplomats to carry out their mission along these lines, in order to preserve the prestige Tunisia has won. After having achieved these gains, Mr Mohamed Mzali went on, duty orders us to think today about the future and to strive together with a view to strengthening the basic aspects of our policy and the Tunisian presence in the world by developing all the conditions necessary domestically and outside the country to firm up Tunisia's prestige abroad.

The first condition consists of making the civil service into effective machinery able to come up with solutions, and to raise the morale of bureaucrats; for diplomats are fighters who actively work to give concrete form to the government's policies and spend their time properly representing their country and [line(s) missing]

"Cooperation requires mutual respect among the partners involved and that their interests be reconciled," he maintained.

Furthermore, while mentioning the shortages certain embassies suffer from in terms of materiel and personnel, Mr Mohamed Mzali reiterated the government's determination to strengthen the capabilities of these embassies to fulfil their mission in the best of conditions.

The prime minister moreover specified that the government has decided to recruit specialized attaches in the economic, commercial and cultural areas for diplomatic representation to be effective and to take on a balanced character and so that embassies adapt to the surroundings within which they operate and best take care of the Tunisian colonies placed under their guiding hand.

Regarding Tunisia's foreign policy, the prime minister indicated that we must remain faithful to the special characteristics of this nation and bring our country's Arab, Islamic, African and Mediterranean sides into harmony, especially since we are defenders of justice struggling together with all free men in this world for the eradication of racism and exploitation.

"Because of this it is incumbent on the ambassadors who represent the chief of state and their country to be completely up to snuff on the government's policy, to express it as sincerely as can be, to defend it, and to aspire to even more competence and conviction in order to present as accurate an image as possible of Bourguibian Tunisia."

95.81

(347) 4400

MOKADDEM LEAVES FOR GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 13 Sep 80 p 5

[Text] Dr Sadok Mokaddem, president of the National Assembly, left Tunis yesterday morning for the German Democratic Republic, heading a delegation made up of deputies Tawfik Essid, Abderrahmane Toukabri, Habib Chaouch and Larbi Mallakh.

In a statement, Dr Mokaddem said that the National Assembly delegation will participate in the work of the 67th session of the International Parliamentary Union to be held in Berlin from 16 to 24 September.

The session will study the political, economic and social situation prevailing in the world and will take up motions drafted by the Preparatory Conference held last month in Oslo.

The Parliament members will discuss the situation in the Middle East and all the contributing factors and will look at development prospects for the coming decade.

"As a member of the Executive Committee and vice president of the Union," Dr Mokaddem said, "I shall participate in the work of the Executive Committee beginning on 14 September, and I shall also participate in the work of the Interparliamentary Council meeting on 15 September to adopt the recommendations of the General Conference."

The Tunisian delegation will also meet with delegations from brother and friendly countries in order to coordinate positions on questions on this session's agenda.

In conclusion, the president of the National Assembly recalled that the Interparliamentary Union includes 90 nations with a parliamentary system.

Dr Mokaddem and the delegation were greeted upon their arrival by Helmut Burke, ambassador of the German Democratic Republic to Tunis.

11,466
CSG: 4400

LABOR COMMUNIQUE SUPPORTS GOVERNMENT POLICIES

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 15-16 Sep 80 p 4

[Text] The Tunisian General Federation of Labor (UGTT) has issued the following communique:

The administrative committee of the UGTT met on Friday, 12 September, and Saturday, 13 September, presided over by Tijani Abid, secretary general of the UGTT. The committee examined the general trade union situation.

Following the debate and discussion, Abid delivered a speech in which he addressed several questions relating to trade union action in the present and the future, both on the domestic and international levels.

In response for requests for clarification from members of the administrative committee concerning the planning committee for the next UGTT congress, whose composition was recommended by the PSD [Destourian Socialist Party], Abid explained that the task of the commission is confined to supervising preparations for the congress and that the committee will have national and regional subcommittees open to all good suggestions.

Speaking of relations between the party's professional cell and the trade union in the enterprises, Abid emphasized that these relations are based on cooperation and that neither one can replace the other.

The secretary general of the UGTT concluded by stressing the need to strengthen ties and contacts between all trade union groups and to pay increased attention to the concerns of the workers so as to find adequate solutions for them that are compatible with the economic and social situation of the enterprises.

Following the meeting, the UGTT administrative committee published the following motion:

After examining the general situation in the country, the UGTT administrative committee:

Expresses its satisfaction with the liberal policy of openness and democracy which the commander in chief has recommended. It is also satisfied with the

premises of that policy emanating from the members of the government and the Political Bureau, led by Mohamed Mzali, prime minister and secretary general of the party. The committee wishes the policy the greatest success.

The administrative committee approves the principle of creating, in keeping with the recommendations of the party, a committee whose task will be limited to supervising preparations for the next UGTT congress. The administrative committee also approves the party orientation aimed at improving the atmosphere in trade unions so that the next congress of the UGTT will be held amidst a spirit of freedom, democracy, and in keeping with the UGTT statutes. The administrative committee will be called upon to elect the members of the committee in charge of planning the congress.

The administrative committee recommends that the Executive Bureau work to combine its efforts with other social partners for the revision of collective contracts.

The administrative committee recalls the need to continue the dialog with the government in order to revise statutes covering the Civil Service and government employees, national offices and companies, as well as special codes governing the various ministries so as to adapt them to the country's economic and social evolution.

The administrative committee reaffirms the need to reactivate the committees emanating from the High Civil Service Council so as to revise salary and bonus scales.

The administrative committee recommends that all workers step up their efforts in order to ensure the success of the government's economic and social policy within the framework of the national options defined by the current development plan, which will be adjusted in the course of the plan.

Tijani Abid
Secretary General of the UGTT

11,464
CSO: 4400

MEASURES AIMED AT DECENTRALIZATION

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 21 Aug 80 p 4

[Text] Yesterday at the Ministry of Public Works and Housing Messrs Mohamed Sayah, minister of public works and housing, and Moncef Belhadj Amor, minister attached to the prime minister for civil service and administrative reform, presided over a joint meeting bringing together high level bureaucrats from the two departments.

During this working session, held as part of the decentralization policy decided on by the government and political bureau at the time of their joint meeting of 28 July 1980, the two ministers reviewed the measures having a decentralizing impact on services for which the ministry of public works and housing is responsible.

It has been decided to provide each governorate with an arrondissement level of administration. Thus four arrondissements have been created at Beja, Siliana, Sidi Bouzid and Tozeur.

Measures have been settled on as well with a view to allowing the regional structures to serve citizens better. Real decision-making power is delegated to them and each region is provided with a local public works and land use subdivision as well as a construction subdivision and another for housing.

These measures will allow adequate coverage and coordination at the regional level for Public Works Department activities.

Furthermore, as part of a land use policy oriented toward promoting genuine economic regions, the creation of a structure for coordinating the different building, industrial, tourism and housing agencies has been examined at the level of the Ministry for Public Works and Housing.

The ministers insisted on the need to immediately take steps aimed at giving more flexibility to the management of administrative and financial affairs as well as raising the level of loans issued to citizens.

To this end, it was decided to decentralize budget management in favor of the arrondissements, by agreeing to delegate to them credit authority relating to the operating budget, based on an allocation established at the national level, and allowing them to completely provide for the management of personnel and materiel and guarantee the upkeep of public works.

Regional parks will be developed while ensuring that they are utilized in an optimal fashion.

Soon to be published texts will formally establish these arrangements and will define the new powers of the arrondissements. Another decision: power over public works budget credits will be delegated to the regional level with a view to simplifying procedures and permitting regional civil servants to more actively participate in the process of economic development. In this vein it was decided to delegate to the heads of the arrondissements authority over funds for studies and construction for projects whose cost does not exceed 200,000 dinars and to put them in charge of supervising and implementing them.

To this end, the ministers are agreed on the need to revise the ceiling for contracts within the jurisdiction of the regional commission of markets.

As for projects whose sums are between 200,000 and 500,000 dinars, the regional structure will be entitled to take charge of their implementation. In the area of land use, so as to permit local communities to manage their usage plans better, taking into account the citizenry and the requirements of socio-economic development, detailed usage plans and town planning regulations will from this point on be established and modified by decree, after notification by the local communities.

In this context, the development of a town planning code will likewise be proposed in the National Assembly to facilitate operations having to do with building authorizations, and for the approval of subdivision plans, which approval has already been decentralized and the procedures for which are going to be simplified, architects will be detailed to small municipalities.

As far as the National Fund for Housing Improvement (FNAH) is concerned, aside from preliminary case investigation which is already decentralized, decision-making will from now on come directly from the arrondissement head who will manage funds the allocation of which will continue to be under the jurisdiction of the national level of the civil service. The preliminary investigation of loans by the National Retirement and Welfare Fund (CNRPS) will be done on the arrondissement level as well.

State organs responsible for land management and real estate development, aside from regional agencies which have already been formed, will be represented at the level of each governorate.

Finally, regarding public buildings, it was decided to set up a commission responsible for appointing architects and overseeing studies for projects for which funds are being managed by a region.

EEC INDUSTRY COMMISSIONER'S ACTIVITIES IN TUNISIA REPORTED

Audience With President Bourguiba

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 30 Aug 80 p 1

[Text] Yesterday morning, President Bourguiba received in audience Etienne Davignon, the European Economic Community (EEC) industry commissioner, at the Essaada Palace in La Marsa. Also present were: Abdelaziz Lasram, minister of national economy; Mansour Moalla, minister of plan and finance and Abdelaziz Hamzaoui, Tunisia's ambassador in Brussels and Tunisia's representative in the EEC.

After the audience, the European commissioner said that he felt honored to have met with President Bourguiba. I saw for myself, he added, the interest which the head of state attached to the development of relations between Tunisia and the EEC.

He also said that he had told the president of the republic how anxious the EEC was to define even more precisely its cooperation with Tunisia in spite of the difficulties created by the international situation and by the expansion of the community.

This definition will take place on two levels.

The first level is of a political nature in view of both parties' wish to maintain and strengthen their cooperation.

The second level consists in translating that wish into concrete actions in the spheres of commercial and industrial cooperation.

On this score, the EEC representative noted that these two subjects will be further discussed during his talks with Tunisian officials.

He explained that President Bourguiba's expressed wish to strengthen the relations of cooperation with the EEC is a very encouraging sign. It is important that we, Europeans, should answer that wish in a precise and concrete manner, the Viscount of Davignon concluded.

Let us mention that before receiving the Viscount of Davignon, the head of state talked with Abdelaziz Lasram and Mansour Moalla.

Working Relations

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 30 Aug 80 p 4

[Text] Yesterday morning, Abdelaziz Lasram, minister of national economy, and Etienne Davignon, EEC industry commissioner, chaired a working meeting held at the Department of National Economy and attended by, among others, Ambassador Ahmed Ben Arfa, director general of international cooperation in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and by Abdelaziz Hamzaoui, Tunisia's ambassador to the EEC.

On this occasion, Lasram made a statement on Tunisia's economic development drive, its objectives and the means to achieve them.

Then the two sides discussed relations between Tunisia and the EEC and their bilateral cooperation, in particular as regards olive oil and textiles.

Both sides stressed the need for united action, dialog and exchange of information on matters of common interest.

Lasram insisted that it would be advisable for Tunisia to participate in the agreements and negotiations that the EEC may conduct with other partners as regards the marketing of some commodities, such as olive oil and textiles, to avoid the snags and difficulties which have occurred in recent years.

He explained that cooperation between Tunisia and the European Community must take into account the objectives of Tunisia's economic development and must encourage new investments which will strengthen the options adopted in the sphere of industrialization.

Mr Davignon made a statement in which he described the working session as a "very important and thorough one" since it went beyond theoretical and general issues and dealt with very specific questions. It reaffirms, he said, the mutual determination of both sides to attach an ever increasing importance to relations between Tunisia and the EEC in spite of their own problems.

In this connection, he noted that both parties had mapped out several procedures to deal with questions presenting more complementarity, more security and more chances of success in the context of Tunisia's next economic development plan.

"We have agreed," Davignon went on to say, "on a method which will make our relations more fruitful and will offer more guarantees as well as creating greater understanding."

He noted that this meeting had given them the opportunity of fully analysing the relations between the two parties and of becoming better acquainted with the problems of their bilateral cooperation.

"Both sides are quite confident, and even if difficulties should arise we will be able to resolve them in a positive manner," Davignon concluded.

Prior to the working session there was a brief meeting attended by Abdelaziz Lasram, by Minister of Plan and Finance Mansour Moalla, by Etienne Davignon and the delegation accompanying him and by Ahmed Ben Arfa and Abdelaziz Hamzaoui.

Meeting With Belkhodja

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 30 Aug 80 p 4

[Text] Yesterday afternoon, Foreign Affairs Minister Hassan Belkhodja met with Etienne Davignon, EEC industry commissioner, and with the delegation accompanying him. Were present at this meeting: Taleb Sahbani, secretary general of the Foreign Affairs Department, Ambassador Ahmed Ben Arfa, director general for international cooperation in the same department, and Abdelaziz Hamzaoui, Tunisian ambassador to the EEC.

After the audience, Davignon made a statement in which he said that the meeting had dealt with the assurances and guarantees which the EEC could offer to Tunisia and with the development of bilateral relations so as to make them more advantageous for both sides in the various spheres of activity stopping them from being one-sided.

He noted that the talks were marked by the same spirit of and desire for cooperation which had characterized the rest of his talks with Tunisian officials.

Lasram Gives Luncheon in Davignon's Honor

Let us mention that Abdelaziz Lasram gave a luncheon yesterday at the Hotel Sidi Bou in honor of Etienne Davignon.

Were invited to this luncheon: Hassan Belkhodja, Mansour Moalla, Ahmed Ben Arfa, Abdelaziz Hamzaoui, as well as Pierre Courtier, EEC representative in Tunis, and Andre Brink, the Netherlands' ambassador to Tunis.

Talks With Agriculture Minister

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 31 Aug 80 p 4

[Text] Yesterday morning, the minister of agriculture, Lassid Ben Osman, received in his ministry office Etienne Davignon, EEC industry commissioner, and the delegation accompanying him.

In a statement which he made following this meeting, Davignon said that his talks had been a follow-up to those he had on Friday with Tunisian officials.

"Our talks with the minister of agriculture," he said, "dealt in particular with the question of improving cooperation between Tunisia and the EEC in the sphere of agriculture and with the future prospects of this cooperation."

Davignon also said:

"The minister and I had an exchange of views which enabled us to raise a number of issues concerning both Tunisia and the community. As a result, we were able to define a new method which consists in making a better use of the possibilities offered to Tunisia in the agricultural sphere.

"Finally, we discussed how to make it possible for Tunisia and for the EEC to expand their bilateral relations, more particularly in the sphere of agricultural cooperation," the EEC industry commissioner said in conclusion.

We should also mention that Etienne Davignon left Tunis yesterday in the early afternoon.

Davignon said at a news conference that during his stay in Tunisia he had talks with Tunisian officials and pointed out that these talks had given both sides the opportunity to discuss matters concerning the reinforcement of cooperation between Tunisia and the EEC.

After declaring that both parties had been able to define a new method which will allow the development of bilateral relations in various spheres, Davignon noted that Tunisia and the EEC have agreed to hold further talks which will guarantee conditions leading to the success of joint projects in the field of electronics and secondary processing of goods.

On his departure from Tunis-Carthage International Airport, Etienne Davignon was seen off by Ambassador Ahmed Ben Arfa, director general for international cooperation in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, by Abdelaziz Hamzaoui, Tunisian ambassador to the EEC and by Pierre Courtier, EEC envoy to Tunis.

8196
CSD: 4400

NEW AIRPORT TO BE BUILT WITH SWEDISH COOPERATION

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 13 Sep 80 p 5

[Text] The ninth day of study for economic development in the governorate of Bizerte was devoted yesterday to Sweden's participation. Actually, about a dozen Swedish enterprises participated along with Tunisian cadres and enterprises in working out certain projects that could be set up in the region within the framework of Tunisian-Swedish cooperation.

The day was directed by Hassan Belkhoja, member of the Political Bureau and minister of foreign affairs. It was held at the Palace of Congresses and attended by regional cadres, headed by the governor and the coordinator of the provisional coordinating committee, the ambassador of Sweden to Tunisia and several Tunisian and Swedish businessmen.

Belkhoja delivered an address in which he praised the Bizerte governorate for its initiative in organizing the days of study. He pointed out that the development days are in keeping with the government's economic orientations and prepare the way for a real boom, particularly in the industrial domain since cooperation with other friendly countries strengthens the development effort. The region of Bizerte provides favorable conditions and an environment for industry and a new airport is going to be built between Tunis and Bizerte.

Speaking of Tunisian-Swedish relations, Belkhoja emphasized that these relations are very solid, especially since Sweden was one of the first countries to establish bonds of cooperation with Tunisia since independence. The minister also recalled the visit made by the Commander in Chief to Sweden, which opened broad prospects in relations between the two countries.

Turning to certain aspects of Tunisian-Swedish cooperation, Belkhoja singled out commercial trade and the export of Tunisian products to Sweden and technical and financial cooperation in the agricultural domains such as livestock raising, fishing and dams. There are Tunisian-Swedish joint ventures in the sectors of medical equipment, household appliances and the infrastructure.

Belkheja noted in this connection that in speaking about cooperation with Sweden, one should point to relations with all four Scandinavian countries, which are establishing solid ties with other nations based on sincere cooperation free of any complexes, whence the great openness of these countries which provide a market for Tunisian fruits and vegetables and handicrafts. There are also great possibilities of cooperation with these countries in the industrial and technological domains and the creation of enterprises. Belkheja emphasized that the important thing is for Tunisian businessmen to have sufficient courage and initiative to invest in these fields. Contacts are now being made and there is a sincere determination to meet commitments, especially since Sweden and the other Scandinavian countries are basing their efforts on planning and good organization.

21,464
CSO: 4400

PROMOTION OF AGRICULTURAL ZONES SURROUNDING TUNIS

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 21 Aug 80 p 4

(Text) Tuesday evening at the institute for education and refresher training for agricultural cadres in Sidi Thabet Mr Lassad Ben Osman, minister of agriculture, presided over a working session bringing together the agricultural cadres of the region, with Messrs M'hadheb Rouissi, governor-president of the Tunis district council and Moncef Ben Romdhane, director-general of the Mejerda Valley development office, present.

During this meeting the minister elaborated on several themes relating to the state of the agricultural sector in the Tunis governorate, the preservation of the capital's green belt, and the possibilities of extending irrigated perimeters to the Hessiane, Bouhnech and Kalaat Andalous sectors.

The participants felt they had to raise various questions which touched on:

- The extension of irrigated perimeters
- The mobilization of new water resources of irrigation
- The continuous upkeep of agricultural roads
- Setting up refrigerated warehouses and sorting centers for agricultural products
- Giving up certain plots of land belonging to the OMVM [Mejerda Valley Development Organization]

In his response to these appeals, Mr Lassad Ben Osman maintained that it was high time for the promotion of certain rural zones surrounding the capital which ought to be slated to provide the capital with fruits and vegetables.

The minister of agriculture indicated that after having studied the situation in the zones he visited, several decisions had been made regarding it particularly:

- The completion of the installation of an efficient network of agricultural roads in the Hessiane and Bouhnech sectors
- Making the agricultural land productive in those two sectors, which are to benefit from water brought in from the La Chargaia and Chotrana purification stations
- The drainage of most of the Mejerda valley land and giving it back to private parties
- Supplying the Borj Touil zone with drinking water
- Strengthening collaboration between the OMVM and the region's farmers especially regarding experimentation in agricultural techniques
- Energetic struggle against unauthorized construction

9631

CSO: 4400

GRAIN PRODUCTION DISCUSSED IN DETAIL

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 18 Sep 80 p 2

[Article by Larbi Chennaoui: "Is Grain Self-Sufficiency Within our Reach?"]

[Text] During last June the Council of Ministers, presided over by the chief of state, devoted its work to examining the situation of the grain sector.

Since then two increases in the price of wheat at the producers' level have occurred. The most recent was the one announced in the course of the meeting held on 12 September at UNA [National Farmers Union] headquarters.

At the onset it should be said that the increases by themselves do not contribute very much.

They will only bear fruit if they are reinforced by other measures.

Of course measures are not lacking. They deal chiefly with soil and seeds. Their effect will not be slow to be felt. If one confines oneself to the prospects offered by the climate, the nature of the soil and the human factor combined, Tunisia is in a position to fill all its needs without having recourse to importation of grains. Are we on the road to self-sufficiency? "That is the question."

Tunisia is comprised of three large-crop zones:

A humid zone. This is by far the best zone, since it includes very fertile land suitable for large crops. Everyone knows that the land of Beja and Fritissa, for example, have a productivity unequalled in Tunisia. In fact, whatever the climatic conditions, the production of this land never falls short of a determined quantity, in view of the fact that the drop in the rain gauge is never more than 30 percent in any case.

According to the least optimistic estimates this zone is in a position to produce 6,000,000 quintals (or 30 quintals per hectare). Its area is 200,000 hectares.

An intermediate zone (neither humid nor dry). This zone differs rather appreciably from the first.

Thanks to the action conducted by the Grain Office, production in recent years reached 12 and then 15 quintals per hectare.

According to studies conducted by the Office, production may go up to 20 quintals per hectare.

These studies take into account the drought, a cyclic phenomenon that occurs every five years.

The dry zone. In this zone production barely exceeds 5 quintals per hectare. Here the drought often takes on worrisome proportions.

Parallel with this traditional distribution there are a number of pilot farms (100 farms all told) which can meet the country's grain needs by themselves, because they are the object of intensive exploitation, according to the most modern standards, with total mechanization.

In the present decade production has not kept pace with consumption. Which is likely to contribute to an increased volume of grain imports.

In fact, in 1980 soft-wheat production per hectare is only 6.1 quintals (as compared to 5.3 in 1970). Hard-wheat production per hectare in 1980 is 6.3 quintals (compared to only 4 quintals in 1970). Barley production went from 3.6 quintals per hectare in 1970 to 5.3 quintals per hectare in 1980.

The importation stampede stems in a direct line from the increasingly prominent lack of adaptation between production, which tends to become stationary, and consumption, which is exceeding all estimates.

This stagnation comes at a time when there are less than 800,000 hectares of land that lends itself perfectly to large crops in the north, and 600,000 hectares in the central and southern parts of the country. All of these lands are far from producing the yield they should produce.

Several factors are responsible for this great imbalance:

First, the natural factors known to everyone (great variations in weather, a very irregular rainfall, a large pluviometric imbalance between the different zones described above).

Next, in the area where our responsibility lies, are the purely human factors. Some are a legacy from the past, which it would always be useful to abandon (the large parceling of land suitable for large crops, the use of archaic techniques). Others come from the inadequacies observed in agricultural orientation and popularization conducted just about everywhere. This explains the under-development of the land still manifested, due to ill-founded reservations and poor selection of the varieties of grain to be sown.

Aware of these gaps, the authorities are continually intensifying the orientation.

In the last two years they have established a map showing the nature of the soil, so it can be adapted to the right type of grain.

That is a sizable remedy that constitutes the framework of any rational action.

Self-Sufficiency is Within our Reach

The second step the authorities are in the process of taking is none other than crop rotation. It roughly involves alternating grains with starchy products. These two remedies are accompanied by orientation--constantly increasing and supported by the farmers--toward techniques that have proved their effectiveness. Up until now this praiseworthy action has involved only 200,000 hectares. It guarantees a production of around 6,000,000 quintals (30 quintals per hectare). It should be noted that this production is equal to that of 600,000 hectares located in the north, which does not exceed 10 quintals per hectare. Thus the difference in yield is enormous. According to the experts, the lands in the central portion and the south are capable of producing 3,000,000 quintals over and above this amount annually.

Theoretically, all these lands as a whole can produce about 15,000,000 quintals; which narrowly surpasses local consumption (14,000,000 quintals per year).

In reality, our production will certainly not go above 11,000,000 quintals. Importation, however, will always be acceptable.

The Fifth Plan provides for consolidating the large crops in the north. Such consolidation can be conveniently brought about by:

- Reviewing the seed varieties.

- Using nitrate fertilizers advisedly.

- Systematically pulling up the weeds.

- Improving crop rotation methods.

- Improving the soil preparation.

- Taking increasing interest in the working conditions of technicians and farmers.

What emerges from this investigation is that grain self-sufficiency is within our reach. All that is required is to smooth away the obstacles and come to the end of reservations about the value of work on the land, insofar as possible.

In conclusion, one cannot fail to recall that increased grain prices at the production level are a guarantee of productivity. The latest increase, on 12 September while those responsible were holding a meeting with the farmers at UNA headquarters, brings the price of wheat per quintal at the production level to 94,500 [expansion unknown].

This gesture is proof of the authorities' interest in the grain sector.

8946

CSO: 4400

INCENTIVES GIVEN TO AGRICULTURE TO PROMOTE PRODUCTION

Self-Sufficiency in Food Sought

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 14 Sep 80 p 5

[Text] Within the framework of the campaign for the partial legislative elections in the governorate of Sidi Bouzid, Driss Guiga, member of the Political Bureau and minister of Interior, presided over a people's meeting in Ouled Haffouz on Friday evening. The meeting was attended by regional cadres, headed by the governor and the secretary general of the party coordinating committee in Sidi Bouzid.

Guiga delivered a speech at the meeting in which he discussed the role of national organizations in national life and the task awaiting Tunisians in the current phase of the country's march toward development.

In this connection, the minister called upon organizations to place their action within a patriotic perspective and to put the country's higher interest over any other consideration. He said that national organizations must work to serve the interest of the Tunisian people as a whole, not a given social class. He also emphasized the need to work for national unity and to remain faithful to the principles of the party and its leadership, while warning against secondary quarrels. "The real battle which Tunisians must wage is the battle for the country's development, in order to achieve economic and social prosperity for the Tunisian people," Guiga said, while at the same time recalling the fight waged by the Tunisian people led by President Bourguiba in order to gain access to independence.

The minister emphasized that the party which led that fight continues to guide the Tunisian people toward economic and social progress in all domains. He called on citizens to spare no effort in uniting around the party just as in the time of the liberation struggle in order to ensure the success of the development battle in which Tunisia and all its forces are engaged.

Conforming to national imperatives does not prevent a diversity of opinions, however, Guiga said. Every person is asked to express his opinion and to make proposals for the good of the community.

The minister then took up a number of economic questions, emphasizing the choice spot occupied by agriculture and its development in the government's economic policy.

He mentioned the different incentives which President Bourguiba has ordered to be given to farmers to encourage an increase in farm production. Guiga stressed that the objective assigned to agriculture is to ensure the country's self-sufficiency in food, noting that the incentives which the chief of state has ordered for farmers and his concern for them should cause them to remain faithful to President Bourguiba and give their absolute support to the party as they did during the liberation struggle.

It should be noted that in the course of his visit to Ouled Haffouz, the minister of interior laid the cornerstone of the People's Hall and presided over the official opening of the regional almond festival. He also gave an official send-off to a drinking water project for Chouachia, Mbarkia and Hanla and distributed aid to small farmers within the framework of the Rural Development Program.

Importation of Livestock

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 17 Sep 80 p 4

[Text] At the Farmers Hall yesterday, Minister of Agriculture Lassad Ben Osman presided over the first meeting of the National Livestock Raising Federation.

In his address, the minister of agriculture recalled the privileged spot occupied by agriculture in the national economy and the means necessary in order to achieve the objective of self-sufficiency. The government intervenes only for training and in order to provide farmers with the means needed to increase production and yield.

Ben Osman indicated that the convergent action of UNA [National Farmers Union] and the Ministry of Agriculture should give a new boost to work toward objectives set forth by the plan.

In his speech, the president of the National Livestock Raising Federation described the disturbing situation of the sector.

After the difficult years of the drought, which gravely affected livestock and forced breeders to make enormous sacrifices, the government has proceeded to make massive imports of milk cows to rebuild the existing herd and get milk production off to a new start.

The participants asked for general application of the price of milk to producers at 130 millimes, the establishment of regional milk collection centers and the availability of sufficient quantities of concentrate to livestock breeders. They also asked for a revision of terms for agricultural loans and the proper priority for livestock raising.

In order to make breeders aware of the importance of selective breeding in increasing production and achieve self-financing, participants asked for the establishment of permanent regional organizations which would regulate the market and the liberalization of the price of beef.

In response to questions and suggestions, Ben Osman said that the Ministry of Agriculture has taken a series of measures aimed at correcting insufficiencies and at rehabilitating the livestock sector.

In keeping with the objectives of the Sixth Plan, it has been decided to import 40,000 head of livestock, including 20,000 milk cows, in order to improve the existing herd and step up milk production.

Some 5,000 head will be brought in every year, with priority being given to regions having irrigated areas and to breeders with suitable knowledge and means. It has also been decided to rehabilitate the Hbibia livestock raising center where 2,000 milk cows have been sent.

Ben Osman said that he was optimistic about the future of the cattle raising sector, which will enjoy great growth over the next 2 years, he said.

He recommended that thought be given to adaption of the milk industries' means, where powdered milk is currently used while awaiting production of fresh milk. The minister emphasized that the country will be self-sufficient in meat and perhaps even capable of exporting it if conditions favorable to livestock raising are created.

Ben Osman noted that there is no problem with seeing beef prices if the proper steps are taken to protect the consumer.

The minister of agriculture concluded that all these measures will tend to ensure the country's food security. By supplying material and technical assistance, the government intends to reach the objective of self-sufficiency and lighten the heavy burden now resting on the economy because of the importation of large quantities of meat and milk.

More Credits to Agriculture

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 13 Sep 80 p 4

[Text] On the eve of the new crop season, Mohamed Ghedira, president of UNA, went to the Farmers Hall yesterday morning to preside over the first meeting of the national committee for major crops.

After emphasizing the difficulties caused by the growing grain shortage, the president of UNA described the means needed to undertake the fight for self-sufficiency in grains and reduce the country's dependency on foreign countries.

After a brief speech by the president of U'NA, there was a reading of the evaluation of the previous season and of preparations underway for 1981.

The amount of arable land increased during the past season by 3 percent and the use of select seed by 90 percent, going from 115,000 quintals to 220,000 quintals in 1980. Despite praiseworthy efforts made by farmers and an encouraging beginning, the drought which lasted 2 months hurt production considerably, especially in the Northwest.

Production, estimated at 11 million quintals, is under the estimates stated in the Fifth Plan.

The evaluation report enumerates problems hindering development of the agricultural sector and makes recommendations to farmers and others involved in production.

Aid to small farmers, which use 65 percent of all arable land, the spreading of agricultural experiments in the regions of the Northwest, the extension of credits to small farmers and the restoration of the storage infrastructure constitute the main points developed.

In their speeches, those present formulated their request for a revision of terms governing loans. The excessive taxation (between 5 and 6 percent) worsens the farmer's indebtedness.

Among the other problems mentioned were the lack of fertilizer and the shortage of storage space.

In addition to tardy supply deliveries due to transport and storage difficulties, crates do not always arrive with their normal weight.

Those at the meeting noted that storage problems result from the low storage fee charged cooperatives which handle the marketing and purchase of production. Set at the beginning of 1964, this rate does not even suffice to cover transport costs. The lack of cover (awnings, wood) is an additional threat to crops, which may be hurt by rainfall this season with abrupt changes in climate.

After the discussion, Ghedira informed farmers and others present of the decision made by the president of the republic to raise the price of grain to producers by 1 dinar per quintal. The decision, the second made by the president (the first was made on 20 March 1980 and amounted to 1 dinar), is applicable to the 1980-1981 season. It is aimed at encouraging farmers to work for self-sufficiency within the next 2 years.

Ghedira also announced that between now and 15 October, large farmers will be able to receive larger loans in order to better prepare for this season.

For every hectare, the farmer may receive a credit varying between 50 and 80 dinars. The farmer must evaluate the amount depending on his needs and his ability to repay the loan.

Regarding small and average-size farmers, delegates and local committees of the regions involved must decide upon the granting of credits as soon as possible. The president of UNA informed those at the meeting that loans for the purchase of fertilizer will be granted to farmers starting next year.

Ghedira said that this new move shows the government's interest in the agricultural sector, which is called upon to play a more dynamic role in the national economy in order to reach self-sufficiency in food.

11,464

CSO: 4400

NEW FISHING PRODUCTS GROUP TO BE SET UP

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 14 Sep 80 p 2

[Article by Larbi Chennaoui]

[Text] At a meeting attended by Minister of Agriculture Lassad Ben Ouan, a group of fishing products canners, Mohsen Hamza, general commissioner for fishing, and Slaheddine Ben Dai, president of the Fishing Federation, it was decided to establish an Interprofessional Fishing Products Group (GIPP) and to do everything possible so that the organization might go into operation as soon as possible.

How did the idea of setting up GIPP emerge? What will its prerogatives be? Is it possible to predict the impact it will have on the fishing sector?

In order to organize and improve both the canning and freezing of seafood such as shrimp, octopus, squid, cuttlefish, and so on, and given the problems of hygiene involved, the industry decided to group producers in a private organization to be known as GIPP.

Naturally, GIPP was not created from nothing, for it is true that GICA (Interprofessional Food Canning Group) already partially represents the profession. Actually, this organizations includes all fishing products canners.

The advent of the General Commissionership for Fishing made it possible to connect all fishing activities.

Being basically an administrative organization, the Commissionership is not capable of responding to all demands, particularly those emanating from the profession. That is why it was decided to set up GIPP.

Several Objectives

Actually, GIPP's objectives are many.

The first major concern of this new fishing organization -- which can only belong to it, in fact -- is to develop the sector. Such development will

only be possible if the producer is given every guarantee for the marketing of his catch. How can this be done? The answer is easy: GIPP's main role will be to take the surplus production and then market it on foreign markets, without this surplus being spoiled in any way. The best technique remains freezing. Given the existing conditions, freezing is not the sector's panacea; far from it.

In the opinion of Sadak Belhaj, deputy director of economic promotion in the General Commissionship for Fishing, the processing of products for export is not well developed at present. It is a fact that these products are frequently poorly preserved or even spoiled. Consequently, they are sometimes refused by our traditional markets, which are France, Italy, Spain and to a lesser degree, Japan.

The problem is particularly acute with regard to octopus, now exported in bulk -- that is, without any preliminary processing. Some countries buy specific quantities and process them at home with great pains before reselling at quite high prices.

GIPP will fill this gap. Among its tasks is to oversee the impeccable processing of octopus and shrimp to safeguard the Tunisian label.

Regarding exports, GIPP will undoubtedly try to find new markets, particularly in the Middle East.

In recent years, there have been difficulties with the marketing of sardines. Actually, some countries refuse to buy our product in cans even though the sardines are of quite good quality. Consequently, some canners are determined to put new cans on the market. The form and even the metal (this is where the problems lie) will be substantially different.

It is to be hoped that GIPP will perform all the tasks it is assigned for the good of this vital sector, fishing.

11,464

CSO: 4400

INCREASE REPORTED IN UAE BALANCE OF TRADE

Abu Dhabi EMIRATES NEWS in English 20 Sep 80 pp 1, 3

[Text]

Abu Dhabi, Sept. 19 (WAM): The Currency Board report on the UAE's economic development in the first six months of 1980 has highlighted the heartening state of the country's economy.

It said that the balance of trade rose remarkable in 1979 as compared to that of the previous year. The balance of trade was heartening in the first half of 1980. This is attributed to the increase in oil prices. It is expected that gas exports will play an increasing role in the balance of trade situation as their prices have been linked to those of crude.

Exports and re-exports are expected to register a big increase as long as Dubai continues to provide facilities as a free commercial centre for neighbouring countries.

Imports' value is expected to shoot up not only to meet the increasing requirements of local demand but also to meet a part of imports needed by other Gulf countries. Therefore, it is expected that the value of 1980 imports may rise to Dh. 35.5 billion compared to Dh. 26.5 billion in 1979.

The report said that the rise in crude prices helped in increasing the surplus of the current account balance estimated at about Dh. 24.7 billion in 1980 as against Dh. 17.22 billion in 1979.

The report expected that the private capital flow and individual deposits abroad to continue at their high rates and with a limit of Dh. 23.7 billion in 1980 as compared to Dh. 15.7 billion in 1979. This includes

the deposits of the rising profits of the oil sector abroad and those of expatriate workers, in addition to other private deposits (private investments abroad) and other services.

The report expected that the capital account which only includes official transactions would continue to be in deficit but not an acute one. Official grants and loans are expected to reach Dh. 8.5 billion compared to Dh. 6.4 billion in 1979. Reserve item and associated items are on the rise because of the increase in the Government's net foreign assets which basically reflect the increase Abu Dhabi Investment Authority assets. The net assets' situation of commercial banks expected to improve.

The balance of trade surplus is expected to be Dh. 14.5 billion in 1980 as compared to Dh. 9.56 billion in 1979.

Regarding crude oil, the report said that the production capacity of oil refining will increase nine-fold in 1982 and production will rise to 135,000 barrels a day as compared to 15,000 barrels a day in 1978 with the completion of Al Ruweis refinery expected to go on stream next year.

The UAE will meet its requirements of refined oil with about 33,000 barrels a day while its exports will reach 100,000 barrels a day.

The report observed that the reduction in crude production was not limited to Abu Dhabi emirate alone but also covered Dubai and Sharjah. It also observed that the value of crude

exports had increased vastly because of the rise in oil prices.

Regarding crude exports destination, the report said that statistics about them were only available in respect of Abu Dhabi from which Japan continued to import 33.8 per cent of its needs, followed by the US with 11.1 per cent, France 10.9 per cent, Holland 7.5 per cent and West Germany 6.5 per cent. Exports to Britain witnessed an increase after a three-year decrease with oil exports rising to 3.4 per cent.

Abu Dhabi gas exports increased in recent years and the exports of natural and liquefied petroleum gas were valued at Dh. 422.7 million during the first quarter of 1980 as compared to Dh. 98.1 million during the same period in 1979.

The report said that the UAE raised its gas prices four times during the first half of 1980 and production of liquefied petroleum gas will reach about three million tonnes a year.

The report does not expect that the Soviet gasoline from Siberia to Europe will have any effect on the marketing of the UAE gas as most of its by-products are exported to Japan, India and other countries in the Far East.

Non-oil exports and re-exports will witness a remarkable development next year because the State is giving increasing attention to industries of which a part is directed to meet local consumption while the remainder is exported to meet the requirements of neighbouring countries.

Traditional exports of the UAE like leather, dates and dried fish are diminishing and are giving way to new manufactured goods.

The report said that the value of non-oil exports increased from Dh. 115 million in 1978 to Dh. 238.3 million in 1979, while the value of re-exports increased from Dh. 1,790 million in 1978 to Dh. 2,706 million in 1979.

After the establishment of the free trade zone in Dubai, the volume of re-exports is expected to rise in 1980 as it was in 1979. Iran accounted for 30.9 per cent of re-exports, Saudi Arabia, 27.2 per cent, Qatar 10.3 per cent, Yemen Arab Republic 12.6 per cent and other countries, 19.1 per cent.

The report added that the UAE's gross imports during 1979 including re-exports barring the transit trade registered a sharp increase and were valued at Dh. 26.5 billion as compared to Dh. 20.8 billion during 1978, registering an increase of 27.7 per cent of the total imports of 1979. Dubai's imports increased from 60.9 per cent of the State's total trade in 1978 to 62.9 per cent in 1979. The share of Abu Dhabi and Sharjah registered a drop.

Regarding the 1979 transit trade, Sharjah continued to dominate it accounting for 91 per cent. The UAE freight operations increased in 1979 with 39 per cent compared to that of 1978 and their value was Dh. 1.2 billion. Their value this year is rise to Dh. 1.6 billion.

It added that in 1979 the imports of consumer goods accounted for 30.2 per cent as compared to 1978 including food and tobacco imports.

Capital goods imports registered a slight increase of 7.2 per cent while those of semi-processed goods registered a big increase - 114.3 per cent - proving the existence of small industrial projects in the country which depend on imports of such goods.

The 1979 imports from Western Europe and some industrialised countries dropped from 79.8 per cent in 1978 to 72.3 per cent in 1979, while imports from Arab countries increased from 4.6 per cent in 1978 to 9.4 per cent in 1979. Imports from Eastern Europe and China dropped during the same period while imports from some Asian countries increased.

RECLAMATION OF HADIRAT ISLAND DISCUSSED

Abu Dhabi EMIRATES NEWS in English 22 Sep 80 p 3

[Text] Abu Dhabi, Sept. 21 (WAN)--The Executive Council held a meeting under the chairmanship of Crown Prince and Lieutenant General Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed and discussed the project of reclamation of Hadirat and Bu Al Sayaeef islands and making them one island linked with a bridge with the Abu Dhabi main island to face the expansion of population.

This project is implemented in accordance with the directives of His Highness President Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan following his recent visit to these islands.

The project necessitates the transport of 35 million cubic metres of sand and the distance of the new island will be about 9 kilometres.

The Council also discussed a project for the development of the southern channel in Abu Dhabi which necessitates the increase of its distance to 300 metres instead of 100 metres and with a depth of 6 metres.

The Council also discussed the project for setting up a power station in Umm Al Nar west 7 and 8 which includes the installation of two steam turbines with a capacity of 160 MW for each turbine and the installation of four desalination units with a capacity of 20 million gallons of water per day.

The Council reviewed several issues on the provision of services to the citizens and the allocations of additional funds for Bida bin Saud and Al Zaala projects in Al Ain and the new financial allocations for the afforestation projects of Abu Dhabi municipality.

CSO: 4820

UAE MAIL RESTRICTIONS EXPLAINED

Abu Dhabi EMIRATES NEWS in English 16 Sep 80 p 3

[Text]

Dubai, Sept. 15 (Ithad) The General Post Office in cooperation with the competent Ministries and departments has prepared a list of the materials and items the entry of which into the UAE through the mail is banned.

The list has been sent to the International Postal Union (IPU), which in turn, will distribute it to post offices throughout.

The list was also circulated to local post offices countrywide for reference in regard to the incoming and outgoing mail.

According to director-general of posts Mohamed Ali Al Majar, the banned items include arms and ammunition and their spare parts, butane gas lighters, celluloid or materials made of it; aerosols, radiating materials, explosives and other dangerous materials.

Other contraband items include radio receivers and transmitters unless licensed, pork and its byproducts, seeds, plants unaccompanied by health clearance certificates, pesticides, and medicines without import licenses.

Also banned from entry by mail are toxic materials, narcotics, alcoholic drinks, political publications, pictures of wholly or partially naked humans, publications abusive of Arabs, Muslims, Islam or the country's symbol, pornographic films, uninsured gold, platinum, diamonds, silver and pearls.

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

BRIEFS

ACCORD FOR REFINERY EXPANSION--Abu Dhabi, Sept. 21 (WAM)--Ruler's Representative in the Eastern Region and ADNOC Chairman Sheikh Tahnoun bin Mohamed today signed an accord with a consultant company, Pullman Kellogg, for expansion of Umm Al Nar refinery to increase its capacity from 15,000 barrels to 75,000 barrels a day. The signing of the accord is considered the first practical step for implementing the project in 33 months. The project is part of the state plan for increasing the output of locally refined oil as well as for providing sufficient supplies to the home market of petroleum by-products. The plan includes similar expansions at Al Ruwels refinery under construction. Pullman Kellogg was the company which build Umm Al Nar refinery. [Text] [Abu Dhabi EMIRATES NEWS in English 22 Sep 80 p 3]

ALLOCATION FOR ABU DHABI--Abu Dhabi, Sept. 16 (WAM)--The Executive Council meeting under the chairmanship of the Crown Prince Lieutenant-General Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed, today approved the allocation of 81 million dirhams for the execution of several projects in Abu Dhabi and Al Ain. The Council approved, among other items, a tender for the execution of the 9th phase of construction of Al Ain roads at a cost of Dh. 46 million; additional works for the supply and installation of 33 KV sub-stations in Abu Dhabi and Al Ain at a cost of Dh. 21 million; a tender for the afforestation of 200 hectares in Al Fina area estimated to cost Dh. 8 million; additional works costing Dh. 6 million for expanding the airport road; payment of installments to contractors; the maintenance, repair and operation works for the Corniche Hospital air conditioning system; and the appointment of a consultancy firm for the water desalination station in Al Sela and for eight agricultural projects in Abu Dhabi. [Text] [Abu Dhabi EMIRATES NEWS in English 17 Sep 80 p 1]

UAE-PAKISTAN PANEL POSTPONED--Abu Dhabi, Sept. 21 (WAM)--Mohamed Khalifa Al-Yusuf, Director of the Department for Economic Affairs and International Cooperation at the Foreign Ministry, today received Pakistani Ambassador Rifat Pasha Sheikh. During the meeting, the two sides reviewed economic relations between the two countries. Al-Yusuf asked the Ambassador for the postponement of the meetings of the joint committee which was originally to be held in October as Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Rashid Abdalla will be in New York at the time to attend the meetings of 35th session of the United Nations General Assembly and will also visit Denmark between October 12 and 15. [Text] [Abu Dhabi EMIRATES NEWS in English 22 Sep 80 p 1]

MOROCCO SATISFIED WITH RESULTS OF FREETOWN MEETING ON SAHARA

Paris LE MONDE in French 19 Sep 80 p 6

[Article by Roland Delcour: "Hassen II is Happy With Results of Freetown Meeting"]

[Text] Rabat--"Freetown II was a big victory for Morocco when compared to Freetown I," read the front-page headline of the pro-government journal LE MATIN DU SAHARA on Wednesday, 17 September, following the analysis made by King Hassan II regarding the meeting of the "committee of wise men" on the conflict in the western Sahara (LE MONDE, 14-15 September). The sovereign as a matter of fact the night before, in his palace at Ifrane, had addressed the representatives of the Saharan population around Freetown in the presence of members of the National Security Council.

Created 2 years after the raid by the POLISARIO [Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro] against the city of Tan-Tan, this organ includes the representatives of the majority and the opposition. The king told them--as he had done earlier on Monday night in talking to a group of high-ranking officers--what his viewpoint was on the conflict's political and military developments.

"We can say that there is reason for great satisfaction because this Freetown meeting is a big victory compared to the earlier one (the July summit). Thanks to God, we developed policies which go hand in hand with our military successes," the monarch said. Surprising though it may seem, this analysis is supported by many official and semi-official commentators.

They note that the Freetown resolution recommends the institution of a ceasefire starting in December 1980 and the organization of a referendum by the OAU with the help of the UN (the Moroccan prime minister and the minister of foreign affairs had criticized this resolution, particularly those two points); but it does not mention the POLISARIO Front, nor the possible admission of the Saharan Republic to the OAU. Some people even go so far as to say that it would not be inconceivable for Morocco to agree to negotiate on the idea of a referendum in the former Spanish Saharan territories. "After all, neither the Moroccan government nor the

Moroccan troops were invited to withdraw from the Sahara, as was the case in December 1979 at Monrovia. Under these conditions, a referendum would have every chance of success as far as Morocco is concerned." This assumption however seems improbable since it would mean abandoning the idea held by Morocco according to which the Saharan people have already expressed their desire to be Moroccans on several occasions.

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'AUTHENTIC' REPRESENTATIVES OF SAHARANS ADDRESS OAU COMMITTEE

Casablanca MAROC SOIR in French 12 Sep 80 p 2

[Article by special MAP correspondent in Bargache and Mejjou]

[Excerpts] Freetown, 12 Sep--For over 4 hours, chiefs of state belonging to the Committee of Wise Men met Wednesday afternoon in Freetown, capital of Sierra Leone, to hear ten movements, associations, deputies and local elected officials from the Saharan provinces, representing the authentic inhabitants of the Sahara formerly under Spanish domination but now liberated and attached to the mother country.

Irregardless of their political affiliations and their domestic choices, every group testified before the group of Wise Men and before history to the evolution of the nation's decolonization process.

AOSARIO

The movement made up of residents of Saguiet Hamra and Rio de Oro (AOSARIO) made the following statement to the president of Sierra Leone, acting president of the OAU and chairman of the ad hoc committee on the Sahara formerly under Spanish domination, and other members of the committee:

First of all, we would like once again to draw attention to the fact that the AOSARIO is made up of liberation movements that fought colonial domination in order to achieve the unconditional return of these provinces to the mother country. The AOSARIO has set as its objective the struggle for the liberation of our people taken from their native land by the Algerian Army, which for years has held them in concentration camps in Algerian territory.

The movement, formed at the beginning of 1976, includes soldiers and resisters who fought colonialism. It also has cells made up of emigres from these provinces now residing in Europe, particularly France, Belgium, Holland, the Federal Republic of Germany, Spain and the Canary Islands.

In coming before the OAU Committee of Wise Men for the first time to defend the true aspirations of the people whose political spokesmen we are, we have

the firm conviction that this dispute created within the framework of the hegemonic policy of certain parties will find a just solution making it possible, in this hospitable land, to have a meeting of the two parties, which are none other than Morocco and Algeria.

We hope that to achieve this purpose, it will not be necessary to go any further. We have said that Africa is as concerned as Algeria and Morocco, naturally anxious to safeguard peace and security in the region.

Naturally, we do not know all the members of the committee. We can even say that until this moment, part of the committee has heard only the "sound of the Algerian clock."

Algerian Designs

Having said this much and in order to put an end to any misunderstanding, we would like to speak solemnly to everyone to say that the bloody events going on in our region are but the continuation of what the government in Algeria has, since independence, stirred up against the established power and against the security of our mother country Morocco.

Our country has undeniably proved to international opinion that the hand outstretched to Algeria was fraternal, as history proves, for it was from Morocco -- and no one can deny this -- that the military actions of the Algerian FLN originated. It is also in Morocco that tens of thousands of Algerians who fled colonial repression took refuge. It was the Moroccan people who consented to share their little bread with the very ones who, in return, decided upon the creation of a puppet organization behind which the army of that country has attacked, murdered and kidnapped our brothers and sisters from their native soil.

The history of that puppet creation is, moreover, nothing more than the history of a handful of influential men in the Algerian Government who have unscrupulously used Algerian nomads, Malians, Mauriticians, Nigerians and Moroccan opponents whom they manipulate, compromise and shape.

Furthermore, we naturally find this tiny group lodged in fancy hotels, stuffed with money and propaganda, flitting from capital to capital. It merely serves as an alibi and screen for an overall hegemonic strategy. These same individuals deny their relatives and roots to help a regime that aims to dominate our region. We therefore propose to your honorable committee that you go to the Sahara, particularly that part of the Moroccan Sahara once under French domination, in order to meet yourselves with the relatives or even the parents of those people, who call themselves the spokesmen of the puppet organization that we just had the opportunity to describe and to which we shall repeatedly have occasion to refer in our address.

Algerian-Libyan Coalition

While the Algerian Government had already exposed its double play, dominated, not by any authentic spirit of liberation for the Sahara as a whole, but by other designs, it has now called upon another regime, that of Libya, with which it shares its affinities. The events known to the people of Chad, Tunisia and Uganda are there to give you a taste of what we are now experiencing in our country.

For history and for international opinion, the Algerian-Libyan coalition has reached a stage where it is very difficult for it to conceal its true objectives because the time has come to account for that obscure past and especially for the lives of our brothers and sisters who disappeared into Algeria and concerning whom we shall accept no bargaining, much less distortions of the facts.

When the Algerian Government claims to have nothing to do with this affair and particularly, when it proclaims from the rooftops that it is but a disinterested party regarding the destiny of this region, it is false.

It is false because the Algerian Government has always opted and planned in terms of the colonial policy laid down and followed by the colonizer, a policy and planning which were aimed purely and simply at the creation of a ministate that would have fallen right into the Algerian lap.

Tindouf

Allow me to make this clarification, which will be useful and instructive for the dossier which you have in your hands and for international public opinion as well. Regarding the 10 percent of our brothers and sisters, we shall continue to use these statements and accusations against the Algerian Government, which we hold responsible for their kidnapping, even their relocation, as long as the government which we accuse has not demonstrated the contrary by organizing a census and by agreeing to accept a committee of authentication.

As you know, the Algerian Government constantly displays the existence in its territory of refugees from our country.

Since the Algerian Government persists in its obstinacy, we have no other choice but to ask the UN High Commission on Refugees for a list of the names of these imaginary refugees. However, that commission has already informed us that the Algerian Government has refused to respect international conventions recommending the application of such a census. We have therefore understood that the Algerian Government is not refusing simply as a matter of form but because it is afraid that international opinion will discover its secret. I hope that you have understood because its attitude needs no further comment.

The silence which has thus far veiled the odious crimes of Tindouf is unpardonable. That is why we have decided to lift a corner of the veil and appeal to international justice. Whole families have been torn apart and subjected to constant blackmail because a relative was taken as a hostage at Tindouf and they face the worst forms of extortion. Children are tortured and delivered like cannon fodder to the intensive training of Qadhdhafi's Qadhdhafi's commandos. Those who have managed to deceive the vigilance of the repressive guards and get through the barbed wire have returned to Morocco and fled Algerian repression. Their accounts are an overwhelming indictment of Algeria and Libya. They describe Tindouf as a hell. They still carry the scars of torture and repression and predict a horrible future for those who did not manage to escape.

It is horrifying that Western opinion, so prompt to condemn any violation of human rights, should not have reacted to the calvary of Tindouf. Do all of our brothers have to be murdered so that men of good conscience will wake up? A murderous reality, one distorted by Algerian propaganda, is emerging and gaining in strength, unknown to public opinion but against it also, one resembling a holocaust.

Thank you.

MOREHOB

Speaking on behalf of the MOREHOB [Blue Men Resistance Movement], Bohoy Sidi Ahmed made the following report to the Committee of Wise Men:

First of all, I should like, before beginning my report, to outline the history of the movement for which I am the political spokesman and the representative to your committee. The MOREHOB was formed in 1969 in the territory under Spanish domination and it has cells throughout Europe and in neighboring countries. It is a petitioner to the United Nations and had an office in Algiers until the end of 1974, when it had to leave that country and break with its leaders, for it had been asked to deny the true purposes for which it had been formed -- that is, to fight Spanish colonial domination for the unconditional return of these provinces to the mother country of Morocco.

Bohoy said that in going to Algiers, the MOREHOB was seeking the opening of an office in order to be near other liberation movements, just as it had offices in several European countries.

Before concluding his speech, the representative of the MOREHOB read a memorandum addressed to the African chiefs of state and the Committee of Wise Men.

FLS

The committee then heard the speech by representatives of the Sahara Liberation Front, who explained that the Front has pursued its struggle against colonization for 25 years.

The representative of the FLS, Mr Zeroual, then drew the committee's attention to the kidnapping of Moroccan citizens of the Sahara and their imprisonment at Tindouf. He added that some of the kidnap victims have been forced to bear weapons against their brothers, adding that the residents of Saqiet El Hamra and Oued Ed-Dahab have expressed their will and renewed their allegiance of 1956 and after the recovery of the Saharan provinces. They have participated in the legislative and communal elections and actively contribute to the economic and social development of their country. Zeroual said that the only remaining problem in the Sahara is the one created by the vestiges of Algerian expansionism, which endeavor to cut Morocco off from the African continent by finding access to the Atlantic Ocean for the ores found in the region of Gara Jbilet, which the FLS considers to be an integral part of Moroccan territory.

Zeroual added that the FLS will remain faithful to its principles and will defend the territorial integrity of Morocco, just as it guarantees the security and rights of the Saharans imprisoned at Tindouf who return to their homeland. He asked the Committee of Wise Men to work for the liberation of the Tindouf prisoners because, he said, that in itself would be a historic success for the OAU and would help find a solution to the conflict between Morocco and Algeria.

FLU

In his speech, the representative of the FLU [Front for Liberation and Unity], Douihi Rachid, first of all thanked the members of the committee for hearing the views of one of the organizations which expresses the true will of the citizens of the Sahara.

He then explained the reasons that have caused Algeria to set up a puppet liberation movement. He added that any solution not taking the national sovereignty and Moroccan territorial integrity into account would not only not have any effect but would constitute an attack on the Saharans dignity.

In conclusion, he asked the committee to act in order to put an end to aggression against the Moroccan territory and for the liberation of Moroccan citizens imprisoned in the Tindouf camps.

Veterans of Liberation Army

The representative of the former resistors and veterans of the Liberation Army, Lahbib Habbouha, first of all said that the residents of Sakiet El Hamra and Oued Eddahab who contributed to the completion of the territorial integrity of their Moroccan homeland and who are setting an example for African liberation movements expect continental leaders to be concerned about preserving their dignity and the unity of their native land.

He then told the members of the committee that the former resistors and veterans of the Liberation Army are determined, if any decision should place the Moroccan nature of Saquiet El Hamra and Oued Addahab in doubt,

to take up arms again to defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the kingdom.

He added that the future of Africa would be extremely gloomy if mercenaries or nations with expansionistic aims should succeed in creating factitious ministates. He concluded that the authentic representatives of the inhabitants of the Sahara are proud of their Moroccan nationality and ready to defend it at the cost of any sacrifice because the national unity of Tangiers in Lagouira is more sacred than resolutions inspired by Algerian and Libyan greed.

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